Introduction to Philosophy
11 April 2001
I. Functionalism
II. Multiple Realizability
A. Problem for Mind/Brain Identity Theory:
creatures with utterly different physical constitutions could have the same
mental states (mental states are multiply realizable).
B. No problem for Functionalism: whatever its physical constitution, if the creature has states that mediate in the right way between inputs, outputs, and other states, then it has a mind.
C. Multiple realizability is a major
advantage for Functionalism over Identity theories.
II. The Problem of
Consciousness
A. Nagel, “What is it Like to be a
Bat?”
1. The subjective character of
experience (aka the “qualitative” character of
experience—thus, the problem of qualia).
2. Definition: For you to be conscious is for there to be something
it is like to be
you.
3. Consciousness is essentially connected to
a “point of view”
4. We cannot imagine what it is like for
a bat to be a
bat; at best we can imagine what it would be like for us to be a bat.
B. Physicalist accounts of the mind are objective
1. They embody no particular point of view
2. We cannot understand the essentially subjective in purely objective terms
1. Objective accounts of phenomena are
adequate when we are attempting to describe a reality behind the appearances.
2. With consciousness, it seems, the
appearance is
the reality.
D. Frank Jackson’s example of Mary,
the brilliant scientist
1. Scientific accounts can’t tell us
everything there is to know about subjective experience.
2. Mary can have all the scientific
information there could possibly be: but she won’t know what the
experience is like.
3. This problem is sometimes called
“the knowledge argument.”