Office: WAG 408A
Office Hours: T 2:30-3:30
Phone: 471-5293
apautz@mail.utexas.edu
Webpage

Education: BA (Philosophy), BA (Psychology), University of Minnesota; PhD, New York University

Research interests:
Professor Pautz specializes in philosophy of mind and metaphysics. Many of his interests center around sensory consciousness and the secondary qualities. He accepts (with some qualifications) a form of Internalist Intentionalism about experience, and argues on broadly empirical grounds for a primitivist position concerning sensory representation and the secondary qualities. His papers include "An Argument Against Armstrong's Analysis of Resemblance between Universals" (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1997), "Have Byrne and Hilbert Answered Hardin's Challenge?" (Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2003), and "Externalist Intentionalism and Neurobiology: An Empirical Problem" (forthcoming in Nous). He is on leave for the 2006/2007 academic year in order to work with David Chalmers on the research project "The Contents of Consciousness" at the Australian National University.

Courses taught:
Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics and Epistemology

Field(s) of Study: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind