Russell 1900–1914

Wednesay, 3-6 pm. WAG 312.
Instructor: Ian Proops
Office: WAG 209
Office hrs: by appointment
iproops@austin.utexas.edu

A course examining Russell's philosophy during the years 1900 to 1914. We will focus on Russell's metaphysics, epistemology and views on meaning. But some attention will also be paid to his views on logic, logicism and the paradoxes.

Grading Policy: Enrolled students will be required to write one seminar paper of roughly 20-25 pages, due at the end of term. No student presentations will be required. (This is a correction to the draft requirements already posted on line. In the end I decided not to do presentations simply because there's an awful lot I want to get through.)

The following required books are available in the Coop.

Russell, B. *The Principles of Mathematics*
Russell B. *Logic and Knowledge*
Russell, B. *The Problems of Philosophy*
Russell, B. *Mysticism and Logic*
Neale, S. *Descriptions*

Key: Proops' website = the "papers" part of my departmental webpages.

Note: the reading for week 2 is heavier than for other weeks. Plan accordingly!

Syllabus:

1. Aug 24. Intro/ Early theory of propositions and denoting concepts/ Russell and Moore's opposition to English Idealism/ characterizing "singular thoughts."

Moore, G. E. "The Nature of Judgment." (available on the web: http://fair-use.org/mind/1899/04/the-nature-of-judgment).

Russell, B. *The Principles of Mathematics*, *Preface* and chapters, 4, 5, 6 and 9. (Available as a free google e-book, but I've also ordered a copy from the Coop.).

2. Aug 31. Russell's "Theory of descriptions"—What it is, how it solves Russell's three puzzles, and how relieves him of a commitment to denoting concepts. The philosophical consequences of Russell's solution to the George IV puzzle.

Russell, B. "On Denoting" (in Marsh, ed. *Logic and Knowledge*, pp. 41–56).
--*Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, ch.16 "Descriptions."

--*Principia Mathematica*, vol. 1, pp. 30–32, 60–71, and 173–4 (in these last pages just look at the formal definitions *14.01 and * 14.02.).

Sainsbury, M. *Russell*, ch. 4, sections 1–3 (i.e., pages 95–116).

Neale, S. *Descriptions*, ch. 2. (Don't spend too long on this chapter: Neale isn't really doing Russell scholarship, but rather presenting a theory of descriptions as generalized quantifiers.).

Proops, I: "Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions," *Philosophical Review*, April 2011, intro and sections 1–5, (i.e., pp. 151–183) (website).

3. Sept 7th. The debate over Russell's early ontology

Russell, B. *The Principles of Mathematics*, sections 46, 53 and 427;
--"On Denoting" (pp. 46–8 & 53–4)
--"On the Existential Import of Propositions," in Lackey ed. *Essays in Analysis*, 98–104.
Quine, "Russell Ontological Development," *Journal of Philosophy*, 1966.

Makin, G. *The Metaphysicians of Meaning*, ch. 3.

Soames, S. *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 1, *The Dawn of Analysis*, pp. 106–113.

Optional: Stevens. G. "Russell's Ontological Development Reconsidered," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 2010, 18 (1), 113–137.

4. Sept 14th. Russellian Acquaintance, part I.

Russell, B. "On Denoting" in Marsh pp, 41–2 and from final para on p. 55 to end.
--"Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," ch. 10 in *Mysticisim and Logic*.
--*The Problems of Philosophy*, chapters 5, 9, 10 and 14.
--"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," excerpt from section II, pp. 189–206 in Marsh.

James, W. *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. I, pp. 221–223, and vol II., pp. 1–9.

Proops, I., "Russellian Acquaintance" (draft)

5. Sept 21st. Russellian acquaintance, part II

Russell, B. "Points about Denoting," excerpt: "points" 1–5 *Papers*, vol. 4, pp. 306–8.
--*Problems of Philosophy*, chapters 3 & 4.

Huemer, M. Stanford Encyclopedia, article "Sense-Data" (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sense-data/).

