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Jason Abrevaya, Chair 2225 Speedway, Stop C3100, Austin, TX 78712 • Admin: 512-471-3211 & Advising: 512-471-2973

Eugenio J Miravete

Professor Ph.D., Northwestern University

Eugenio J Miravete

Contact

ECO 328 • Industrial Organization

34775 • Spring 2014
Meets TTH 200pm-330pm UTC 3.112
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THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIES AND MARKETS: COMPETITION, MONOPOLY, AND OLIGOPOLY; ANTITRUST POLICY AND ITS ALTERNATIVES.

PREREQUISITE: ECONOMICS 420K WITH A GRADE OF AT LEAST C-.

Industrial Organization is the study of imperfectly competitive markets. In this course, we will analyze the behavior on economic agents (consumers and firms) in such settings, as well as policy issues that arise therein. Topics we will cover include monopoly, oligopoly, product differentiation, entry deterrence, and the role of asymmetric information. Calculus and game theory will be our primary analytical tools. The goal of the course is to develop your understanding of the forces at work in many kinds of market interactions, as well as to foster your ability to think critically.If more information is needed contact instructor.

ECO 351K • Curr Iss In Business Economics

34290 • Fall 2012
Meets MW 1230pm-200pm BRB 1.120
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NEWLY EMERGING PROBLEMS IN BUSINESS AND THE APPROACHES USED FOR STRUCTURING, ANALYZING, AND TREATING THEM.

PREREQUISITE: ECONOMICS 420K WITH A GRADE OF AT LEAST C-.

The aim of this course is to learn about the how industries organize, and how, in practice, market structure, firms conduct, and the overall performance of firms are related. Overall, this course should provide with a wide and deep knowledge of the features of several US industries as they face an increasingly integrated world economy. We review the features and main competitive, technological, and regulatory challenges of several US industries in the age of globalization. Students will read scientific papers focusing on specific issues of these industries in order to introduce students to the latest empirical techniques and results of recent academic research ranging from the estimation of demand for differentiated products, to the possibility of foreclosure by vertical integration, or the ex-ante evaluation of mergers. Students will be responsible for presenting their work in class and write a term paper on a current issue affecting some American industry.

May be counted toward the writing flag requirement.

For more info visit here:http://www.eugeniomiravete.com/Courses/1.4142_EC351K/Syllabus%20351K.pdf

ECO 328 • Industrial Organization

33430 • Fall 2010
Meets MWF 1100am-1200pm BRB 2.136
show description

THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIES AND MARKETS: COMPETITION, MONOPOLY, AND OLIGOPOLY; ANTITRUST POLICY AND ITS ALTERNATIVES.

PREREQUISITE: ECONOMICS 420K WITH A GRADE OF AT LEAST C-.

Industrial Organization is the study of imperfectly competitive markets. In this course, we will analyze the behavior on economic agents (consumers and firms) in such settings, as well as policy issues that arise therein. Topics we will cover include monopoly, oligopoly, product differentiation, entry deterrence, and the role of asymmetric information. Calculus and game theory will be our primary analytical tools. The goal of the course is to develop your understanding of the forces at work in many kinds of market interactions, as well as to foster your ability to think critically.If more information is needed contact instructor.

ECO 384K • Industrial Organization

33760 • Spring 2010
Meets MW 1230pm-200pm BRB 1.120
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ECO 384K: INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Department of Economics
University of Texas at Austin


Eugenio J. Miravete - University of Texas at Austin and CEPR.

Office hours: Tuesdays, 14:00 - 16:00 or by appointment.

TA: Yizao Liu. Office hours TBA.

We will meet on Mondays and Wednesdays from 12:30 to 2:00 in BRB 1.120.

This course will go over an extense reading list focused around three topics: Testing for Asymmetric Information, Vertical Relationships, and Dynamic Oligopoly Models. The idea is to cover the first two topics before spring break and focus on the third during the rest of the semester.

This year, I am also teaching the first half of Econometrics III (ECO 392M). I will cover theoretical and applied single agent dynamic models in that class. The second half of this class is its natural continuation: it focuses on how to extend the tools of single agent dynamic models to dynamic games. Overall you will acquire a very up to date knowledge of the central issues of this promising area. Of course, you still have to get your hands dirty with data and coding to fully benefit from it.

Think of this class as an advanced seminar that should put you on your path to a dissertation rather than another problem solving hurdle. You will get from this class as much as you want to put on it. Please do not come to class and sit down there waiting for the lecture to end.

