Origo, pointing, and speech – the phenomenon of two non-identical origos on the gestural and verbal level
Ellen Fricke
Technische Universität Berlin

1. Introduction

How are origos created? How are they structured? In this short version of my paper (Fricke, 2002) I will give a short sequence of a route description that can only be analyzed adequately if the concept of origo in linguistic deixis theory will be widened or changed.

The term origo is introduced by Bühler (1934) and is conceptually understood as the origin of a coordinate system of subjective orientation (Bühler, 1934/1982a, p. 102), which is used to organize the personal, spatial, and temporal structure of utterances. Bühler (1990, p. 117) assumes one single origo for all dimensions, a mutual coordinate starting point for personal, local, and temporal deixis. The question arises whether the assumption of one origo is sufficient.

2. The phenomenon of two non-identical origos on the gestural and verbal level in the dimension of German local deixis

Does more than one origo exist within the local dimension? I will give an example that illustrates the phenomenon of two non-identical origos on the gestural and verbal level in German local deixis.

Let us consider more closely the following conversation section and the conceptual spatial relation LEFT OF verbalized as links von dir [on your left] in German. It is taken from video recordings of route descriptions at Potsdamer Platz in Berlin. Both communication partners are standing at the Infobox-exit of the Potsdamer Platz underground station, the starting point of the route. The section of the route talked about is not accessible to the perception of the speaker and the addressee. The beginning and end of the pointing gesture is marked by square brackets. Other co-speech gestures that appear are not considered in this context.
(1) Dann soll irgendwann links ein Arka/ ein Eingang zum Arkadenzentrum kommen oder so was. Ich kenns leider nich, aber es soll dann also [links von dir] irgendwann Arkaden, zwischen den Häusern irgendwann stehen und da sollst du reingehen, nach links, ja?
‘Then a bit later on the left there should be an ent/ an entrance to the mall or something like that. I don’t know it, unfortunately, but you should see a mall some time later [on your left] between the buildings and that’s where you have to go in, to the left, okay?’

Figure 1. Execution of the pointing gesture in example (1)
Let us now analyze the utterance. The following diagram summarizes the results of the instantiation of the origo and the deictic object in example (1):

Table 1. The conceptual relation LEFT OF in example (1)

The deictic object on the verbal and gestural level is the same, namely the entrance to the glass-covered shopping mall. On the verbal level the speaker localizes the mall with reference to the intrinsic coordinates of the addressee, who instantiates the origo.
However, if we include the gestural level in our analysis it is evident that, in contrast to the verbal localization, the speaker carries out the gestural localization of the deictic object referring to her own current intrinsic coordinates. We can observe that while the deictic objects at the verbal and gestural level are the same, the gestural and verbal origos differ. How is this finding to be interpreted?

3. Bühler’s three main cases of imagination-oriented deixis
For the verbal and gestural levels in example (1) the case of demonstratio ad oculos [ocular demonstration] is excluded: On the verbal level the origo is instaniated by the imagined addressee. Although there is a real perceptible demonstrative action on the gestural level, the deictic object is located in the imagined space and not in the perceptual space. According to Bühler this should be considered a case of imagination-oriented deixis on both levels.
Within this mode, Bühler distinguishes between three different main cases. The first main case of imagination-oriented deixis, is characterized by the fact that the deictic object is localized as an imaginary object within the actual perceptual space of speaker and addressee. The origo is instantiated by the speaker. (cf. Bühler, 1990, p. 150; cf. 1982a, p. 134).
In the second main case, however, the given order of actual perception is eliminated. The origo is displaced to new positions within perceptual space or imagined space. Thus, the uttered verbal deictics are not interpreted in relation to the current orientation of the speaker but rather in relation to an origo of an entity that is not the actual speaker himself (cf. Bühler, 1982a, p. 135). (I will leave out the third main case here because it is not relevant for the argument below)
If we transfer Bühler’s divison to our example, then for the gestural level only the first main case can be appropiate, because the pointing gesture is carried out in relation to the intrinsic coordinates of the actual speaker and localizes the mall as an imaginary object. The purely verbal utterance fulfills the criteria of the second main case: the origo is assumed by the imagined addressee, who is to follow the described imagined route after the current conversation. Thus, the circumstance of a divided origo or of two non-identical origos is maintained.

4. McNeill’s model of gestures as indicators of certain perspectives
Is our observation of a divided origo compatible with the characteristics of gestures interpreted as indicators of certain perspectives? According to McNeill (1985, 1992), the type of gesture execution can be used to determine whether the speaker assumes a protagonist’s viewpoint or an observer’s viewpoint, whereby the observer can be positioned inside or outside the described situation.

Let us transfer the first possibility to our example: does the speaker place herself in the shoes of the imaginary addressee? With her pointing gesture to the left, the speaker does not act like the imagined addressee, who follows the route on Potsdamer Platz. Instead, the speaker acts like a passer-by who provides directional information. This behavior provides an argument against a protagonist’s viewpoint. The speaker seems to adopt the role of an observer inside the situation. She integrates herself into the imagined space, assumes the origo herself and localizes the deictic object by abstract pointing within the gestural space. There is, consequently, no shift to the addressee on the gestural level.

The assignment of an inside observer viewpoint to the gestural behavior is compatible to the assignment of Bühler’s first main case. Thus, the contradiction of two different origos on the gestural and verbal level is not resolved so far.

5. The origo-allocating act
Considering the dimension of local deixis, how can the phenomenon of two non-identical origos as demonstrated in example (1) be explained? The following diagram illustrates the function of origo-allocation:



Figure 2. The origo-allocating act

On the one hand, we have the communicators in their roles as speaker and addressee. On the other hand, we have the object of communication, those entities that are talked about. In the communication process, the communicators alternately assume the roles of the speaker and the addressee. With the role of the speaker, the primary origo is acquired and, thereby, the possibility to intentionally allocate secondary origos to intrinsically arranged entities with a clear front and back, be these perceptual or imaginary. These intrinsically oriented entities can be any objects, people, and creatures, even the addressee and the speaker, in so far as they are objects of communication that are referred to in speech.

With the hierarchical organization of the origos as primary and secondary, the discrepancy of the local origos on the verbal and gestural levels in example (1) becomes clear: The speaker (primary origo) allocates a secondary local origo to the imaginary addressee on the verbal level. At the same time, on the gestural level she allocates a secondary local origo to her own body as an intrinsically oriented entity.

Since the body of the speaker is analogous to that of the imaginary addresse, the speaker allows herself to be understood as a model that represents the imaginary addressee to the speaker as well as to the addressee present in the actual communication. Thus, on the gestural level the speaker does not shift herself to the addressee but rather instantiates the origo by her own body, which functions as an iconic sign of the imaginary wanderer.

References

Bühler, Karl (1934/1982a). Sprachtheorie: Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. Stuttgart & New York: Fischer.
Bühler, Karl (1934/1990). Theory of language. The representational function of language. Translated by Goodwin, Donald Fraser. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Fricke, Ellen (in press/2002). Origo, pointing, and speech: the impact of co-speech gestures on linguistic deixis theory. Gesture 2, 2.
McNeill, David (1985). So you think gestures are nonverbal? Psychological Review, 92, 3, 350-371.
McNeill, David (1992). Hand and Mind. What Gestures Reveal about Thought. Chicago: Chicago University Press.