PHL 301 Practice Exam 2 Identify a. Augustine b. Plato c. Locke d. Leibniz e. Zhuangzi 1. . . . even if the whole human race were fast asleep, it would still be necessarily true that three times three are nine. 2. In fact, I believe that the senses are not untrustworthy either because deranged persons suffer illusions, or because we see things wrongly when we are asleep. If the senses correctly intimate things to the vigilant and the sane, it is no affair of theirs what the mind of a sleeping or insane person may fancy for itself. 3. Separation is the same as construction: construction is the same as destruction. Nothing is subject to either construction or destruction, for these conditions are brought together into One. 4. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should exist- even if I were deceived- certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know that I know. 5. Since I think I may be confident, that, whoever should see a creature of his own shape or make, though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call him still a man; or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a cat or a parrot; and say, the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent rational parrot. 6. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well. 7. . . . how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? 8. . . . it being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person. . . . 9. A keeper of monkeys said with regard to their rations of chestnuts that each monkey was to have three in the morning and four at night. But at this the monkeys were very angry, so the keeper said they might have four in the morning and three at night, with which arrangement they were all well pleased. 10. it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. 11. For, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. 12. I am certain that either there is only one world or there are more worlds than one. I am likewise certain that if there are more worlds than one, their number is either finite or infinite. a. Descartes b. Plato c. Hume d. Leibniz e. Zhuangzi 13. 'Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the senses. 14. When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion. 15. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos'd. 16. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. 17. And as these objects are immediate objects of our understanding and are always present (although they cannot always be consciously perceived because of our distractions and wants), why should it be surprising that we say that these ideas, along with all that depends on them, are innate in us? 18. All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. 19. Therefore it is that, viewed from the standpoint of Dao, a beam and a pillar are identical. 20. For, where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them. 21. . . . all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid.... 22. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning. 23. . . . the true sage rejects all distinctions of this and that. 24. ... this proposition I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it or conceive it in my mind. 25. How do I know that love of life is not a delusion after all? How do I know but that he who dreads to die is not as a child who has lost the way and cannot find his home? 26. Descartes concludes from the cogito that a. I am b. I am a thing that thinks c. I am essentially a thinking thing d. I can know my own mind more securely than anything else e. all of the above 27. When Princess Elizabeth writes, ""I ask you to tell me how man's soul, being only a thinking substance, can determine animal spirits so as to cause voluntary actions," she raises the problem of a. personal identity b. sensation c. rationality d. free will e. mental causation 28. If Socrates could be reincarnated as Caesar Borgia, Locke says, they might be a. different human beings, but the same person b. different persons, but the same human being c. different persons, but the same animal d. different persons and different human beings e. different persons and different animals 29. The inference, "I heard thunder; so, there must have been lightning," is best understood as a. deductive b. mathematical c. causal d. an analogy e. irrational 30. When Socrates implies that you must be able to define courage and defend your definition to know what courage is, he is assuming a. realism b. skepticism c. relativism d. internalism e. externalism 31. Internalists typically take knowledge to be a. true belief b. justified true belief c. true belief arising from a reliable process d. indefinable e. impossible 32. Which is NOT an option for an internalist? a. there are self-evident truths b. knowledge has no foundation c. sensations can justify knowledge directly d. some knowledge is not justified e. some knowledge justifies itself 33. Judgment rationalism is the thesis that some knowledge is a. direct b. derived from experience c. perceptual d. inferential e. innate 34. Empiricists contend that which of these classes of propositions match exactly? a. analytic & necessary b. analytic and a priori c. contingent & a posteriori d. synthetic & a posteriori e. all of the above 35. Leibniz asks "whether the soul, in itself, is entirely empty, like a writing tablet on which nothing has yet been written." Someone who answers "no" is a(n) a. empiricist b. rationalist c. idealist d. realist e. skeptic 36. The theory of knowledge of the Nyayasutra is a. foundationalist b. skeptical c. internalist d. externalist e. Buddhist 37. That different people see things differently, and there's no way to tell who's right, is a classic argument for a. atheism b. skepticism c. relativism d. internalism e. empiricism 38. Rationalists have proposed all of these as synthetic a priori truths, EXCEPT a. nothing is made from nothing b. the whole is greater than its parts c. every event has a cause d. every effect has a cause e. happiness is intrinsically good 39. If mathematics is necessary, then, according to empiricists, it must be a. analytic b. synthetic a priori c. synthetic a posteriori d. innate e. false 40. Hume asserts that induction rests on the assumption that a. the future resembles the past b. logic is certain c. logic is truth-preserving d. the world is eternal e. mathematics is analytically true 41. The traditional Nyaya sources of knowledge include perception, analogy, a. sensation and reflection b. inference and comparison c. inference and sensation d. inference and testimony e. testimony and reflection 42. All of the following advance foundationalist theories of knowledge, EXCEPT a. Descartes b. Locke c. Hume d. Nyayasutra e. Augustine 43. Augustine and Descartes disagree about our ability to doubt our knowledge that a. I am b. I think c. cats meow d. 1 + 1 = 2 e. water freezes 44. The sceptic charges that we can't tell which perceptions we should trust. This is the problem of a. knowledge b. perception c. relativity d. the criterion e. the subjective 45. "If I would make any proposition whatever, then by that I would have a logical error; But I do not make a proposition, therefore I am not in error." Nagarjuna here replies to the objection that a. communication is impossible b. skeptics cannot live their skepticism c. skepticism is self-refuting d. skepticism leads to an infinite regress e. epistemic role depends on context 46. Which of the following is synthetic? a. Money is money b. Stocks will go up c. When it rains, it rains d. You'll either give me your money, or else you won't e. None of the above 47. According to all enlightenment philosophers, judgments are ____ if and only if they are _____. a. Analytic, a priori b. Analytic, necessary c. Necessary, a priori d. Synthetic, a posteriori e. Synthetic, contingent 48. Locke contends that ____ implies ___. a. Concept empiricism, concept rationalism b. Concept empiricism, judgment empiricism c. Concept rationalism, judgment empiricism d. Concept rationalism, judgment rationalism e. Judgment empiricism, concept empiricism 49. Hume argues that inductive reasoning has no a posteriori justification, for a. Even if observed ravens have been black, the next one might be white b. Such an appeal to experience is just what's at issue c. All justification is a priori d. Inductive reasoning is illegitimate e. Induction does not originate in impressions 50. A crucial premise in the argument from variability: a. Our senses often deceive us b. The demand for justification leads to an infinite regress c. There is no neutral way to tell which perceptions are accurate d. We cannot tell we are dreaming while we are dreaming e. We would need another source of knowledge for our sources of knowledge 51. Nagarjuna's argument can be seen as an externalist version of a. The argument from illusion b. The argument from comparison c. The argument from dreaming d. The argument from variability e. The problem of the criterion