I will discuss the organizational details during our first meeting but in any case, I will assume you have read the papers ahead of each presentation (or at least reviewed them) so that we can have productive discussions in class.

Grading includes:

  • Three referee reports (45%).
  • One class presentation (30%).
  • A three-page final project (25%).

The final project will be due the last day of class (May 5). Referee reports are due at the beginning of the class where we discuss such paper. Class presentations should focus on one of the papers marked with [*]. They will be assigned on a first-come first-serve basis as your requests by e-mail hit my inbox. It is wise to request 2-3 papers in order of preference to solve the matching problem as quickly as possible.

In this page have included links to the papers that we will cover in class (some of these links will only work from campus computers). I have made links to either to JSTOR or to freely available versions on the web. Papers without link are additional readings that you may find useful if you want to pursue research ideas on these topics.

I will update this page regularly with additional readings and/or more accurate information. I will post my presentations shortly before being delivered. Remember, only the required paper reading will include a link.

At the end of this page you will also find links to the assignments for this part of the course and their due dates.

NOTEWORTHY

For the past couple of years I have been collecting links to conferences, journals and job market papers of interest for students interested in IO issues. I posted this information in the page of the past IO Writing Workshop. I have now updated these links: (ECO 387M).



READINGS

TESTING FOR ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

  • Abbring, J., P.-A. Chiappori, and J. Pinquet (2003): "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, pp. 767-820.
  • Altman, D., D. Cutler, and R. Zeckhauser (1998): "Adverse Selection and Adverse Retention," American Economic Review, 88, pp. 122-126.
  • Akerlof, G. (1970): "The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," Quarterly Journal of Economy, 85, pp. 488-500.
  • Ausubel, L. (1999): "Adverse Selection in the Credit Cards Market," University of Maryland working paper.
  • Cardon, J. and I. Hendel (2001): "Asymmetric Information in the Health Insurance Market: Evidence from the NMES," RAND Journal of Economics, 32, pp. 408-427. [* W: 1/27]
  • Chiappori, P., B. Jullien, B. Salanie, and F. Salanie (2006): "Asymmetric Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications," RAND Journal of Economics, 37, pp. 783-798.
  • Chiappori, P. (2001): "Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information," in Dionne, G.: Handbook of Insurance, Springer-Verlag.
  • Cutler, D. and S. Reber (2000): "Paying for Health Insurance: The Tradeoff Between Competition and Adverse Selection," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, pp. 433-466. [* M: 2/15]
  • Dionne, G., P.-C. Michaud, and M. Dahchour (2004): "Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection and Learning in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France," mimeo, University of Montreal.
  • Fang, H., M. P. Keane, and D. Silverman (2008): "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurace Market," Journal of Political Economy, 116, pp. 303-350. [* W: 2/10]
  • Finkelstein, A and J. Poterba (2002): "Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market," Economic Journal, 112, pp. 28-50.
  • Finkelstein, A and J. Poterba (2004): "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," Journal of Political Economy, 112, pp. 183-208. [* M: 2/1]
  • Finkelstein, A and K. McGarry (2006): "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market ," American Economic Review , 96, pp. 938-958. [* M: 2/8]

 

VERTICAL CONTRACTING

Concepts:

  • Bernheim, B. and M. Whinston (1985): "Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, 16, pp. 269-281.
  • Bernheim, B. and M. Whinston (1986): "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation and Economic Influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, pp. 1-31.
  • Rey, P. and J. Tirole (2007): "A Primer on Foreclosure," in M. Armstrong and R. Porter (eds.), "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Vol. 3, Elsevier.
  • Whinston, M. (2006): "Lectures on Antitrust Economics," MIT Press, chapter 4.
  • Whinston, M. (1990): "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, 80, pp. 837-859.

Vertical Pricing and Incentives:

  • Bresnahan, T. and P. Reiss (1985): "Dealer and Manufacturer Margins," RAND Journal of Economics, 16, pp. 253-268.
  • Shepard, A. (1993): "Contractual Form, retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing," RAND Journal of Economics, 24, pp. 58-77.
  • Slade, M. and F. Lafontaine (2001): "Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision," in K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson (eds.), "Advances in business Applications of Game Theory," Kluwer Academic Press.
  • Slade, M and F. Lafontaine (1997): "Retail Contracting: theory and Practice," Journal of Industrial Economics, 44, pp. 1-25.
  • Villas-Boas, S. (2007): "Vertical Relationships Between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference With Limited Data," The Review of Economic Studies, 74, pp. 625-652. [* M: 3/1]

Multilateral Relationslhips:

  • Corts, K. (2001): "The Strategic Effects of Vertical Market Structure: Common Agency and Divisionalization in the U.S. Motion Picture Industry," Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 10, pp. 509-528.

Exclusive Contracts:

  • Asker, J. (2004): "Measuring Advantages from Exclusive Dealing," mimeo NYU-Stern.
  • Marín, P. and R. Sicotte (2003): "Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping," Journal of Industrial Economics, 51, pp. 193-214.

Tying:

  • Evans, C., C. Grimm and C. Winston (1992): "Foreclosure of railroad markets: A Test of the Chicago Leverage Theory," Journal of Law and Economics, 35, pp. 295-310.
  • Slade, M. (1998): "The leverage theory of Tying Revisited: Evidence from Newspaper Advertising," Southern Economic Journal, 65, pp. 204-222.

Vertical Foreclosure:

  • Chipty, T. (2001): "Vertical integration, Market Foreclosure and Consumer Welfare in the Cable TV Industry," American Economic Review, 91, pp. 428-453.
  • Gilbert, R. and J. Hastings (2005): "Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Rising Rival's Costs," Journal of Industrial Economics, 53, pp. 469-492.
  • Heide, J., S. Dutta, and M. Bergen (1998): "Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency: Evidence from Industry Practice," Journal of Law and Economics, 41, pp. 387-407.
  • Hortacsu, A. and C. Syverson (2007): "Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, 115, pp. 250-301. [* W: 3/10]
  • Mullin, J. and W. Mullin (1997): "United States Steel's Acquisition of the Great Nothern Ore Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient contractual governance?," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 13, pp. 74-100.
  • Slade, M. (1998): "Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?," Economic Journal, 108, pp. 565-602.
  • Waterman, D. and A. Weiss (1996): "The Effects of Vertical Integration between Pay Cable Networks and Cable Television Systems," RAND Journal of Econometrics, 72, pp. 357-395.

 

DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLY MODELS

General References:

  • Ackerberg, D., L. Benkard, S. Berry and A. Pakes (2006): "Econometric Tools for Analyzing Market Outcomes," Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 6. North-Holland.
  • Doraszelski, U., and A. Pakes (2006): "A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3. North-Holland.
  • Miller, R. (1997): "Estimating Models of Dynamic Optimization with Microeconomic Data," Handbook of Applied Econometrics: Microeconomics, Blackwell.
  • Pakes, A. (1994): "Dynamic Structural Models: Problems and Prospects," Advances in Econometrics, Sixth World Congress, Cambridge.
  • Rust, J. (1994a): "Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes," Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 4. North-Holland.
  • Rust, J. (1994b): "Estimation of Dynamic Structural Models: Problems and Prospects - Discrete Decision Processes," Advances in Econometrics, Sixth World Congress, Cambridge.



SCHEDULE (Papers will be presented in this order)

Sequential Methods. March 22, 24, 29, 31. (Presentation)


Two-Step Methods. April 5, 7. (Presentation)


BBL Applications. April 12, 14. (Presentation)


Auctions. April 19, 21. (Presentation)

  • Jofre-Bonet, M. and M. Pesendorfer (2003): "Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game," Econometrica, 71, 1443-1489.


Constrained Optimization Methods. April 26, 28. (Presentation)


Durable Goods. May 2, 5. (Presentation)

 

EVALUATION: Reports, Assigments, and/or Final Exam.

  • ASSIGNMENT / FINAL EXAM: Description. Due in class, during our last meeting on Wednesday, May 6th.

ECO 392M • Econometrics III

33855 • Spring 2010
Meets T 500pm-800pm BRB 2.136
show description

EC 392M: ECONOMETRICS III
Department of Economics
University of Texas at Austin


Eugenio J. Miravete - University of Texas at Austin and CEPR.

Office hours: Tuesdays, 14:00 - 16:00 or by appointment.

TA: Zhan Shi. Office hours TBA.

We will meet on Tuesdays from 17:00 to 20:00 in BRB 2.136.

This class is intended to be a bridge between your previous courses and your next stage in the program: writing a dissertation. Take it seriously. It may prove more useful that you might think now. I will stress practical issues such as identification, motivation of the paper and importance of the research to succeed in academia. But do not worry, there will be enough methodology and notation in this first half of the semester to make you believe that I am not honoring my word.

