

**Electing Women and Ethnic Minorities:
Proportional Representation and the Paradox of Descriptive Representation**

Democracies increasingly face pressures to make their legislatures and other power structures better reflect the social and cultural milieu of society. The potential benefits of more proportionate representation for women and ethnic minorities are manifold. States with legislatures that mirror the gender and ethnic makeup of society tend to be seen as more legitimate by both domestic and international audiences; legislative output is expected to improve in general and, in particular, better protect the interests of traditionally marginalized groups; and voter interest, efficacy, and participation among excluded groups are expected to rise with the presence of candidates and representatives that look more like them and share their experiences.¹ Indeed, the central role of political inclusion to democratic quality and stability is becoming more appreciated in the study of democratic transition and consolidation in developing countries.²

However, as current events in the United States demonstrate, democracies often face competing demands for inclusion. The historic competition between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama to become the presidential nominee of the Democratic Party has spawned a wider debate over which historically underrepresented group is more deserving of the opportunity to fill the country's top political office.³ This underlying narrative highlights a more universal tension involved in representing historically marginalized groups through competitive elections. Universal goals and values that may theoretically unite excluded groups around similar goals of greater representation come under severe stress when faced with the tradeoff entailed in competition over scarce political commodities such as electoral office. In short, in electoral politics someone wins and someone loses in an atmosphere that approximates a zero-sum game.

In such an environment, rules designed to favor one group necessarily come at the expense of other groups. The implicit assumption of rules of positive discrimination such as gender quotas, lower legal thresholds, or gerrymandering, seems to be that the majority will be forced to give up some of its large advantages. But, why should we presume that only the majority will bear the costs of such steps rather than other marginalized groups not favored by such rules?

While some studies, particularly work on intersectionality in gender studies, have acknowledged the tensions inherent in representing women and ethnic minorities, the vast literature on female and minority representation has largely ignored this question. This is particularly true of the institutional approach that has focused on the impact of electoral systems and more specific electoral rules such as gender quotas or majority-minority districts on descriptive representation. Such scholarship almost universally examines female or minority representation in isolation from the other. In this paper, we take a more holistic approach toward descriptive representation through a comparison of the dynamics and contours of female and minority representation under proportional representation (PR). In the process, we argue that women and minorities gain representation in significantly different ways under PR. We argue that due to the cross-cutting nature of the gender cleavage, which bridges partisan divisions, women benefit from a balancing strategy in which parties have incentives to balance the gender makeup of their nominations. Ethnicity tends to be a coinciding cleavage that follows partisan divisions leading minorities to follow a mobilization strategy in which minorities tend to be represented through ethnic parties mobilizing co-ethnic voters.⁴

At first blush, PR systems seem to promote both strategies, albeit for different reasons, and thus appear to be a single institutional remedy for both types of under-representation. However, balancing and mobilization strategies are inherently in conflict under a PR system.

Balancing is best realized through large parties that can go deep into their party lists where more members of the excluded group tend to be located while ethnic parties tend to require rules that promote small parties, which tend to have fewer women in the limited number of electable spots on their party lists. Moreover, parties based on exclusive appeals such as ethnic or women's parties work against mainstream parties balancing their tickets (and vice versa) by competing over popular candidates and votes. Through the use of district magnitude (the number of representatives elected from each district) and legal thresholds (laws requiring a certain percentage of the vote to gain election), PR systems tend to favor *either* larger or smaller parties and thus to favor *either* minority or gender representation but not both simultaneously.

This observation makes two important contributions to the literature. First, these differences have important effects on the relative success of both social categories and thus must be taken into account when engineering electoral systems. Second, the central distinction between the way gender and ethnicity are mobilized for representation under proportional representation captures a central paradox of institutional means for attaining multiple political goals. Institutions involve tradeoffs that are often overlooked. In this case, if one views the political goals of increased female and minority representation in isolation (which is typical in the scholarly literature), PR offers a solution to both female and minority under-representation. However, when viewed holistically, conflicts between competing goals are more perceptible. Once one acknowledges these tensions additional institutional remedies can be applied to help mitigate them. We consider two such remedies for resolving the conflict between electing more women and more minorities at the end of this paper.

Intersectionality: Potential Tensions in the Representation of Women and Minorities

While we concentrate in this paper on institutional differences, the tensions underlying female and minority representation arguably involve fundamental philosophical differences in how the two social categories view their role in society. In short, feminism and multiculturalism do not always agree on how best to achieve equality.

Multiculturalism focuses on group rights and protecting minority cultures that might be eliminated under liberal individualism. Since liberalism advocates individual rights, each individual is treated as equal at least theoretically. But, as Taylor notes, this can become problematic when equality leads to universalism that ignores difference.⁵ Kymlicka argues that collective rights for cultural and minority groups are necessary for individual rights because cultural membership defines individual identity.⁶ Culture provides meaning to life and plays a fundamental role in the lives of its members. Groups provide a “situated perspective” and democracy benefits from deliberation among groups with different points of view.⁷ Therefore, group rights are important for individual rights because the group gives individuals context for their identity and empowerment.

But multiculturalism may not always lead to equality for women. Okin asks, “What should be done when the claims of minority cultures clash with the norm of gender equality?”⁸ She argues that culture is gendered and many groups subordinate women. “Most cultures are patriarchal, then, and many (though not all) of the cultural minorities that claim group rights are more patriarchal than the surrounding cultures.”⁹ Using the shield of group rights, patriarchal systems often appeal to culture to defend violence against women. Therefore, the defense of group rights potentially conflict with efforts to increase gender equality. Again, quoting Okin “It

is by no means clear, then, from a feminist point of view, that minority group rights are part of the solution. They may well exacerbate the problem.”¹⁰

Studies of voting behavior toward female and minority candidates also suggest competition and tension rather than congruence between gender and ethnic identities. For example, in the United States, while there is a debate over whether white voters are reluctant to vote for black candidates,¹¹ most scholars agree that African-American candidates need black voters to get elected¹² and, conversely, African-American voters concentrate their support on black candidates when offered that option.¹³ Similarly, gender studies focus on the barriers for women to run for office and the attitude of male and female voters toward female candidates.¹⁴ However, the results “of decades worth of studies examining the electoral prospects of female candidates is inconclusive.”¹⁵ Studies of the American electorate show that, unlike African-Americans, group identity among women is not particularly high.¹⁶ Hardy-Fanta, et. al. study the electoral pathways of women of color in the United States and conclude that there are distinctive paths for women of color and that race “trumps” gender.¹⁷ Therefore, race and gender work in different ways in the U.S., and race is a stronger identification than gender.

Some scholars studying intersectionality, particularly those examining gender quotas and reserved seats for minorities, have noted the potential of this tension. Htun notes that states adopt gender quotas that apply across mainstream parties when trying to promote women’s representation but tend to adopt reserved seats outside of mainstream parties as special rules favoring the election of ethnic minorities.¹⁸ Verloo argues that different forms of inequality are not necessarily the same so scholars must remain attentive to the different dynamics of inequalities. She concludes there is a potential for competition between inequalities, and remedies to address inequalities are not necessarily neutral to other forms of inequality.¹⁹

Similarly, Krook and O'Brien explore the factors that influence how particular identities emerge and seek political representation, and suggest that attention to certain groups is determined by a political process that can put different groups at odds with each other.²⁰ Hughes conducts cross-national research to examine structural and institutional factors that affect the election of minority women and concludes that state policies designed to address one social inequality may in fact create barriers for another. She also finds that the simultaneous use of quotas that target ethnic minorities and women can enhance the representation of minority women but actually diminish overall representation of women and minorities.²¹

Despite these studies, the prevailing conventional wisdom conflates processes and institutions that are presumed to promote the election of women and minorities. This is particularly true of the preference among scholars for proportional representation. Given the theoretical tension within liberalism about group rights and individual rights as well as the empirical evidence showing that voters react differently based on gender and ethnic identities, we should not expect one institution – proportional representation – to simultaneously increase the representation of women and ethnic minorities. However, that is precisely the way many scholars of electoral systems view PR, as shown by the following quote by Arend Lijphart, one of the most influential scholars of electoral systems: “the beauty of PR is that in addition to producing proportionality and minority representation, it treats all groups—ethnic, racial, religious, or even noncommunal groups—in a completely equal and evenhanded fashion. Why deviate from full PR at all?”²² As a result, many scholars assume that the causal mechanisms for the election of ethnic minorities apply to the election of women, and visa versa. Authors who study descriptive representation often only focus on women but draw conclusions for all types of descriptive representation, including race. For example, Matland and Taylor conclude their study

of female representation, claiming “Although the argument is presented here in terms of women, the same logic would apply for other poorly represented groups.”²³ Similarly, arguments about democracy increasing equality or post-conflict societies redistributing power to marginalized groups often study these issues through the lens of women’s representation. The arguments for increased representation of women become arguments about social equality, without delineating race from gender. Arguing for gender quotas to increase equality, Bacchi writes that the goal of equal treatment is a “gender-blind (and race-blind) polity.”²⁴

By explicating the contrasting dynamics by which PR promotes the election of women and minorities, our study demonstrates how institutions have different effects on historically marginalized groups and suggests that by conflating the election of women and the election of ethnic minorities, electoral engineers may miss the full implication of their recommendations.

PR, Women, and Balancing: The Conspicuous Absence of Women’s Parties

Proportional representation arguably has been one of the main factors promoting the election of women to legislatures worldwide. Numerous studies have established the central role that PR electoral systems play in female representation even after controlling for other factors such as socioeconomic conditions and culture.²⁵ After surveying the evidence from over 180 countries worldwide, Pippa Norris claims, “As a simple rule, *women proved almost twice as likely to be elected under proportional than under majoritarian electoral systems* (emphasis in original).”²⁶ Not only are women better represented under PR systems but the growth in women representation over time is more dramatic under PR than under majoritarian systems.²⁷

Insert Figure 1 about here.

However, women have tended to achieve this greater representation under PR rules through mainstream political parties rather than parties created exclusively for the representation of women (see Figure 1). Indeed, it is striking that scholars do not offer the emergence of a political party devoted primarily to the election of women among the various reasons why women fare so much better in PR elections than under other electoral arrangements. Instead, scholars have emphasized factors that are assumed to provide resources and incentives necessary for gender balancing on PR party lists across the political spectrum rather than mobilization of female voters as a distinct constituency prepared to support a women's party.²⁸

PR systems enhance the capability of parties to consider gender in their nomination strategy by allowing parties greater control over nominations and producing greater legislator turnover, which increases political openings for women.²⁹ Parties in PR elections have greater incentives to balance their nominations with a larger proportion of women because the system requires that they present to the public a full slate of candidates to potentially fill all available seats within a district. Since all nominations are centralized on single party lists for each multi-member district a conspicuous lack of female candidates is easily apparent, can be perceived as discrimination, and thus may be an electoral liability. In fact, the notion of a "balanced" set of candidates is only practical if the list of candidates is presented in its entirety to the electorate.³⁰

The incentive to introduce gender balancing on party lists is also enhanced by the greater competitive nature of PR elections. Matland and Studlar put forward a contagion model of women's representation arguing that the promotion of female candidates can start with one party and then spread throughout the party system as other parties emulate the strategy. PR is most conducive to such a process because of the factors outlined above – greater centralized control

over nominations and public presentation of each party's full slate of candidates. Moreover, because of the greater proportionality between vote shares and seat shares under PR, parties are more vulnerable to even small shifts in the proportion of votes to another party and thus more sensitive to all types of electoral threats. Consequently, if a party is perceived to gain electoral success by nominating a significant proportion of women there will likely be more women on other party lists in future elections.³¹

Scholars have also studied the effect of party magnitude on the election of women candidates. There is general agreement that when a party pulls candidates from deeper in their lists, women have a greater likelihood of winning a seat.³² Consequently, the number of the seats available for representation within a district (district magnitude) is not as crucial as the number of seats each party wins within a district (party magnitude). Matland and Taylor conclude that electoral rules should encourage large parties to advantage the election of women.³³ As Figure 1 shows, gender balancing (in the absence of gender quotas) requires parties of significant size to effectively serve as a vehicle for increased women representation. Small parties that only elect their top candidates are unlikely to elect women even if they nominate them in significant numbers because they will not delve deep enough into their party lists.

Does the historical record justify this emphasis on gender balancing and the implicit dismissal of the idea of gender-based mobilization and women's parties as vehicles for women's legislative representation? In short, yes. Table 1 outlines the performance of women's political parties that won at least one seat in an election to a national legislature based on an examination of elections in 134 countries from 1974-2001.³⁴

Insert Table 1 about here.

Women's parties have been comparatively rare and when they have emerged they have tended to have relatively short life spans. Iceland's Women's Alliance was the world's most consistently successful women's party, winning between 5 and 10 percent of the vote and a similar percentage of seats in legislative elections in four consecutive elections in the 1980s and 1990s. However, in the 1999 election, the Women's Alliance agreed to join forces with other major left-wing parties to form the Alliance, a unified coalition on the left designed to serve as a counterweight to the conservative Independence Party in power at the time.³⁵ Most women's parties have managed to gain even less electoral traction and typically have lasted only one or two elections. Such has been the experience in the post-communist states of the former Soviet Union, the only geopolitical region where women's parties emerged on a regular basis. According to Ishiyama, eight out of 22 post-communist states witnessed the emergence of women's parties although only four of these parties actually won seats and none could sustain a stable presence in the legislature across multiple elections.³⁶

The experience of the Women of Russia, a centrist party that avoided ties to the feminist movement, is indicative of the pattern of the rise and quick demise of women's parties in post-communist states. Women of Russia made surprising inroads in Russia's initial post-communist election in 1993, where the party won over 8 percent of the PR vote and 23 seats to the parliament. In the following election there was a marked increase in the presence of women on other party lists with most major parties including a woman in one of their top three positions.³⁷ Such strategic adaptations cut into Women of Russia's niche in the electoral market and the party lost almost half of its vote share in 1995, failing to overcome the 5 percent legal threshold in the

PR half of the election. The party managed to win only three seats in single-member district races and was a negligible force in the legislature. By Russia's third post-communist election in 1999, Women of Russia, after suffering a party split and the defection of one of its co-founders to a larger party, was no longer a competitive party.³⁸ In Armenia, the demise of an initially promising women's party was even more sudden. The Shamiram Women's Party won nearly 17 percent of the vote and 12 seats, coming in second in the PR vote in 1995 only to see its electoral fortunes plummet to less than 1 percent in the next election.³⁹

Rather than using group-based parties, women tend to balance among many parties. Women are not homogenous, so there is not as strong of a group identity as with race. Moreover, as Hassim notes, "the very idea of institutionalizing group representation can be disadvantageous to women."⁴⁰ In South Africa, the Women's Party failed to mobilize the female vote as a stand-alone party in 1994.⁴¹ The women's movements instead worked with the leadership of all sympathetic parties to "main stream gender".⁴² The goal was to make policies gender neutral and responsive to gender issues so that gender was integrated into all of government programs because women come from different constituencies and groups.⁴³ But the sheer number of women in the population, a majority or near majority in most countries, makes women an important constituency, despite the fact that they may form a less coherent voting bloc than other social categories. Women are potential voters for all parties to capture. Given these characteristics, women benefit from balancing rather than mobilizing through one women's party.⁴⁴

The record of women's parties over the last quarter century showcases the difficulties inherent in maintaining a party with a program based exclusively on gender. Such parties rarely emerge and when they do they tend not to last over a long period of time. Such parties not only

face barriers to entry into the electoral arena but also must confront the prospect that multiple parties can undermine their central appeal by nominating female candidates of their own. Consequently, women's representation is almost exclusively accomplished through mainstream parties that do not make appeals to voters based exclusively or even primarily on gender.

PR, Ethnic Minorities, and Mobilization: The Prevalence of Ethnic Parties

Unlike women, ethnic minorities have tended to find representation through parties appealing exclusively to one or more ethnic groups. Ethnic parties, defined here as parties that appeal "to voters as the champion of the interests of one ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others, and makes such an appeal central to its mobilizing strategy,"⁴⁵ have long been a consistent and significant fixture of competitive elections and often dominate the electoral landscape in ethnically divided societies. In fact, Donald Horowitz has argued that ethnic party systems (those dominated by ethnic parties) are the norm, not the exception, within ethnically divided states. Such parties are often seen as a threat to democratic politics because if party identification becomes too fixated around ethnic identity electoral outcomes become so predictable that, in the words of Horowitz, an election can degenerate into a census.⁴⁶ However, Chandra has recently challenged this view, arguing that the emergence of numerous ethnic parties could enhance democratic consolidation.⁴⁷

Insert Figure 2 about here.

Of course, non-ethnic political parties can and do balance their offerings of candidates by nominating elites from ethnic minority groups.⁴⁸ Indeed, in her study of ethnic parties in India,

Kanchan Chandra has shown that a primary factor determining whether ethnic parties emerge and succeed are competitive rules for nomination within non-ethnic parties that allow opportunities for advancement of minority elites within their power structures.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, when explaining the positive impact that proportional representation systems are presumed to have on ethnic representation, scholars have tended to emphasize the role of mobilization by ethnic parties of co-ethnic voters rather than multi-ethnic balancing among party lists across the political spectrum.⁵⁰ Norris has offered a three-step model to account for the positive impact that PR is assumed to have on the representation of ethnic minorities: PR systems increase proportionality between votes and seats, which increases the likelihood of legislative representation for smaller parties, which, in turn, increases the viability of ethnic parties.⁵¹ If legal and effective electoral thresholds (the level of support necessary to achieve legislative representation) are low enough, even very small ethnic groups with the will and wherewithal to mobilize their communities can achieve some representation within the legislature. While other electoral systems can provide minority representation as well, they do so only under certain circumstances (e.g., majority-minority districts in plurality systems) and only for certain types of ethnic minorities such as those that are geographically concentrated.⁵² Thus, it is precisely the opportunity for ethnic or other identity-based groups to form their own party rather than force the nomination of a minority candidate by a mainstream party that is emphasized by proponents of proportional representation.

The empirical record supports the scholarly concentration on ethnic parties as the main vehicle for the representation of ethnic minorities in PR systems. To illustrate the relative significance of ethnic parties as an electoral force (especially in comparison to women's parties), Table 2 provides data on ethnic parties in Western and Eastern European countries using PR

electoral systems for only the most recent elections to date.⁵³ This is a particularly relevant region for our study because ethnic parties have long been a fixture in ethnically divided states in Western Europe such as Belgium and Spain and many countries in Eastern Europe intentionally fostered the development of ethnic parties in order to mitigate against ethnic conflict and minority exclusion after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We found that ethnic parties won at least one seat in the national legislature in 14 countries using PR systems in this single geopolitical region. In half of these countries, ethnic minority parties won over 10 percent of seats.⁵⁴ Europe is hardly unique in this regard. Countries in Asia (Sri Lanka), Africa (South Africa), the Middle East (Israel), and Latin America (Bolivia, Ecuador) all have significant ethnic parties.

Insert Table 2 about here.

The Consequences of Balancing versus Mobilization

What are the electoral consequences of the tendency of women to gain representation through gender-balancing on major party lists and ethnic minorities' tendency to gain representation through mobilization in separate parties? We argue that these contrasting routes toward greater representation actually can work against one another under many circumstances. This tension can be conceived of as emanating from a juxtaposition between party "depth" and party system "breadth". Representation through gender balancing is best realized when parties are able to go deep into their party lists, that is, a party system composed of relatively large parties (party depth), while the representation of ethnic minorities through their own parties is

often only possible if a party system is composed of or at least open to very small parties (party system breadth).

The historical scarcity of women's parties and prevalence of ethnic parties as vehicles of female and minority representation, respectively, is merely suggestive of our claim of a distinctive route toward representation for women and minorities. More direct comparison of election patterns of individual female and minority legislators within specific countries is needed to support our arguments.

Unfortunately, comparisons of partisan patterns of gender and minority representation face two principal obstacles. First, while the gender composition of national legislatures is readily available, information on ethnic minorities is not. Moreover, even data on the gender of legislators are usually aggregated at the national level rather than examined at the level of individual deputies. Individual level information is required for detailed analysis of the role that partisan characteristics play in the election of women and minorities. Despite these obstacles, we have managed to gather data on the ethnic background and gender of over 1800 legislators in eight countries, which allow for a more detailed comparison of patterns of female and minority representation.⁵⁵ The dataset is not meant as an exhaustive account of patterns of representation for women and ethnic minorities around the world. Many of the cases come from Eastern Europe, which tended to provide more information on the ethnic background of legislators than other regions. Nevertheless, the evidence provides some valuable new insights into the ways in which women and minorities are elected under proportional representation.

In this paper, our main concern is the average size of parties representing women and ethnic minorities and the relative concentration of these social groups within their respective parties. It is our contention that women tend to be elected in lower concentrations and in larger

parties than ethnic minorities, which should achieve most of their seats in smaller ethnic parties composed more exclusively of the target constituency. In order to compare the party size and relative mobilization based on gender or ethnicity, we computed three measures: party size (total number of deputies elected by a party), female concentration (percentage of female deputies elected within a party), and minority concentration (percentage of minority deputies elected within a party). We computed each of these measures using data disaggregated to the level of the individual legislator.⁵⁶ We then computed an average of these three measures for each of our country cases based on the total women and ethnic minorities elected.⁵⁷ Table 3 shows the results of this analysis.

Insert Table 3 about here.

Our findings strongly support our argument that women tend to gain representation through balancing while minorities get elected through mobilization. Ethnic minorities clearly tended to be much more concentrated in the parties from which they were elected than women even when those parties did not have an explicit ethnic character to their voter appeals. Across our eight cases, the mean minority concentration for parties electing minorities was more than three times as large as the mean female concentration for parties electing women. With the exception of Ukraine, ethnic minorities tended to be elected from parties in which more than half of their elected representatives were ethnic minorities. By and large, ethnic minorities were elected in parties made up almost exclusively of minorities while female legislators rarely came close to comprising a majority of the parties through which they were elected.

Moreover, even in Ukraine, the one country in our dataset that does not have any ethnic parties that won legislative seats, ethnic minority representation tended to be much more concentrated in certain parties than female representation. While all parties gaining election in 2006 elected Russians (the major ethnic minority in Ukraine), two parties – the Communist Party and the Party of Regions – had a legislative contingent composed of nearly 40 percent Russians; whereas for the two parties with weaker links to the Russian minority – Our Ukraine and the Timoshenko Bloc – Russians comprised less than 18 percent of those elected.

The difference in average party size between minorities and women was not as striking as concentration but was still substantial. In some countries such as Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Israel, minorities tended to be elected in parties that were half the size, or less, of parties electing women. In particular, Croatia and Israel matched the stereotype of systems that promoted the election of minorities through very small “microparties”. On the other hand, our findings also demonstrate that even though ethnic minorities tend to get elected by mobilizing in ethnic parties those ethnic parties are not always small. Large ethnic parties in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Sri Lanka were prominent players in their countries’ party systems and the party that elected the most ethnic Russians in Ukraine was also that country’s largest party in 2006. This suggests that countries with ethnic minorities large enough to support a relatively large ethnic party may not experience the same tensions regarding party size when using proportional representation to promote the election of historically marginalized groups. However, the two largest ethnic parties in our dataset, the Movement for Rights and Freedom, the Turkish party in Bulgaria, and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) tended to elect very few women, a trend that deserves much closer investigation since it suggests that under certain

circumstances countries with larger ethnic parties may actually experience more tensions between female and minority representation not less.⁵⁸

Why Do Women Balance and Ethnic Minorities Mobilize?

The tendency for women to achieve representation through gender balancing within larger parties and ethnic minorities to gain access to the legislature through mobilization in smaller ethnic parties arises from the divergent natures of gender and ethnicity as social cleavages. As Htun points out: "In countries where it is mobilized, ethnicity is a central, if not *the* central principle of political behavior; gender, though occasionally a consideration, almost never defines how individuals vote and what parties they affiliate with."⁵⁹ In studies of American voting patterns, African-American voters have a much stronger group identity than women.⁶⁰ While countries often experience a gender gap in voter behavior, such differences based on gender pale in comparison to the type of mobilization manifest by ethnic groups in countries where ethnicity is politicized.

This difference in politicization produces two important consequences that cause differential modes of mobilization for electoral representation. First, the greater politicization of ethnicity tends to infuse certain minority ethnic groups with a greater group solidarity and cohesion that is absent among the broader and less politicized category of gender. Ethnic groups often form very cohesive voting blocs in which the vast majority of members of an ethnic category vote for a particular party at the exclusion of all other parties. Such cohesive voting behavior is a key ingredient in the mix of factors necessary for the formation of parties based on ascriptive group identity.⁶¹ In ethnically divided societies such as Belgium, Switzerland, Sri Lanka or Nigeria such ethnic voting can be manifest through parties that dominate the whole

party system or the phenomenon can be more limited to the emergence of ethnic parties in otherwise non-ethnic party systems (e.g., Welsh and Scottish parties in Great Britain, the Bloc Quebecois in Canada, or the Turkish party in Bulgaria.) Of course, this "voting bloc" mentality does not necessarily result in the production of ethnic parties as seen in the absence of ethnic parties in the United States despite the salience of ethnic voting, particularly among African Americans.⁶²

Conversely, as a voter constituency, women have tended to vote much less cohesively than politicized ethnic minorities and thus have not been shown to coalesce around a single party to the exclusion of all others. In part, this is due to the sheer size and diversity of the category but also, no doubt, due to the fact that gender tends to be a less salient and less divisive cleavage than ethnicity. For evidence of this dynamic one needs to look no further than the record of women's parties. As shown above, such parties rarely emerge and are highly vulnerable to incursions into their constituencies from other parties. Even more telling are countries with extremely low electoral thresholds like Israel, which has experienced a proliferation of parties representing a wide variety of ethnic, religious, and other "sectoral" groups in society (many of which win only one or two seats in the Knesset) but has not had a stable women's party capable of consistently winning representation.⁶³ In short, while ethnic differences are not always a source of partisan cleavage and identity, they consistently provide the potential for cohesive bloc voting based on group identity in a variety of institutional, political, economic, and cultural contexts, which in turn promotes the emergence of parties based on these identities. Gender does not produce similar voting behavior, at least not to as great an extent as ethnicity, and thus tends not to lead to gender-based parties.

The greater politicization of ethnicity helps to explain why minority ethnic groups tend to be better able to mobilize in parties than women. However, this does not necessarily explain why minority ethnic groups tend to achieve less representation than women through balancing within larger parties. Indeed, given that ethnic minorities provide the potential to deliver cohesive and stable blocs of votes, one could imagine that large, non-ethnic parties would attempt to appeal to these constituencies with a balancing strategy in order to benefit from the potential windfall of electoral support. Arguably, including members of an ethnic minority could lead to a greater electoral pay-off than including women on a party list due to higher partisan loyalty of the former.

One could view the greater tendency toward balancing for women as opposed to ethnic minorities as simply a consequence of the mobilization dynamic described above. Parties may include members of social groups that are un-mobilized in their own parties (such as women) because they face less competition for the group's vote than mobilized groups (such as ethnic minorities), which tend to have their own parties. While this is part of the story, we argue that tendencies toward balancing party lists with members of marginalized social categories are primarily influenced by the level of social distance between the category in question and the party's core constituency. In short, we argue that women are more likely to achieve representation than ethnic minorities through balancing on large party lists because of the exclusionary nature of politicized ethnic identity and the more inclusionary nature of gender differences. As Chandra notes when defining ethnic parties, such parties appeal:

“to voters as the champion of the interests of one ethnic category or set of categories to the exclusion of others . . . The key aspect of this definition is *exclusion*. An ethnic party may champion the interests of more than one ethnic category, but only by identifying the common ethnic enemy to be excluded.”⁶⁴

Given the level of exclusion inherent in salient ethnic cleavages the reason that balancing is not normally practiced is that it tends to entail high costs. Parties that include ethnic minorities that are not well assimilated within the majority population stand to lose a significant level of support from their core constituency, which may offset any gain from the minority votes won. While it is not unimaginable that parties may lose some male voters if they include some females on their list, such a risk is much smaller and reserved for parties representing the most conservative and patriarchal constituencies.⁶⁵ Moreover, given the greater salience of ethnic divisions, incorporation of elites from ethnic minorities could involve greater policy compromises from non-ethnic parties. Since women are such a large social category, they tend to be more diverse in their socioeconomic, political, and ideological backgrounds and policy preferences. Thus, parties from across the political spectrum can find female candidates who hold their ideological views.⁶⁶ However, in ethnically divided societies, nomination of minority elites who can legitimately speak for their communities and deliver the group's bloc of votes inevitably entails taking stands on divisive issues that may alienate large swaths of the electorate from the majority ethnic group that may form the core constituency for non-ethnic parties.

Institutional Remedies: Bundling and Segregation of Preferential Rules

So far we have argued that while proportional representation promotes both the election of women and ethnic minorities it does so in distinct ways. This suggests that electoral engineers face a trade-off when employing PR to enhance inclusion. PR electoral systems can either promote gender balancing through larger parties or ethnic mobilization through smaller parties. However, on closer inspection, the contrasting avenues by which women and minorities gain elected office do not pose an insurmountable tradeoff between increasing women's and minority

representation as long as practitioners are mindful of the underlying distinctions in the patterns of female and minority representation.

We offer two institutional remedies for the apparent tension between female and minority representation: bundling and segregation. Bundling entails combining electoral rules that favor women and minorities (specifically, gender quotas and low electoral thresholds) so that they mitigate the detrimental side effects of each other. Segregation involves applying special rules only to a targeted social group (namely, a special lower threshold or reserved seats for minorities) that are not applied to other electoral actors. The intention here is to insulate the rest of the party system from effects of these rules that may undermine the election of other underrepresented groups.

One notable tool for increasing women's representation is the gender quota. Gender quotas have received increased attention due to their remarkable effects on female representation under certain conditions as well as the dramatic increase in their use across the globe.⁶⁷ While there remains substantial controversy over their normative and practical utility as a vehicle of women's representation⁶⁸, in many countries, gender quotas have served as a "fast track" for female candidates to be elected, particularly in new democracies where the alternative may be to wait for long-term social change to promote women into positions of power.⁶⁹ Quota provisions vary greatly, from 5 percent in Nepal to 50 percent in France, but the higher the quota the more women are likely to be elected.⁷⁰ Dahlerup and Freindenvall argue that quotas must be "robust" by ensuring sufficient specification of placement mandates and sanctions for non-compliance.⁷¹ Large quotas couple with placement mandates such as zipper quotas, which require that female and male candidates alternate on the party list, can approximate a 50/50 gender balance. So, although quotas do not guarantee increased women's representation, when they are combined

with placement mandates and effective enforcement their effects on the election of women can be profound.⁷²

In this study, we are particularly interested in how gender quotas can mitigate the negative effect of small party magnitude on the election of women. As noted above, in countries with significant ethnic cleavages, a low electoral threshold (produced by a high district magnitude and a low legal threshold) could promote the election of minorities through ethnic parties but harm the election of women by producing small parties. However, gender quotas could ensure that smaller parties also nominate women to winnable slots on their party lists.

