Thomas Aquinas and Divine Command Theory
,Dougherty,-M-V
Proceedings-of-the-American-Catholic-Philosophical-Association. 2002; 76: 153-164
Nearly all attempts to include Aquinas among the class of divine command theorists have focused on two kinds of texts: those exhibiting Aquinas's treatment of the apparent immoralities of the patriarchs (e.g., Abraham's intention to kill Isaac), and those pertaining to Aquinas's discussion of the divine will. In the present paper, I lay out a third approach unrelated to these two. I argue that Aquinas's explicit endorsement of one ethical proposition as self-evident throughout his writings is sufficient justification to include Aquinas among the class of divine command theorists. (edited)
Obligation, Divine Commands and Abraham's Dilemma
,Quinn,-Philip-L
Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-Research. Mr 02; 64(2): 459-466
This paper is devoted to a critical examination of the divine command account of obligation offered by Robert M. Adams in his Finite and Infinite Goods. First it considers questions about the way Adams formulates his account and criticizes his arguments for preferring a divine command theory of obligation to rival divine will theories. Then it discusses the inconsistency apparently created by the divine command to Abraham to kill his innocent son. Its main argument is that Adams has not shown that the Kantian resolution he favors, according to which there really is no such command, is superior to the Kierkegaard solution, according to which it is not wrong for Abraham to kill his son.
Divine Commands at the Foundations of Morality
,Shaw,-Joseph
Canadian-Journal-of-Philosophy. S 02; 32(3): 419-440
A 'pure' divine command theory claims that all obligations derive from divine commands. This incoherently suggests that the obligation to obey commands follows from commands. In addition it implies that God has no reason or motivation not to command bad, unknowable or impossible things. The first argument also holds against a theory which says that God is the source of obligations but not values. A 'mixed' theory, held by Duns Scotus and Aquinas, in which some, but not all, obligations derive from divine commands, avoids all these objections and satisfies the most important theistic intuitions about God's relationship with morality.
Cudworth and Quinn
,Hooker,-Brad
Analysis O 01; 61(4): 333-335
The divine command theory of ethics makes moral rightness depend upon God's commands. Cudworth objected that the divine command theory wrongly implies that, were God to command that we torture an innocent child to death, this command would make our torturing an innocent child to death morally right. One of the things that Philip Quinn's chapter in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory tries to do is to answer Cudworth's objection. My paper argues that Quinn's answer to Cudworth is unsatisfactory.
"Divine Command Theory" in "The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory", LaFollette, Hugh (ed)
,Quinn,-Philip-L
PB: Blackwell : Cambridge, 2000
This article surveys historical and contemporary discussions of divine command morality. It starts with a precise formulation of a divine command theory of moral requirement, permission and prohibition. Next it supports this theory with a cumulative case argument consisting of four parts. Then it presents and offers defenses against five important objections. Its conclusion is that theory should be very attractive to ethical theorists who are monotheists.
Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation
,Murphy,-Mark-C
Faith-and-Philosophy. Ja 98; 15(1): 3-27
In this article I consider the respective merits of three interpretations of divine command theory. On DCT1, S's being morally obligated to X depends on God's command that S X; on DCT2, that moral obligation depends on God's willing that S be morally obligated to X; on DCT3, that moral obligation depends on God's willing that S X. I argue that the positive reasons that have been brought forward in favor of DCT1 have implications theists would find disturbing and that the positive reasons brought forward in favor of DCT2 support only a weak formulation of DCT2 that is indistinguishable from other theistic moral theories. DCT3 is, however, a distinctive theory that theists have strong reasons to affirm. (edited)
The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics.
,QUINN,-Philip-L
Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-Research. Fall 90; 345-365
This paper begins with a review of recent philosophical work on divine command ethics. Its central sections set forth two arguments for the divine command conception of morality. Following a tradition of medieval commentary, I try to show that a divine command theory best explains the scriptural cases of the immoralities of the patriarchs. I go on to argue that such a theory is a consequence of a strong version of the doctrine of divine sovereignty.
IS THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY DEFENSIBLE?
,CHANDLER,-J-H
Religious-Studies. S 84; 20: 443-452
THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT PHILIP QUINN'S RECENT DEFENSE OF THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY (IN HIS BOOK "DIVINE COMMANDMENTS AND MORAL REQUIREMENTS") FAILS TO REBUT SEVERAL STANDARD OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY. IN PARTICULAR, HE FAILS TO SHOW THAT A SUPPORTER OF THE THEORY CAN CONSISTENTLY JUDGE GOD TO BE GOOD IN A SIGNIFICANT SENSE. IT IS ALSO ARGUED THAT A FULL-BLOODED DIVINE COMMAND THEORY SUCH AS QUINN'S IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH MORAL AUTONOMY.
DIVINE COMMAND THEORIES AND THE APPEAL TO LOVE.
,CHANDLER,-JOHN
American-Philosophical-Quarterly. JL 85; 22: 231-239
SEVERAL RECENT WRITERS, AMONG THEM R M ADAMS, E WIERENGA AND R BURCH, HAVE SOUGHT TO MODIFY THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY IN ORDER TO OVERCOME WELL-KNOWN DEFECTS IN ITS SIMPLE FORM. AN EMPHASIS ON GOD'S NATURE AS LOVING, IN ADDITION TO THE ROLE OF HIS WILL IN DETERMINING RIGHTNESS, OVERCOMES THESE PROBLEMS. IT IS ARGUED HOWEVER THAT THE MODIFIED THEORY IS NOT A GENUINE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY. IN ORDER FOR LOVE TO PERFORM THE TASKS REQUIRED, THERE MUST BE CO-EXTENSIVENESS BETWEEN THE PROPERTIES OF BEING A LOVING ACT, OR BEING THE ACT A LOVING BEING WOULD PERFORM, AND BEING MORALLY REQUIRED. BUT, IT IS ARGUED, IF THIS IS THE CASE, GOD'S WILL BECOMES REDUNDANT TO MORALITY. IN FACT, IT IS ARGUED THAT IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER CO-EXTENSIVENESS OBTAINS.
A DEFENSIBLE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY.
,WIERENGA,-EDWARD
Nous S 83; 17: 387-408
I FIRST FORMULATE A VERSION OF THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY OF ETHICS AND THEN ARGUE THAT THIS VERSION OF THE THEORY CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED AGAINST A VARIETY OF INITIALLY IMPRESSIVE OBJECTIONS.
DIVINE COMMANDS AND MORAL REQUIREMENTS.
,QUINN,-PHILIP-L
PB: CLARENDON-PR : OXFORD, 1978
THIS BOOK DEALS WITH DIVINE COMMAND THEORIES OF ETHICS, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE MORAL STATUS OF HUMAN ACTIONS DEPENDS UPON THE WILL OF GOD. IT CHALLENGES AND ATTEMPTS TO REFUTE THE VIEW, COMMON AMONG CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS, THAT SUCH THEORIES ARE KNOWN TO BE FALSE OR CONCEPTUALLY INCOHERENT. IT IS ARGUED THAT HUMAN MORAL AUTONOMY IS COMPATIBLE WITH UNQUALIFIED OBEDIENCE TO DIVINE COMMANDS. SEVERAL VERSIONS OF DIVINE COMMAND THEORY ARE FORMULATED AND DEFENDED AGAINST A BATTERY OF POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS. CONNECTIONS ARE MADE BETWEEN DIVINE COMMAND THEORIES AND RECENT FORMAL WORK IN THE LOGIC OF REQUIREMENT AND DEONTIC LOGIC.
DE: AUTONOMY-; DEONTIC-LOGIC; DIVINE-IMPERATIVE; JUSTICE-; LOVE-; MERCY-; MORAL-PRINCIPLE; MORALITY-; OBEDIENCE-; OBLIGATION-; POSSIBLE-WORLD; RELIGION-
Predestination
Is Molinism as Bad as Calvinism?
,WALLS,-JERRY-L
Faith-and-Philosophy. Ja 90; 7(1): 85-98
This paper compares the theories of providence and predestination in Molinism and Calvinism. My particular concern is with whether Molinism is beset with the same sort of disturbing moral implications which plague Calvinism. I conclude that Molinism is better off than Calvinism in this regard, but still fails to give us a satisfactory account of God's goodness and will to save all persons. I suggest an amended version of Molinism to repair this difficulty, according to which God gives all persons an optimal amount of grace and equal opportunity to respond to it.
DETERMINISM AND THE HIDDENNESS OF GOD IN CALVIN'S THEOLOGY.
,KINLAW,-C-JEFFERY
Religious-Studies. D 88; 24: 497-509
THE PAPER ARGUES THAT CALVIN IS A DETERMINIST IN THAT ALL EVENTS FOLLOW NECESSARILY FROM GOD'S WILL. THIS DIVINE WILL IS A HIDDEN AND INEFFABLE WILL AND IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE DIVINE DECREES OF PREDESTINATION. CALVIN'S INVESTMENT IN AN UTTERLY HIDDEN GOD THAT STANDS OUTSIDE ANY POSSIBLE RELATION AND ON WHOM ALL EVENTS DEPEND UNDERMINES KNOWLEDGE OF GOD, CHRISTOCENTRIC THEOLOGY, AND THE ASSURANCE OF SALVATION.
A FABLE OF FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM.
,WALLS,-J-L
Philosophy JA 87; 62: 67-75
THIS PAPER DEALS WITH SOME MISLEADING THOUGHTS WHICH INCLINE US TO THINK FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM ARE INCOMPATIBLE. I BEGIN WITH A STORY WHICH ILLUSTRATES SOME OF THESE. ONE SUCH THOUGHT IS THAT GOD SEEMS TO DETERMINE OUR FUTURE BY WITHHOLDING FROM US INFORMATION CONCERNING OUR CHOICES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES. IF WE HAD SUCH INFORMATION, WE WOULD SOMETIMES MAKE DIFFERENT CHOICES. I ALSO SUGGEST POSSIBLE REASONS WHY GOD DOES NOT GIVE US SUCH INFORMATION.
THE GOD OF THE PHILOSOPHERS.
,KENNY,-ANTHONY
PB: CLARENDON-PR : OXFORD, 1979
THIS BOOK IS BASED ON THE WILDE LECTURES IN NATURAL RELIGION IN OXFORD IN 1970-1972. IT IS A STUDY OF SOME OF THE PRINCIPLE ATTRIBUTES TRADITIONALLY ASCRIBED TO GOD IN WESTERN THEISM, IN PARTICULAR OF OMNISCIENCE AND OMNIPOTENCE. IT DEALS COMPREHENSIVELY WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM, FROM BOTH A HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL VIEWPOINT. TOPICS TREATED INCLUDE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE OF ETERNAL TRUTHS; DIVINE KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE; THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OMNISCIENCE, ETERNITY, AND TIME; DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM AND THEIR RELATION TO DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION AND THE DEFINITION OF OMNIPOTENCE.
SOME REFLECTIONS ON PREDESTINATION, PROVIDENCE AND DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE.
,HEBBLETHWAITE,-B-L
Religious-Studies. D 79; 15: 433-448
IT IS A NECESSARY IMPLICATION OF THE CREATION OF A TEMPORALLY STRUCTURED WORLD WITH A GENUINELY OPEN FUTURE THAT NOT EVEN OMNISCIENCE KNOWS THE FUTURE. THE DOCTRINES OF PREDESTINATION AND PROVIDENCE ARE EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THIS CONCLUSION. GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT HE WILL DO IN BRINGING THE CREATIVE PROCESS TO COMPLETION MUST INCLUDE A RANGE OF DIFFERENT POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO WHAT HIS CREATURES DO. THE ARGUMENT IS EXTENDED TO INCLUDE THE ROLE OF CHANCE IN THE MATERIAL CREATION AS WELL AS THAT OF FREEDOM IN MAN. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEODICY OF SUCH A VIEW ARE MENTIONED.
A REJOINDER TO O'CONNOR.
,BECKER,-LAWRENCE-C
Mind JA 75; 84: 95
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION RE-EXAMINED.
,O'CONNOR,-JOHN
Mind JA 75; 84: 94
THIS NOTE CLAIMS THAT AN ARGUMENT OF L BECKER'S DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT, GIVEN CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT GOD AND CREATION EVERYTHING IS PREDESTINED, TWICE COMMITS A MODAL FALLACY AND IS THEREFORE UNSUCCESSFUL.
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION.
,BECKER,-LAWRENCE
Mind JA 72; 81: 138-141
BY FOCUSING ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ASSUMPTION ALWAYS MADE BUT RARELY EMPHASIZED IN DISCUSSIONS OF PREDESTINATION (THAT GOD KNEW, AS HE CREATED THE UNIVERSE, EVERY DETAIL OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN IT), IT CAN BE SHOWN STRAIGHTFORWARDLY THAT FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM ARE INCOMPATIBLE.
EVIL AND THE GOD OF LOVE.