I will cover the literature on empirical single agent dynamic models. There are several reasons to address dynamic models in this class. First, many economic decisions such as investment, R&D, innovations and others have dynamic consequences and thus, they should be approached by not ignoring their dynamic features. Second, developments in computing have made possible to consider much more complex problems than just one decade ago. Third, it is a vibrant field today, offering interesting research and job opportunities if you are able to master the techniques and come up with a sensible application. And last but no least, I want to avoid having a fifth year macro student walking into my office and explaining his/her dynamic model to me without previous knowledge of this literature (nor that his/her model is indeed a micro model).

The methods discussed in class have been applied in many areas. One important set of contributions that I will only mention from time to time are the dynamic structural models of labor. The other fast growing field deals with entry decisions and dynamic games. I will cover some of these applications in ECO 384K.

I have included links to the papers that I suggest to read for each topic (some of these links will only work from campus computers). I have made links to either to JSTOR or to freely available versions on the web. If some paper is not linked I guess that you will have to visit the library. I will assume that you have attempted to read the paper in advance so that we can discuss it rather than just digest what I throw at you.

I will update this page regularly with additional readings. I will post my presentations shortly before being delivered. I prefer to have the freedom of changing at the very last minute what I am going to teach depending on how the previous presentation goes. Remember, only the required paper reading will include a link.

At the end of this page you will also find links to the assignments for this part of the course and their due dates.



READINGS

I know that many of you are aware of the discussion between applied economists that favor reduced form methods over structural models. I am not going to get into that fight. In my work I have employed both methodologies at about 50/50 split. By nature though, dynamic models belong to the structural category. A good methodological paper to read on this subject is:

It is not a required reading, but at some point you should find time to go over it.

General References:

  • Ackerberg, D., L. Benkard, S. Berry and A. Pakes (2006): "Econometric Tools for Analyzing Market Outcomes," Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 6. North-Holland.
  • Doraszelski, U., and A. Pakes (2006): "A Framework for Applied Dynamic Analysis in Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3. North-Holland.
  • Miller, R. (1997): "Estimating Models of Dynamic Optimization with Microeconomic Data," Handbook of Applied Econometrics: Microeconomics, Blackwell.
  • Pakes, A. (1994): "Dynamic Structural Models: Problems and Prospects," Advances in Econometrics, Sixth World Congress, Cambridge.
  • Rust, J. (1994a): "Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes," Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 4. North-Holland.
  • Rust, J. (1994b): "Estimation of Dynamic Structural Models: Problems and Prospects - Discrete Decision Processes," Advances in Econometrics, Sixth World Congress, Cambridge.


Motivation and Introduction. January 19.


Nested Fixed Point Algorithm. January 26.


NFXP Identification and Applications. Frebuary 2.

  • Das, M. (1992): "A Micro-Econometric Model of Capital Utilization and Retirement: The Case of the Cement Industy," Review of Economic Studies, 59, 277-297.
  • Kennet, M. (1993): "Did Deregulation Affect Aircraft Engine Maintenance? An Empirical Policy Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, 24, 542-558.
  • Kennet, M. (1994): "A Structural Model of Aircraft Engine Maintenance," Journal of Applied Econometrics, 9, 351-368.


Conditional Choice Probability. February 9.


CCP Extensions. February 16.

  • Hotz, J., R. Miller, S. Sanders, and J. Smith (1994): "A Simulation Estimator for Dynamic Models of Discrete Choice," Review of Economic Studies, 61, 265-289.


CCP Applications. February 23.

  • Hollifield, B., R. Miller, and P. Sandas (2004): "Empirical Analysis of Limit Order Markets," Review of Economic Studies, 71, 1027-1063.
  • Slade, M. (1998): "Optimal Pricing with Costly Adjustment: Evidence from Retail Grocery Stores," Review of Economic Studies, 65, 87-108.


Approximation to Continuous State Variables. March 2.


More Applications. March 9.

 

EVALUATION: Reports, Assigments, and/or Final Exam. The assignments below account for 50% of your total grade in this class. Percentages between parentheses indicate the weight of each assignment out of this 50%.

  • Assignment 1: A short assignment will be posted here on February 2nd. Due at the beginning of class on Tuesday, February 16th. (30%)
  • ASSIGNMENT / FINAL EXAM: An assigment will be posted here on March 2nd. Due by 5:00pm on Friday, March 12th. (50%)

 

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