Introduction to Philosophy

14 February 2001

Berkeley

I. Berkeley’s reaction to Locke’s dualism of idea and quality

II. Epistemological argument for a metaphysical position

A. Extension of skepticism, assuming Locke’s dualism

B. But, repugnance of skepticism

C. Rejection of Locke’s dualism

III. Argument from relativity (extension of Lockean argument against secondary qualities)

A. If an object doesn’t change, then if it has a certain property, it doesn’t lose it.

B. Objects don’t change just because we alter our position.

C. If an object “loses” a property just because we alter our position, then it never really had it in the first place.

IV. Argument against resemblance: “Can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea?”

V. Argument from inconceivability: It is impossible to conceive of something existing entirely independent of any idea of it (since there will always be at least your own conception of it).

VI. Summary of Berkeley’s challenge:

A. All knowledge consists of ideas.

B. The material world is independent of these ideas.

C. How then can we know anything about the material world?

D. But we do; therefore the material world is not independent of our ideas.

VII. Berkeley’s own response: Idealism

A. Esse est percipi

B. The role of God