,HICK,-JOHN
PB: HARPER-and-ROW : NY, 1966
ONE OF THE MOST THOROUGH DISCUSSIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL EVER PUBLISHED. ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF THE BOOK IS DEVOTED TO THE HISTORY OF THEODICIES; THE REMAINDER IS CONCERNED WITH THE DEFENSE OF HICK'S OWN THEODICY. THE HISTORICAL PART IS DIVIDED INTO "THE AUGUSTINIAN TYPE OF THEODICY" AND "THE IRENAEAN TYPE OF THEODICY." INCLUDED IN THE AUGUSTINIAN SECTION ARE DISCUSSIONS OF AQUINAS, CALVIN, LEIBNIZ, AND BARTH AS WELL AS AN ANALYSIS OF AUGUSTINE HIMSELF. HICK ENDS THIS SECTION WITH A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT HE BELIEVES ARE THE BASIC SHORTCOMINGS OF THE AUGUSTINIAN POSITION. THE IRENAEAN POSITION, INSTEAD OF EMPHASIZING THE FALL AS THE AUGUSTINIAN POSITION DOES, FINDS THE JUSTIFICATION OF EVIL IN AN INFINITE GOOD WHICH GOD IS BRINGING OUT OF THE TEMPORAL PROCESS. INCLUDED IN THE IRENAEAN SECTION ARE SCHLEIERMACHER, F R TENNANT AND AUSTIN FARRER. HICK'S OWN VIEW HE REGARDS AS A MODIFICATION OF THE IRENAEAN POSITION. HE OFFERS A LENGTHY DEFENSE OF THIS"THEODICY FOR TODAY" IN THE FACE OF CRITICISMS ADVANCED BY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHERS FROM HUME TO THE PRESENT DAY. (BP)
Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will
On an Attempt to Demonstrate the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom
,Brueckner,-Anthony
Faith-and-Philosophy. Ja 00; 17(1): 132-134
Ted A. Warfield seeks to establish the compatibility in question by getting the incompatibilist to reject an unpersuasive argument from fatalism to the conclusion that a given action is not freely done. He maintains that such a rejection requires the incompatibilist to hold that there is a possible world in which the fatalist's premise is true and in which the conclusion is false (and so the given action is freely done). If a foreknowing God exists in that world, then incompatibilism must be rejected. I criticize this reasoning on the ground that one can reject a bad argument from true premises without countenancing a possible world in which the premises are true and yet the conclusion false.
Freedom and Foreknowledge
,Tooley,-Michael
Faith-and-Philosophy. Ap 00; 17(2): 212-224
In her book, "The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge", Linda Zagzebski suggests that among the strongest ways of supporting the thesis that libertarian free will is incompatible with divine foreknowledge is what she refers to as the "accidental necessity argument". Zagzebski contends, however, that at least three satisfactory responses to that argument are available. I argue that two of the proposed solutions are open to strong objections, and that the third, although it may very well handle the specific versions of the "accidental necessity argument" that Zagzebski considers, fails when confronted with a stronger version of the "accidental necessity" line of argument.
Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
,Vihvelin,-Kadri
Canadian-Journal-of-Philosophy. Mr 00; 30(1): 1-23
The traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was based on the assumption that if determinism deprives us of free will and moral responsibility, it does so by making it true that we can never do other than what we actually do. All parties to the debate took for granted the truth of a claim now widely known as "the principle of alternate possibilities": someone is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise. In a famous paper, Harry Frankfurt argued that the principle of alternate possibilities is false. I argue that Frankfurt's argument rests on a modal fallacy.
On Freedom and Foreknowledge: A Reply to Two Critics
,Warfield,-Ted-A
Faith-and-Philosophy Ap 00; 17(2): 255-259
No Easy Way Out: A Response to Warfield
,Hasker,-William
Nous S 98; 32(3): 361-363
Ted A. Warfield's claim to show that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible is mistaken. His argument does, however, establish a weaker conclusion that possesses a certain explanatory value and may possibly have been confused with the one he claims to have proved.
Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Are Compatible
,Warfield,-Ted-A
Nous Mr 97; 31(1): 80-86
Does Theological Fatalism Rest on an Equivocation?
,Hunt,-David-P
American-Philosophical-Quarterly. Ap 95; 32(2): 153-165
A well-known objection to "theological fatalism" is that God's past beliefs about what is yet future amount to no more than "soft" facts about the past. One cost of this approach is that it makes divine beliefs mysteriously different from human beliefs. The present paper avoids such special pleading by charging the fatalist instead with an equivocation between two ordinary and unmysterious senses of 'belief': "occurrent" and"dispositional". While arguing that dispositional foreknowledge can be conceived in such a way that the fatalistic implications of occurrent foreknowledge are avoided, the paper nevertheless identifies a residual problem which remains impervious to the dispositional approach.
The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge.
