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David Sosa, Chair WAG 316, Mailcode C3500, Austin, TX 78712 • 512-471-4857

Miriam Schoenfield

Assistant Professor PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Miriam Schoenfield

Contact

Biography

My primary research interests are in epistemology but I also have interests in ethics.  Please visit my personal website (see "personal website" link above)  for more information on my research, links to papers, and CV.  

(If the link is not working for some reason, you can copy and paste: https://webspace.utexas.edu/ms58685/www/Home.html into your web browser). 

 

PHL 313 • Introductory Symbolic Logic

42970-42980 • Fall 2013
Meets MWF 1100am-1200pm WAG 420
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This is a first course in deductive symbolic logic. We'll study formal languages for representing sentences
in logically precise ways, we'll study algorithms for evaluating arguments as logically valid or invalid, and
we'll get an introduction to some of the surprising discoveries logicians have made about what tasks no
algorithm can possibly do.

PHL 321K • Theory Of Knowledge

43025 • Fall 2013
Meets TTH 930am-1100am WAG 208
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What is knowledge? What are the principal types of knowledge, and what
does a person's knowing a claim or proposition p amount to? Philosophers
have commonly supposed that a person's having justification, or warrant, for
believing that p is a necessary condition of his/her knowing that p.
Accordingly, this course will be concerned with theories of justification as
well as of knowledge, along with the question of whether there can be
knowledge without what is called epistemic justification. Views in ancient,
early modern, and contemporary philosophy—also one Eastern view—will
be surveyed.

PHL 383 • Higher Order Evidence

42850 • Spring 2013
Meets M 1230pm-330pm WAG 312
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HIGHER ORDER EVIDENCE

Prerequisites

Graduate Standing and Consent of Graduate Advisor or instructor required.

Course Description

Higher order evidence concerns evidence of our own cognitive capabilities.  There has been a lot of recent literature on how to accommodate such evidence and how our higher order beliefs (about the rationality of our beliefs) should interact with the beliefs themselves. 

In the first part of the seminar we will think about how to accommodate higher order evidence generally, and then look into some more specific cases such as irrelevant influences on belief and evolutionary explanations for belief. 

In the second part of the seminar, we will read some papers about how theories of higher order evidence impact theories of rationality more generally.  We will spend some time discussing “bridge principles”: principles that say, roughly, that your credence in p should equal the expected rational credence in p.  We will then discuss connections between accommodating higher order evidence and views according to which what seems rational to the agent plays a large role in determine what is rational for that agent.

Grading

Grade based on term paper. Required: attendance and class presentation.

Texts

We’ll be reading papers by (in no particular order): Christensen, Weatherson, Kelly, Elga, Street, Aarnio, Horowitz and Sliwa, White, a couple things by yours truly (Schoenfield), and others.

PHL 313 • Introductory Symbolic Logic

42498 • Fall 2012
Meets MWF 1100am-1200pm WAG 420
show description

This is a first course in deductive symbolic logic. We'll study formal languages for representing sentences
in logically precise ways, we'll study algorithms for evaluating arguments as logically valid or invalid, and
we'll get an introduction to some of the surprising discoveries logicians have made about what tasks no
algorithm can possibly do.

PHL 321K • Theory Of Knowledge

42560 • Fall 2012
Meets TTH 930am-1100am WAG 208
show description

What is knowledge? What are the principal types of knowledge, and what
does a person's knowing a claim or proposition p amount to? Philosophers
have commonly supposed that a person's having justification, or warrant, for
believing that p is a necessary condition of his/her knowing that p.
Accordingly, this course will be concerned with theories of justification as
well as of knowledge, along with the question of whether there can be
knowledge without what is called epistemic justification. Views in ancient,
early modern, and contemporary philosophy—also one Eastern view—will
be surveyed.

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