²Of course, the case of Mary is a threat not only to physicalism with respect to phenomenal qualities but also to functionalism. For Mary has all the pertinent functional information too. To simplify exposition, I focus on physicalism. But what I say applies mutatis mutandis to functionalism. For a theory of the nature of phenomenal qualities that falls within the physicalist-functionalist camp, see my 1995.

³ Nemirow (1990) takes a different view. His claim is that "what E is like" is a syncategorematic part of the expression "know what experience E is like." This creates difficulties for him of a sort that Lewis can avoid.

⁴ A response of the same sort can be given to Lycan's argument from attempting-to-describe. See his 1996, p. 98.

⁵ See, for example, Kosslyn (1980). These representations (on Kosslyn's view) are also importantly dissimilar from pictures.

⁶ For Lewis, pain and the feeling of pain are one and the same. See his 1983, p. 130.

⁷ I ignore here blindsight. My remark is made with respect to normal, everyday seeing.

⁸ By parallel reasoning, we may infer that Mary has other new knowledge-that associated with her experience of red, notably knowledge that she is having an experience of this particular shade of red and knowledge that she is having an experience of this phenomenal type. The latter knowledge, incidentally, should be granted even by those who deny that what experience E is like is the same as E.

⁹ These abilities, I might add, are best taken to have an indexical component themselves. The relevant recognitional ability is the ability to recognize that this is the experience of red, when the experience of red comes again. Likewise, the memory ability is the ability to remember that the experience of red is an experience of this sort, as one undergoes a suitable phenomenal memory image. (Patently, it is not just the ability to remember that one has had experiences of red. For one might have that without now having any idea what such experiences were like).

¹⁰ An alternative possible discovery is that this is the phenomenal character of the experience of red, where the phenomenal character of the experience of red is held to be distinct from the experience of red. For a discussion of the relationship between phenomenal character and experience-types, see Chapter 3.

¹¹ For more here, see Chapter 2.

¹² The term 'fact' is itself ambiguous. Sometimes it is used to pick out real-world states of affairs alone; sometimes it is used for such states of affairs under certain conceptualizations. When I speak of the physical facts here, I should be taken to refer either to physical states of affairs alone or to those states of affairs under purely physical conceptualizations. For more on 'fact', see Tye 1995.

¹³ I would like to thank David Lewis for a helpful comment.