,ZAGZEBSKI,-Linda-Trinkaus
PB: Oxford-Univ-Pr : New York, 1991
This book examines the three leading traditional solutions to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free will--those arising from Boethius, from Ockham, and from Molina. Although all three solutions are rejected in their best-known forms, three new solutions are proposed, and the book concludes that divine foreknowledge is in fact compatible with human freedom. Discussions of the nature of time, the causal relation, and the logic of counterfactual conditionals are included. An appendix introduces a new foreknowledge dilemma which arises from a conflict between omniscient foreknowledge and temporal asymmetry. This new dilemma is independent of the question of free will.
Timelessness and Foreknowledge.
,LEFTOW,-Brian
Philosophical-Studies. S 91; 309-325
"Boethians" reconcile human libertarian freedom and divine knowledge of actions which to us are future by asserting that God is timeless. Plantinga and others have recently argued that this solution fails, because even if God is timeless, propositions reporting what He timelessly knows are true in our past. This paper first rejects a response to Plantinga by William Hasker, then develops another response, one based on distinguishing two sorts of tenselessness.
The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge
,Zagzebski,-Linda-Trinkaus
RV: Purtill,-Richard-L
Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-Research Mr 94; 54(1): 239-241
The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge
,Zagzebski,-Linda-Trinkaus
RV: Kane,-Robert
Mind Jl 96; 105(419): 518-520
Aquinas on God's Knowledge of Future Contingents
,CRAIG,-WILLIAM-LANE
Thomist Ja 90; 54(1): 33-79
A thorough examination of the primary texts, dealing with God's timeless scientia visionis and analyzing the implications for Thomas's theory of time, the doctrine of God's knowing all things through His essence, and the doctrine of God's knowledge as the cause of things.
God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom.
,FISCHER,-JOHN-MARTIN (ED)
PB: Stanford-Univ-Pr : Stanford, 1989
This is an anthology composed of contemporary articles on the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human freedom. There is a substantial introduction which locates the articles within a larger historical and analytical grid.
AUGUSTINE.
,KIRWAN,-CHRISTOPHER
PB: ROUTLEDGE : LONDON, 1989
THIS BOOK IS IN THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS SERIES. IT TREATS THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO, EXAMINING HIS DOCTRINES AND ARGUMENTS ON SCEPTICISM, LANGUAGE, THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, FREE WILL AND DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND GRACE, ORIGINAL SIN, TIME, LOVE, SEX, DYING, SUICIDE, RELIGIOUS TOLERATION, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY. THE BIBLIOGRAPHY INCLUDES A GUIDE TO EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS.
HARD FACTS AND THEOLOGICAL FATALISM.
,HASKER,-WILLIAM
Nous S 88; 22: 419-436
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "HARD FACTS" AND "SOFT FACTS" ABOUT THE PAST HAS BEEN INVOKED TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL FATALISM AND ALSO THAT OF THEOLOGICAL FATALISM. I EXAMINE TWO RECENT EXPLICATIONS OF THIS DISTINCTION--BY FREDDOSO AND BY HOFFMAN AND ROSENKRANTZ--AND SHOW THAT, WHILE THEY SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL FATALISM, NEITHER SUCCEEDS IN AVOIDING THEOLOGICAL FATALISM. I THEN SHOW THAT MY ARGUMENT CAN BE GENERALIZED TO APPLY TO ANY SATISFACTORY EXPLICATION OF THE HARD/SOFT FACT DISTINCTION. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HARD AND SOFT FACTS CANNOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF THEOLOGICAL FATALISM.
SCOTISM.
,FISCHER,-JOHN-MARTIN
Mind AP 85; 94: 231-243
THERE ARE PARALLEL ARGUMENTS FOR INCOMPATIBILISM ABOUT CAUSAL DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM TO DO OTHERWISE, AND DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM TO DO OTHERWISE. I LOOK AT ANTHONY KENNY'S RESPONSE TO THESE ARGUMENTS (WHICH EMPLOYS AN INSIGHT OF "DUNS SCOTUS"). I ARGUE THAT KENNY'S "SCOTISM" IS AN UNACCEPTABLE RESPONSE TO INCOMPATIBILISM.
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND NECESSITY.
,HASKER,-WILLIAM
Faith-and-Philosophy. AP 85; 2: 121-157
I BEGIN BY SETTING OUT THE ARGUMENT FOR THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FREE WILL AND COMPREHENSIVE DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE, AND I EXAMINE SOME OBVIOUSLY INEFFECTIVE REPLIES TO THIS ARGUMENT. I THEN EXAMINE THE THREE MAJOR REPLIES--THE CLAIM THAT TRUTHS ABOUT GOD'S BELIEFS ARE "SOFT FACTS", CLAIM THAT WE HAVE WHAT MAY BE TERMED "COUNTERFACTUAL POWER OVER THE PAST" (PLANTINGA), AND THE CLAIM THAT WE HAVE POWER TO BRING ABOUT AND TO PREVENT PAST EVENTS (MAVRODES). I CONCLUDE THAT NONE OF THESE ANSWERS TO THE INCOMPATIBILITY ARGUMENT IS SUCCESSFUL.