Schmidt and Saunders prove that gender quotas in Peru had a greater effect on the election of women than party magnitude.⁷³ Similarly, Jones concludes in his study of 14 Latin American countries that gender quotas matter more than party magnitude.⁷⁴ As we have shown, larger parties that pull candidates from deeper into their list are more likely to elect women candidates while smaller parties elect fewer women because male candidates hold higher spots on the party list.⁷⁵ However, as shown in Figure 3, gender quotas can mitigate the harm done to female representation by smaller parties because gender quotas increase the election of women in parties of all sizes by requiring all parties, large or small, to put women on their party list. If quota legislation also utilizes placement mandates, women candidates are more regularly nominated in winnable spots on the list.⁷⁶ As a result, parties with a sufficiently strong quota that elect as few as two candidates could produce female representatives in the same proportion as much larger parties (see Figure 3).⁷⁷ Essentially, gender quotas can make party size irrelevant to the election of women, as women are elected by both small and large parties.⁷⁸

The absence of either element would produce detrimental effects for the neglected underrepresented group. An electoral system with low thresholds and no gender quotas would

potentially elect high numbers of minorities but few women while a system with gender quotas and high thresholds would promote greater representation of women but few minorities. Given the tensions between women and minority representation under PR discussed here, we suggest that in order to maximize both women and minority representation electoral engineers must consider the combination of low thresholds, which benefit ethnic parties, and gender quotas that encourage the election of women as a vital institutional instrument. Finally, it is important to note that such a combination could also address the chronic under-representation of minority women around the world. Minority women enjoy less representation than both their male and majority female counterparts. The introduction of gender quotas among ethnic parties would be a powerful instrument for advancement of descriptive representation in this arena.⁷⁹

Alternatively, countries can utilize a process of segregation in order to limit the detrimental side effects of preferential rules designed to help a particular social group. Special lower legal thresholds for ethnic parties and reserved seats for ethnic minorities represent the most relevant form of this institutional configuration. Lower legal thresholds, which, as discussed above, are essential for the representation of small ethnic minorities, can promote the proliferation of smaller parties and thus may undermine the election of other groups like women that benefit from larger parties. Such party proliferation has also been seen as detrimental to governance in general because it makes forming and maintaining majority coalitions more difficult. However, one way to lessen the impact of low legal thresholds yet retain their benefits for ethnic minorities is to apply lower thresholds only to parties representing ethnic minorities. Romania represents the most extreme form of this type of positive discrimination in favor of ethnic minority representation. Romania allows ethnic parties that do not win any seats to parliament under its nation-wide legal threshold (5 percent in 2004) the right to one legislative

seat if they win 5 percent of the votes needed to elect one legislator, a threshold that has amounted to less than 1500 votes.⁸⁰ This system has allowed literally dozens of ethnic parties to achieve legislative representation while maintaining a relatively high legal threshold for the rest of the party system that has promoted relatively large non-ethnic parties. Reserved seats for minorities work in much the same way by establishing an electoral arena for minority representation that is separated from the rest of the party system. By limiting the electoral consequences of preferential measures for ethnic minorities to only those parties representing the target groups, the rest of the electoral system is relatively unaffected and thus other groups avoid the externalities of these measures.

Conclusions


In this paper, we have attempted to illustrate that while proportional representation electoral systems are likely to be more conducive for the representation of both women and ethnic minorities, they promote the inclusion of traditionally marginalized groups in very different ways. Women tend to achieve increased representation through gender balancing within party lists of major parties while ethnic minorities rely more on mobilization through ethnic parties outside the mainstream party structure. In the absence of additional electoral rules designed to enhance inclusion, these two strategies can come into conflict because balancing is best achieved through larger parties while mobilization is optimized through smaller parties. Thus, unless electoral engineers are attentive to this potential tension, a PR system may inadvertently include rules that enhance the prospects for representation of ethnic minorities at the expense of representation for women and vice versa.

We suggest that there are two ways out of this conundrum. First, countries can “bundle” low legal thresholds and gender quotas. Such a *combination* of rules not only offers rules favorable to both women and minorities but actually helps to mitigate the detrimental side effects that may emerge when either step is used alone. Conversely, in countries with relatively high legal thresholds (and thus the propensity to produce fewer, larger parties) it is recommended that parties representing ethnic minorities be provided special opportunities for representation not available to mainstream parties either through lower thresholds applied only to ethnic minority parties or reserved seats. This would allow minorities increased representation through ethnic parties while maintaining rules for the rest of the party system that enhances the prospects for women’s representation.

These findings have several important implications. First, there does not appear to be a single, universal electoral arrangement capable of resolving issues of inclusion for all groups in society. In particular, proportional representation by itself is shown not to be an institutional panacea for problems of inclusion. Second, electoral rules are double-edged swords that can have positive results for the inclusion of certain marginalized groups while having detrimental effects on the representation of other groups that have suffered discrimination. In particular, rules designed to lower the electoral threshold of representation (high district magnitudes and low legal thresholds) do not automatically lead to greater inclusion of all marginalized groups. They promote the representation of groups with cohesive, mobilized constituencies through the emergence of small, niche parties (e.g., ethnic parties) but can actually harm the representation of more diffuse groups such as women that rely on mainstream parties including their members within their normal nomination procedures. Finally, special provisions, such as gender quotas, designed to promote the representation of a particular social category may indirectly enhance the

representation of other social groups by making other rules that benefit them (such as very low legal thresholds) less damaging and thus more acceptable. This realization may broaden the constituency for special provisions that individualize electoral systems by promoting a coalition of forces dedicated to increased levels of gender and ethnic representation that is based on the self-interest of each component social category.

