

Bureaucracy & Policy Implementation
GOV 384M (38923)

The University of Texas at Austin
Wednesday 9:00 AM - 12:00 PM
Batts Hall 1.104

Fall 2011

1 Professor

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Office Hours: Wednesday 12-2:00 PM, 3-4:00 PM

2 Course Description

This seminar assesses the role of the federal bureaucracy in American politics and policy implementation. The course splits roughly into three sections. First, we will come to grips with the consequences and opportunities presented by bureaucracy in democratic government. Important questions in this area of research concern democratic control, accountability, and influence on bureaucratic processes and policymaking. The second section focuses on bureaucratic politics and the tremendous influence these politics have in shaping opportunities for influence from above as well as resultant policy implementation. The third section focuses on policy implementation and examines questions related to influences on successful implementation, bureaucratic policymaking, and what the system is able to learn from this policymaking. Each week's discussion will combine scholarship on theory development, conceptualization, and empirical tests, sometimes within distinct policy areas.

Prerequisites for the course include an understanding of American politics. Having had an introductory graduate-level course in research design or statistical methodology is helpful, but by no means required.

3 Grades & Assignments

Seminar Participation. Seminar participation comprises 12% of the final course grade. There are 12 seminar meetings for which the students will be graded on their participation (more on which seminars in our first meeting). Each of these 12 meetings accounts for 1%. After each of these 12 seminars, the Professor will assign a grade ranging from 0 to 1. Following Peter J. May's formula for seminar evaluation, students will receive grades on a scale of: $\leq .3$ —"less than desired contributions", $> .3$ to $\leq .6$ —"acceptable contributions", $> .6$ to $\leq .8$ —"solid contributions", and $> .8$ —"stellar contributions".

Leading Seminar Discussion. At the first seminar meeting, students will sign up to lead seminar discussion in twice (with a partner) during the course. Each of these discussion leader opportunities will amount to 9% of the final grade for a total contribution of 18%. This means there are more opportunities for leading

discussion than for student pairs. Students whose seminar participation grades are lacking may volunteer for leading seminar discussion a third time in order to round out their grades.

Research Project or Synthesis. The research project for the course contributes 60% of the final grade. Students will have an option between between two tracks. Students will choose to write either a synthesis paper or an original research paper. Each student must consult with the Professor for approval of the topic of choice. More detail will be given in the first course meeting, but in general, the options are as follows:

Synthesis Paper. This paper should stimulate your thinking on some strand of diverse literature we will cover over the semester. Note that this will require a tremendous amount of reading beyond the course material in a particular area of interest. The paper may take the following forms.

- Discussion of an underdeveloped concept in the literature on bureaucracy or policy implementation.
- A meta-analysis of empirical findings on a key theoretical premise.

Original Research Paper. This is self explanatory. Take on the literature, develop a theory with testable hypotheses or propositions, collect data, and test the argument.

Presentation. Students will present their Synthesis or Research Papers to the entire class in the final meeting of the course. This will comprise 10% of the final grade. There will be more discussion of this throughout the seminar.

The grading scheme for the course is as follows:

A	93-100%	C	73-76%
A-	90-92%	C-	70-72%
B+	87-89%	D+	67-69%
B	83-86%	D	63-66%
B-	80-82%	D-	60-62%
C+	77-79%	F	<60%

4 Required Texts

The texts listed below are required for the course and may be purchased anywhere students prefer. They will not be available, however, at the Co-Op. All of the required articles are available either from the library (which is quite good here at UT) or online through various sources (e.g. JSTOR, PROQUEST, ALLACADEMIC, etc).

- Daniel P. Carpenter. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001
- Steven P. Croley. *Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007
- Gregory A. Huber. *The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality: Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety.* Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007
- John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan. *Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy.* Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002
- David E. Lewis. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance.* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008

- Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky. *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973

5 Contacting the Professor

I tend to check my email only once every 24 hours. Depending on when I check my email on a given day, the earliest time at which a response may be expected is within 24 hours. Please be aware that I also do not respond to emails on the weekend.

6 Academic Dishonesty

Students who violate University rules on scholastic dishonesty are subject to disciplinary penalties, including the possibility of failure in the course and/or dismissal from the University. Since such dishonesty harms the individual, all students, and the integrity of the University, policies on scholastic dishonesty will be strictly enforced. During examinations, you must do your own work. Copying and collaboration with others is strictly prohibited. At a minimum, any collaborative behavior during the examinations will result in failure of the exam. A statement regarding UT Honor Code (or statement of ethics) and an explanation or example of what constitutes plagiarism (Link to University Honor Code: <http://registrar.utexas.edu/catalogs/gi09-10/ch01/index.html>).

