PHL 301 Practice Exam 2 Identify a. Augustine b. Descartes c. Hume d. Locke e. Leibniz f. Zhuangzi 1. . . . even if the whole human race were fast asleep, it would still be necessarily true that three times three are nine. 2. ... this proposition I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it or conceive it in my mind. 3. . . . all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid.... 4. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning. 5. . . . the true sage rejects all distinctions of this and that. 6. All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except so far as the relation of parts -gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union, as we have already observed. 7. For, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. 8. How do I know that love of life is not a delusion after all? How do I know but that he who dreads to die is not as a child who has lost the way and cannot find his home? 9. I am certain that either there is only one world or there are more worlds than one. I am likewise certain that if there are more worlds than one, their number is either finite or infinite. 10. In fact, I believe that the senses are not untrustworthy either because deranged persons suffer illusions, or because we see things wrongly when we are asleep. If the senses correctly intimate things to the vigilant and the sane, it is no affair of theirs what the mind of a sleeping or insane person may fancy for itself. 11. Separation is the same as construction: construction is the same as destruction. Nothing is subject to either construction or destruction, for these conditions are brought together into One. 12. 'Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the senses. 13. When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion. 14. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should exist- even if I were deceived- certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know that I know. 15. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. 16. The objective emanates from the subjective; the subjective is consequent upon the objective. 17. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd. 18. . . . .it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. 19. But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and feels. 20. A keeper of monkeys said with regard to their rations of chestnuts that each monkey was to have three in the morning and four at night. But at this the monkeys were very angry, so the keeper said they might have four in the morning and three at night, with which arrangement they were all well pleased. 21. And as these objects are immediate objects of our understanding and are always present (although they cannot always be consciously perceived because of our distractions and wants), why should it be surprising that we say that these ideas, along with all that depends on them, are innate in us? 22. All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. 23. Therefore it is that, viewed from the standpoint of Dao, a beam and a pillar are identical. 24. For, where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them. 25. The inference, "I heard thunder; so, there must have been lightning," is best understood as a. deductive b. mathematical c. causal d. an analogy e. irrational 26. When Socrates implies that you must be able to define courage and defend your definition to know what courage is, he is assuming a. realism b. skepticism c. relativism d. internalism e. externalism 27. Internalists typically take knowledge to be a. true belief b. justified true belief c. true belief arising from a reliable process d. indefinable e. impossible 28. Which is NOT an option for an internalist? a. there are self-evident truths b. knowledge has no foundation c. sensations can justify knowledge directly d. some knowledge is not justified e. some knowledge justifies itself 29. Judgment rationalism is the thesis that some knowledge is a. direct b. derived from experience c. perceptual d. inferential e. innate 30. Empiricists contend that which of these classes of propositions match exactly? a. analytic & necessary b. analytic and a priori c. contingent & a posteriori d. synthetic & a posteriori e. all of the above 31. Leibniz asks "whether the soul, in itself, is entirely empty, like a writing tablet on which nothing has yet been written." Someone who answers "no" is a(n) a. empiricist b. rationalist c. idealist d. realist e. skeptic 32. The theory of knowledge of the Nyayasutra is a. foundationalist b. skeptical c. internalist d. externalist e. Buddhist 33. Externalists typically take knowledge to be a. true belief b. justified true belief c. true belief arising from a reliable process d. indefinable e. impossible 34. That different people see things differently, and there's no way to tell who's right, is a classic argument for a. atheism b. skepticism c. relativism d. internalism e. empiricism 35. Rationalists have proposed all of these as synthetic a priori truths, EXCEPT a. nothing is made from nothing b. the whole is greater than its parts c. every event has a cause d. every effect has a cause e. happiness is intrinsically good 36. If mathematics is necessary, then, according to empiricists, it must be a. analytic b. synthetic a priori c. synthetic a posteriori d. innate e. false 37. Hume asserts that induction rests on the assumption that a. the future resembles the past b. logic is certain c. logic is truth-preserving d. the world is eternal e. mathematics is analytically true 38. The traditional Nyaya sources of knowledge include perception, analogy, a. sensation and reflection b. inference and comparison c. inference and sensation d. inference and testimony e. testimony and reflection 39. All of the following advance foundationalist theories of knowledge, EXCEPT a. Descartes b. Locke c. Hume d. Nyayasutra e. Augustine 40. Augustine and Descartes disagree about our ability to doubt our knowledge that a. I am b. I think c. cats meow d. 1 + 1 = 2 e. water freezes 41. The sceptic charges that we can't tell which perceptions we should trust. This is the problem of a. knowledge b. perception c. relativity d. the criterion e. the subjective 42. "If I would make any proposition whatever, then by that I would have a logical error; But I do not make a proposition, therefore I am not in error." Nagarjuna here replies to the objection that a. communication is impossible b. skeptics cannot live their skepticism c. skepticism is self-refuting d. skepticism leads to an infinite regress e. epistemic role depends on context 43. Morality is a matter of feeling, not of reason, Hume says, because morality a. influences actions and affections b. varies person to person c. varies with time and circumstance d. is unknowable e. is incoherent 44. Descartes concludes from the cogito that a. I am b. I am a thing that thinks c. I am essentially a thinking thing d. I can know my own mind more securely than anything else e. all of the above 45. Which of the following is synthetic? a. Money is money b. Stocks will go either up or down c. When it rains, it rains d. You'll either give me your money, or else you won't e. None of the above 46. According to all enlightenment philosophers, judgments are ____ if and only if they are _____. a. Analytic, a priori b. Analytic, necessary c. Necessary, a priori d. Synthetic, a posteriori e. Synthetic, contingent 47. Locke contends that ____ implies ___. a. Concept empiricism, concept rationalism b. Concept empiricism, judgment empiricism c. Concept rationalism, judgment empiricism d. Concept rationalism, judgment rationalism e. Judgment empiricism, concept empiricism 48. Hume argues that inductive reasoning has no a posteriori justification, for a. Even if observed ravens have been black, the next one might be white b. Such an appeal to experience is just what's at issue c. All justification is a priori d. Inductive reasoning is illegitimate e. Induction does not originate in impressions 49. A crucial premise in the argument from variability: a. Our senses often deceive us b. The demand for justification leads to an infinite regress c. There is no neutral way to tell which perceptions are accurate d. We cannot tell we are dreaming while we are dreaming e. We would need another source of knowledge for our sources of knowledge 50. Nagarjuna's argument can be seen as an externalist version of a. The argument from illusion b. The argument from comparison c. The argument from dreaming d. The argument from variability e. The problem of the criterion