6. Sept 28th. Russell's Construction of the External world

Russell, B. "The Relation of Sense Data to Physics," in *Mysticism and Logic*, 108–131.
--"Our Knowledge of the External World," ch 3 in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 70–105.

Potter, M. *Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic*, pp. 26–43.

Nunn T. P., "Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception"?
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 10 (1909–1910), pp. 191-231

Optional:
Russell, B. "On Matter," *Papers* vol. 6, 77–95.
--"The Ultimate Constituents of Matter," *Mysticism and Logic*, 94–107.

7. Oct 5th. Russell's argument against denoting concepts (aka. the Gray's Elegy argument)

Russell, B. "On Denoting," 48–52.
--"On Fundamentals," *Papers*, vol. 4, pp. 359–413. (Read around *ad lib*, focusing on the non-formal remarks.)
Makin, G, *The Metaphysicians of Meaning*, ch. 2.

Optional.
Makin, G. *The Metaphysicians of Meaning*, Appendix C.

8. Oct 12th. Russell's early (c.a. 1902) conception of logic and the philosophical significance of his logicism

Russell, B. *The Principles of Mathematics*, chapters, 1–3.

Hylton, Peter W. "Logic in Russell's Logicism," in Bell, David, and Neil Cooper (eds), *The Analytic Tradition: Philosophical Quarterly Monographs*, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Blackwell, (1990) 137–172.

Proops, "Russell's Reasons for Logicism," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 44, no. 2 (2006), 267–92.

9. Oct 19th. The paradoxes (Liar and Cantorian paradoxes)

Russell, B. *Principia Mathematica*, volume I, 37–65.

Kevin Klement, "Russell, His Paradoxes and Cantor's Theorem," Part I, *Philosophy Compass* 5/1 (2010): 16–28.

Potter, M. *Reasons Nearest Kin*, ch. 5.

Optional:
Stevens, G., *The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, ch. 2.

10. Oct 26th. The paradoxes, the substitutional theory and ramified type theory

Klement, Kevin, C. "Russell, His Paradoxes and Cantor's Theorem," *Philosophy Compass* 5/1 (2010), 29–41, part II.

Stevens, G., *The Russellian Origins of Analytical Philosophy*, ch. 3.

Linsky B. "The substitutional paradox in Russell's 1907 letter to Hawtrey," *Russell*, 2002–3.

11. Nov 2nd. The multiple relation theory of judgment and Wittgenstein's objections to it

Russell, B. "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood" in *Philosophical Essays*, 1910.
--*Theory of Knowledge*, Part II, ch. 1.

Potter, M. *Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic*, ch. 13.

This is a relatively light reading week; so begin the reading for next time, which is much heavier.

12. Nov 9th. Strawson and Donnellan's objections to the theory of descriptions

Strawson, P. F., (1950). "On Referring," *Mind*, 59, 320–334.

Russell, "Mr Strawson on Referring," B.
(http://home.sandiego.edu/~baber/analytic/Russell1957.pdf)

Donnellan, K. S., (1966). "Reference and Definite Descriptions," *Philosophical Review* 77, 281-304.

Kripke, S., (1977). "Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference," in French, Uehling, and Wettstein (eds.), *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, Minneapolis: University of Minnestoa Press, 6-27.

Kneale, S. *Descriptions*, ch. 3.

13. Nov 16th. Fara and Ludlow and Segal's objections to the theory of descriptions

Fara, D. Graff, "Descriptions as Predicates," *Philosophical Studies*, Volume 102, Issue 1, pp. 1–42 (2001). Published under the name "Delia Graff."

Ludlow, P., and S. Neale, (1991). "Indefinite Descriptions: In Defense of Russell," *Linguistics and Philosophy* 14, pp. 171-202.

Ludlow, P. and G. Segal, (2003). "On a Unitary Semantical Analysis for Definite and Indefinite Descriptions." In A. Bezuidenhout and M. Reimer (eds.) *Descriptions and Beyond: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays on Definite and Indefinite Descriptions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

14. Nov 23rd, Wed before Thanksgiving. (Special discussion section.) Class will be held, but no new material will be introduced

15. Nov 30. Spare meeting (I expect to be running behind)