6.1 University of Texas Honor Code

The core values of The University of Texas at Austin are learning, discovery, freedom, leadership, individual opportunity, and responsibility. Each member of the university is expected to uphold these values through integrity, honesty, trust, fairness, and respect toward peers and community.

7 Students with Disabilities

Students with disabilities may request appropriate academic accommodations from the Division of Diversity and Community Engagement, Services for Students with Disabilities at 471-6259 (voice) or 232-2937 (video phone) or <http://www.utexas.edu/diversity/ddce/ssd>. If you require accommodation, it is your responsibility to bring your note to me *early* in the semester so we can work out arrangements.

8 Religious Holy Days

By UT Austin policy, you must notify me of your pending absence at least fourteen days prior to the date of observance of a religious holy day. If you must miss a class or an examination in order to observe a religious holy day, you will be given an opportunity to complete the missed work within a reasonable time after the absence.

9 Emergency Evacuation

In the event of a fire or other emergency, it may be necessary to evacuate a building rapidly. Upon the activation of a fire alarm or the announcement of an emergency in a university building, all occupants

of the building are required to evacuate and assemble outside. Once evacuated, no one may re-enter the building without instruction to do so from the Austin Fire Department, University of Texas at Austin Police Department, or Fire Prevention Services office. Students should familiarize themselves with all the exit doors of each room and building they occupy at the university, and should remember that the nearest exit routes may not be the same as the way they typically enter buildings. Students requiring assistance in evacuation shall inform their instructors in writing during the first week of class. Faculty members must then provide this information to the Fire Prevention Services office by fax (512-232-2759), with "Attn. Mr. Roosevelt Easley" written in the subject line. Information regarding emergency evacuation routes and emergency procedures can be found at <http://www.utexas.edu/emergency>.

10 Important Administrative Dates

First Day of Class	August 24
Labor Day Holiday	September 5
Last Day to Drop	September 21
Thanksgiving Holiday	November 24-26
Last Day of Class	Friday, December 2

11 Important Course Dates

Course Participation	EVERY SINGLE MEETING
Leading Discussion	When it is your turn.
Presentation	Wednesday, November 30
Course Project DUE	Wednesday, December 7, 10:00 AM

12 Course Schedule

Students are expect to have reading the listed materials for each week *prior* to meeting for seminar discussion. Readings followed by an asterisk* must be obtained from the Professor. Nominate an individual to copy these—there are not many.

12.1 *Bureaucracy in American Politics*

12.1.1 August 24: Introduction & What it means to study Bureaucracy

No readings, just pay attention.

12.1.2 August 31: Classical Perspectives on Bureaucracy & its Importance

- Herbert Kaufman. Major players: Bureaucracies in american government. *Public Administration Review*, 61(1):18–42, 2001
- Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman. Mandates or mandarins? control and discretion in the modern administrative state. *Public Administration Review*, 48(2):606–612, 1988
- Robert F. Durant. Public policy, overhead democracy, and the professional state revisited. *Administration and Society*, 27(2):165–202, 1995

- Richard F. Elmore. Backward mapping: Implementation research and policy decisions. *Political Science Quarterly*, 94(4):601–616, 1979
- Johan P. Olsen. Maybe it is time to rediscover bureaucracy. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 16(1):1–24, 2006

12.1.3 September 7: Democratic Accountability

- John Brehm and Scott Gates. Donut shops and speed traps: Evaluating models of supervision on police behavior. *American Journal of Political Science*, 37(2):555–581, 1993
- Richard W. Waterman and Kenneth J. Meier. Principal-agent models: An expansion? *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 8(2):173–202, 1998
- Gary J. Miller. *Annual Review of Political Science*, volume 8, chapter The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, pages 203–225. 2005
- Andrew B. Whitford. The pursuit of political control by multiple principals. *The Journal of Politics*, 67:29–49, 2005
- Andrew B. Whitford. Competing explanations for bureaucratic preferences. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 19(3):219–247, 2007

12.1.4 September 14: Congressional Control

- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. *American Journal of Political Science*, 28(1):165–179, 1984
- Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 3:243–277, 1987
- Kathleen Bawn. Choosing strategies to control the bureaucracy: Statutory constraints, oversight, and the committee system. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 13(1):101–126, 1997
- John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. Legislatures and statutory control of bureaucracy. *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(2):330–345, 2001
- Evan J. Ringquist, Jeff Worsham, and Marc Allen Eisner. Salience, complexity, and the legislative direction of regulatory bureaucracies. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 13(2):141–164, 2003