FISCHER ON FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE.
,PIKE,-NELSON
Philosophical-Review O 84; 93: 599-614
FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE.
,FISCHER,-JOHN-MARTIN
Philosophical-Review. JA 83; 92: 67-79
IF GOD IS ETERNAL (SEMPITERNAL) AND OMNISCIENT, THEN IT MIGHT SEEM THAT MY FREEDOM NOW TO DO OTHER THAN WHAT I'M DOING MUST BE THE FREEDOM SO TO ACT THAT A FACT ABOUT THE PAST (GOD'S PRIOR BELIEF ABOUT MY PRESENT ACTIVITY) WOULDN'T BE A FACT ABOUT THE PAST. BUT SINCE THE PAST IS 'FIXED', IT SEEMS THAT IF GOD EXISTS, THEN I AM NOT NOW FREE TO DO OTHER THAN WHAT I'M DOING. THE "OCKHAMIST" CLAIMS THAT GOD'S PRIOR BELIEF ABOUT MY PRESENT ACTIVITY IS A 'SOFT' FACT ABOUT THE PAST AND HENCE NOT FIXED; MY FREEDOM IS THUS PRESERVED. SOME OCKHAMISTS EVEN CLAIM THAT THE VERY EXISTENCE OF GOD IS ALSO A SOFT FACT ABOUT THE PAST. THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT A VERY ATTRACTIVE PRESENTATION OF THE OCKHAMIST APPROACH, ONE EXPLICITLY FORMULATED BY MARILYN ADAMS, IS INADEQUATE. THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WITH ADAMS' ATTEMPT TO CHARACTERIZE THE HARD FACT/SOFT FACT DISTINCTION. FURTHER, I PRESENT A GENERAL CHALLENGE TO ANY SORT OF OCKHAMIST ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THIS DISTINCTION.
ON DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM.
,HOFFMAN,-JOSHUA; ROSENKRANTZ,-GARY
Philosophical-Studies. AP 80; 37: 289-296
IN HIS BOOK, "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION", WILLIAM ROWE HAS DISCUSSED AN ARGUMENT (CALL IT "A") WHOSE CONCLUSION IS THAT HUMAN FREEDOM IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE. ROWE SAYS THAT "A" FAILS TO ESTABLISH ITS CONCLUSION IF EITHER (1) IN CERTAIN CASES HUMAN BEINGS CAN CHANGE THE PAST, OR (2) GOD IS OUTSIDE OF TIME. WE REPLY, FIRST, THAT NEITHER (1) NOR (2) IS A PLAUSIBLE ARGUMENT AGAINST "A" AND SECONDLY, THAT "A" CAN BE REFUTED IN A WAY WHICH ROWE OVERLOOKS. WE THEN SHOW THAT THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM RAISED BY "A" FOR HUMAN FREEDOM IS INDEPENDENT OF THE CLAIM THAT THERE IS DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE.
ON DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM: A REPLY.
,ROWE,-WILLIAM-L
Philosophical-Studies. MY 80; 37: 429-430
ENDEAVORS TO SHOW THAT AN ARGUMENT OF MINE CONCERNING DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM RESTS, NOT ON A FALSE PRINCIPLE, BUT ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLE: IF P ENTAILS Q AND S HAS IT WITHIN HIS POWER AT T TO BRING IT ABOUT THAT P OBTAINS THEN THERE IS SOME STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH IS SUCH THAT IT IS IN S'S POWER TO BRING ABOUT IT AND IF IT HAD OBTAINED THEN Q WOULD HAVE OBTAINED.
SOME REFLECTIONS ON PREDESTINATION, PROVIDENCE AND DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE.
,HEBBLETHWAITE,-B-L
Religious-Studies. D 79; 15: 433-448
IT IS A NECESSARY IMPLICATION OF THE CREATION OF A TEMPORALLY STRUCTURED WORLD WITH A GENUINELY OPEN FUTURE THAT NOT EVEN OMNISCIENCE KNOWS THE FUTURE. THE DOCTRINES OF PREDESTINATION AND PROVIDENCE ARE EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THIS CONCLUSION. GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT HE WILL DO IN BRINGING THE CREATIVE PROCESS TO COMPLETION MUST INCLUDE A RANGE OF DIFFERENT POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO WHAT HIS CREATURES DO. THE ARGUMENT IS EXTENDED TO INCLUDE THE ROLE OF CHANCE IN THE MATERIAL CREATION AS WELL AS THAT OF FREEDOM IN MAN. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEODICY OF SUCH A VIEW ARE MENTIONED.