12.1.5 September 21: Presidential Control

- David E. Lewis. *The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008
- David E. Lewis. The adverse consequences of the politics of agency design for presidential management in the united states: The relative durability of insulated agencies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 34:377–404, 2004

12.1.6 September 28: Theories of Delegation

- John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan. *Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002

12.1.7 October 5: Bureaucratic Responses

- Gregory A. Huber. *The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality: Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007

12.2 Bureaucratic Politics

12.2.1 October 12: Bureaucratic Autonomy

- Daniel P. Carpenter. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001

12.2.2 October 19: Structure, Mission, & Routine

- Terry M. Moe. The new economics of organization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 28:739–777, 1984
- Thomas H. Hammond. Agenda control, organizational structure, and bureaucratic politics. *American Journal of Political Science*, 30(2):379–420, 1986
- Susan Hoffmann and Mark Cassell. Understanding mission expansion in the federal home loan banks: A return to behavioral-choice theory. *Public Administration Review*, 65(6):700–712, 2005
- Carol A. Heimer. Thinking about how to avoid thought: Deep norms, shallow rules, and the structure of attention. *Regulation and Governance*, 2:30–47, 2008
- Peter J. May, Samuel Workman, and Bryan D. Jones. Organizing attention: Responses of the bureaucracy to agenda disruption. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(4):517–541, 2008

12.2.3 October 26: Bureaucrats & More Bureaucrats

- Anthony Downs. A theory of bureaucracy. *American Economic Review*, 55:439–446, 1965
- Michael Lipsky. *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*. Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1980, pp 3-23*
- Marcia K. Meyers and Susan Vorsanger. *Handbook of Public Administration*, chapter Street-Level Bureaucrats and the Implementation of Public Policy, pages 245–255. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2002*
- Peter J. May and Robert S. Wood. At the regulatory front lines: Inspectors' enforcement styles and regulatory compliance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 13(2):117–139, 2003
- Alisa Hicklin, Lawrence J. O'Toole, and Kenneth J. Meier. Serpents in the sand: Managerial networking and nonlinear influences on organizational performance. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(2):253–273, 2008

12.3 Policy Implementation

12.3.1 November 2: The Context of Implementation

- Robert P. Stoker. A regime framework for implementation analysis: Cooperation and reconciliation of federalist imperatives. *Policy Studies Review*, 9(1):29–49, 1989
- Daniel McCool. Subgovernments as determinants of political viability. *Political Science Quarterly*, 105(2):269–293, 1990
- Jeffrey Worsham. Wavering equilibriums: Subsystem dynamics and agenda control. *American Politics Quarterly*, 26(4):485–512, 1998
- Peter J. May. Reconsidering policy design: Policies and publics. *Journal of Public Policy*, 11(2):187–206, 1991
- Peter J. May. Can cooperation be mandated? implementing intergovernmental environmental management in new south wales and new zealand. *Publius*, 25(1):89–113, 1995
- Peter J. May, Joshua Sapotichne, and Samuel Workman. Widespread policy disruption: Terrorism, public risks, and homeland security. *Policy Studies Journal*, 37(2):171–194, 2009

12.3.2 November 9: Implementation Perspectives

- Paul A. Sabatier. Top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research: A critical analysis and suggested synthesis. *Journal of Public Policy*, 6(1):21–48, 1986
- Malcolm L. Goggin. ‘the too few cases, too many variables’ problem in implementation research. *Western Political Quarterly*, 39(2):328–347, 1986
- Soeren C. Winter. *Handbook of Public Administration*, chapter Implementation Perspectives: Status and Reconsideration, pages 212–222. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2002*
- Peter J. May. *Handbook of Public Administration*, chapter Policy Design and Implementation, pages 223–233. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2002*
- Harold Saetren. Facts and myths about public policy implementation: Out-of-fashion, old fashioned, allegedly dead, but still very alive and relevant. *Policy Studies Journal*, 33(4):559–582, 2005

12.3.3 November 16: Wicked Implementation Problems. Can We Learn from Our Mistakes?

- Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky. *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973
- Peter J. May. Policy learning and failure. *Journal of Public Policy*, 12(4):331–354, 1992

12.3.4 November 23: Bureaucratic Policymaking

- Steven P. Croley. *Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007

12.3.5 November 30: Presentation of Synthesis and Research Papers