PIKE ON POSSIBLE WORLDS, DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE, AND HUMAN FREEDOM.
,HOFFMAN,-JOSHUA
Philosophical-Review. JL 79; 88: 433-442
IN A RECENT ARTICLE ("PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW", APRIL 1977), NELSON PIKE CONTINUES THE DEBATE HE HAS BEEN CONDUCTING WITH ALVIN PLANTINGA OVER THE YEARS ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE IS COMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN FREEDOM. PIKE ARGUES, FIRST, THAT IN "GOD, FREEDOM, AND EVIL" PLANTINGA PROVIDED A MISTAKEN ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS OF HUMAN FREEDOM IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE WORLDS. SECONDLY, HE OFFERS HIS OWN ANALYSIS IN THOSE TERMS WHICH HE SAYS SUBSTANTIATES HIS INCOMPATIBILIST POSITION. I SHOW THAT THERE IS REASON TO DOUBT THAT PLANTINGA IS COMMITTED TO THE ANALYSIS PIKE ATTRIBUTES TO HIM AND THAT PIKE'S OWN ANALYSIS IS INCORRECT.
DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND CAUSAL DETERMINISM.
,KANE,-R-H
Southwestern-Journal-of-Philosophy. SPR 78; 9: 69-76
THE PAPER DISCUSSES THE CLAIM, DEFENDED BY BOETHIUS, AUGUSTINE AND OTHERS, THAT (IN BOETHIUS' WORDS) 'FOREKNOWLEDGE IS NO HINDRANCE TO FREE WILL BECAUSE IT IS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE NECESSITY OF FUTURE THINGS'. THIS CLAIM IS ULTIMATELY REJECTED (IN PART II OF THE PAPER) IN THE LIGHT OF A DISCUSSION OF NOTIONS OF NECESSITY, DETERMINATION AND CAUSATION (PART I). PART III OF THE PAPER DISCUSSES TWO HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE DIVINE OMNISCIENCE AND HUMAN FREEDOM WHICH ACCEPT THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM, BUT DENY THAT OMNISCIENCE NECESSARILY IMPLIES FOREKNOWLEDGE.
TIMELESSNESS, FOREKNOWLEDGE, AND FREE WILL.
,DANIELSON,-DENNIS
Mind JL 77; 86: 430-432
DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE, HUMAN FREEDOM AND POSSIBLE WORLDS.
,PIKE,-NELSON
Philosophical-Review. AP 77; 86: 209-216
IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED SOME TIME AGO IN THE "PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW" ENTITLED "DIVINE OMNISCIENCE AND VOLUNTARY ACTION," 1 I ARGUED THAT IF GOD EXISTS AND THE RIGHT COLLECTION OF THEOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING HIS NATURE ARE TRUE, NO HUMAN ACTION IS FREE. IN PART I, SECTION B OF HIS RECENT BOOK, "GOD, FREEDOM AND EVIL", 2 ALVIN PLANTINGA CONTENDS THAT THE ARGUMENT I OFFERED IN THAT EARLIER PAPER FOR THIS THESIS IS MISTAKEN AND THAT THERE IS NO GOOD REASON FOR THINKING THAT GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE ACTIONS HAS ANY IMPLICATIONS REGARDING HUMAN FREEDOM. IN THIS BRIEF PAPER I RESPOND TO PLANTINGA'S CRITICISMS OF MY EARLIER EFFORT.
TIME AND FOREKNOWLEDGE.
,HELM,-PAUL
Mind O 75; 84: 516-527
A REJOINDER TO O'CONNOR.
,BECKER,-LAWRENCE-C
Mind JA 75; 84: 95
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION RE-EXAMINED.
,O'CONNOR,-JOHN
Mind JA 75; 84: 94
THIS NOTE CLAIMS THAT AN ARGUMENT OF L BECKER'S DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT, GIVEN CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT GOD AND CREATION EVERYTHING IS PREDESTINED, TWICE COMMITS A MODAL FALLACY AND IS THEREFORE UNSUCCESSFUL.
A NEW DISPROOF OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREE CHOICE.
,LACKEY,-DOUGLAS-P
Religious-Studies. S 74; 10: 313-318
THIS ARTICLE APPLIES CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS OF RECENT EPISTEMOLOGY TO THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE. A 'CAUSAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE' IS ENDORSED, AND THIS THEORY, APPLIED TO GOD'S KNOWLEDGE, PRECLUDES HUMAN FREE WILL. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT GOD DOES 'NOT' KNOW THE ASPECTS OF THE FUTURE SUBJECT TO FREE WILL.
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FATALISM.
,PURTILL,-RICHARD-L
Religious-Studies. S 74; 10: 319-324
IF GOD HAS FOREKNOWLEDGE DOES THIS IMPLY FATALISM? I ARGUE THAT IF GOD IS TEMPORALLY CONDITIONED--IS "INSIDE TIME"--INFALLIBLE DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE WOULD IMPLY FATALISM. HOWEVER, IF GOD IS NOT TEMPORALLY CONDITIONED--IS "OUTSIDE OF TIME"--GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURE WOULD NOT IMPLY FATALISM. I ARGUE THAT WE CAN MAKE SENSE OF A TEMPORALLY UNCONDITIONAL GOD, JUST AS WE CAN MAKE SENSE OF A SPATIALLY UNCONDITIONED GOD. BUT I GRANT THAT IF WE COULD NOT MAKE SENSE OF A TEMPORALLY UNCONDITIONED GOD WE WOULD HAVE TO REJECT INFALLIBLE DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE OR ACCEPT FATALISM.
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDESTINATION.
,BECKER,-LAWRENCE
Mind JA 72; 81: 138-141
BY FOCUSING ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ASSUMPTION ALWAYS MADE BUT RARELY EMPHASIZED IN DISCUSSIONS OF PREDESTINATION (THAT GOD KNEW, AS HE CREATED THE UNIVERSE, EVERY DETAIL OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN IT), IT CAN BE SHOWN STRAIGHTFORWARDLY THAT FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM ARE INCOMPATIBLE.
GOD AND TIMELESSNESS.
,PIKE,-NELSON
PB: ROUTLEDGE-and-K-PAUL : LONDON, 1970
THE AUTHOR EXAMINES THE UNDERSTANDING OF GOD'S ETERNITY AS THE TIMELESSNESS OF GOD. HE TRIES TO IDENTIFY THE LOGICAL STATUS OF THE STATEMENT 'GOD IS TIMELESS'. (BP, EDITED)
DIVINE OMNISCIENCE AND VOLUNTARY ACTION.
,PIKE,-NELSON
Philosophical-Review. JA 65; 74: 27-46
PIKE ARGUES THAT IF AN OMNISCIENT GOD EXISTS, THEN NO HUMAN ACTION IS VOLUNTARY. IF GOD KNEW EIGHTY YEARS AGO THAT JONES WOULD MOW HIS LAWN LAST SATURDAY, THEN IT WAS NOT IN JONES' POWER LAST SATURDAY TO REFRAIN FROM MOWING HIS LAWN. TO HAVE THIS POWER TO REFRAIN, JONES WOULD HAVE TO HAVE THE POWER ON SATURDAY TO DO SOMETHING THAT WOULD MAKE IT THE CASE THAT GOD DID NOT HOLD THE BELIEF THAT HE HELD (THAT JONES WOULD NOW HIS LAWN) EIGHTY YEARS AGO; OR ELSE THE POWER TO MAKE GOD'S BELIEF EIGHTY YEARS AGO FALSE. BUT NEITHER RETRO-ACTIVE CAUSATION NOR MAKING GOD'S BELIEFS FALSE IS A COHERENT NOTION.
AUGUSTINE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE AND FREE WILL.
,ROWE,-WILLIAM-L
Review-of-Metaphysics. D 64; 18: 356-363
THE AUTHOR EXPLAINS AND CRITICIZES AUGUSTINE'S ARGUMENT AGAINST THE VIEW THAT GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN FREEDOM, AND SUGGESTS ANOTHER WAY OF REJECTING THAT POSITION. IN (ON FREE WILL" AUGUSTINE MAINTAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH NECESSARY, ONE'S WILLING TO SIN IS FREE BECAUSE IT IS IN HIS POWER TO DO. ANALYZING AUGUSTINE'S IDEA OF POWER IN THIS CONTEXT, THE AUTHOR REJECTS THIS LINE OF REASONING. INSTEAD, CITING BOETHIUS AND AQUINAS, HE DISTINGUISHES TWO SENSES OF THE PROPOSITION, "WHATEVER GOD FOREKNOWS MUST NECESSARILY HAPPEN," AND ARGUES ON THE BASIS OF THIS DISTINCTION THAT DIVINE PRESCIENCE IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH FREE WILL.