Figure 1: Balancing Tendency and Women's Representation



Key
♂ = male
♀ = female
♂ = ethnic minority

Figure 2: Mobilizing Tendency and Minority Representation





Figure 3: Party Size and Quotas

Small Party:



Large Party:





Table 1: Women’s Parties Winning At Least One Legislative Seat, 1974-2001

| Party | Country and Election Year | Electoral System | Percentage of the Vote | Number (%) of Legislative Seats |
|--|---------------------------|------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Women’s Alliance | Iceland 1983 | PR | 5.5 | 3 (5) |
| Women’s Alliance | Iceland 1987 | PR | 10.2 | 6 (10) |
| Women’s Alliance | Iceland 1991 | PR | n/a | 5 (8) |
| Women’s Alliance | Iceland 1995 | PR | n/a | 3 (5) |
| Women, Make Policy! | Switzerland 1995 | PR | 1.5 | 1 (0.5) |
| Women of Russia | Russia 1993 | Mixed | 8.3 | 23 (5) |
| Women of Russia | Russia 1995 | Mixed | 4.6 | 3 (0.7) ^a |
| Shamiran Women’s Movement | Armenia 1995 | Mixed | 16.9 | 12 (6) |
| Lithuanian Women’s Party | Lithuania 1996 | Mixed | 3.7 | 1 (0.7) ^a |
| Women’s Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan | Kyrgyzstan 2000 | Mixed | 12.7 | 2 (3) ^b |

^aSeats won in single-member districts. Parties did not overcome legal threshold in the PR tier of the election.

^bSeats won in PR tier of election. Only 15 out of 60 seats were elected according to PR rules. The two seats won by the Women’s Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan represent 13 percent of all PR seats. Kyrgyz elections are generally regarded as highly flawed and failing to meet international standards of transparency and competitiveness. The country was rated as not free by Freedom House at the time of this election.

**Table 2: Ethnic Minority Parties That Won Seats in Most Recent Elections
in 14 European Countries with PR Systems**

| Country | Year | # of Ethnic Parties | # of Seats Won by Ethnic Parties | % of Total Seats Won by Ethnic Parties |
|-----------|------|---------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| Albania | 2005 | 1 | 2 | 1.4 |
| Belgium | 2007 | 4 | 61 | 40.7 |
| Bulgaria | 2005 | 1 | 34 | 14.2 |
| Croatia | 2007 | 4 | 10 | 6.5 |
| Denmark | 2007 | 3 | 3 | 1.7 |
| Finland | 2007 | 1 | 10 | 5.0 |
| Italy | 2008 | 3 | 70 | 11.1 |
| Latvia | 2006 | 1 | 17 | 17.0 |
| Macedonia | 2006 | 6 | 29 | 24.2 |
| Romania | 2004 | 18 | 39 | 11.7 |
| Serbia | 2008 | 7 | 19 | 7.6 |
| Slovakia | 2006 | 1 | 20 | 13.3 |
| Slovenia | 2004 | 1 | 2 | 2.2 |
| Spain | 2008 | 3 | 22 | 6.3 |

Table 3: Election of Women and Ethnic Minorities in Eight Countries

| Country | % of Women Elected | % of Minorities Elected | Female Concentration (Average % of Women within Parties that Elected Women) | Minority Concentration (Average % of Minorities within Parties that Elected Minorities) | Average Size of Party for Women Legislators | Average Size of Party for Minority Legislators |
|-----------|--------------------|-------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| Bulgaria | 22.1 | 11.7 | 28.4 | 82.5 | 55.4 | 34.0 |
| Croatia | 20.3 | 5.2 | 24.7 | 100.0 | 54.0 | 1.8 |
| Macedonia | 30.8 | 28.2 | 36.3 | 97.0 | 23.1 | 11.7 |
| Romania | 9.1 | 12.1 | 18.0 | 100.0 | 69.0 | 12.6 |
| Slovakia | 18.7 | 13.3 | 19.1 | 90.5 | 33.2 | 20.0 |
| Ukraine | 7.3 | 28.0 | 7.7 | 31.6 | 137.1 | 152.8 |
| Israel | 13.4 | 10.2 | 21.2 | 73.7 | 20.5 | 8.3 |
| Sri Lanka | 5.9 | 29.0 | 6.5 | 54.5 | 82.0 | 59.4 |
| Average | 15.9 | 16.8 | 20.2 | 78.7 | 53.4 | 37.6 |

Bibliography

- Barkan, Joel, "Elections in Agrarian Societies," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6 (October 1995): 106-116.
- Bauer, Gretchen, "Party Quotas versus Reserved Seats: Comparing Electoral Gender Quotas for Parliament in East and Southern Africa," Prepared for the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30-September 2, 2007.
- Bratton, KA and LP Ray, "Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2002): 428-437.
- Cameron, C., Epstein, D. and O'Halloran S., 1996. "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" *American Political Science Review*, 90: 794-812.
- Caul, M. 1999. "Women's Representation in Parliament: the Role of Political Parties," *Party Politics*. (January).
- Caul, M. 2001. "Political parties and the adoption of candidate gender quotas: A cross-national analysis." *Journal of Politics* 63, 4:1214-29.
- Chandra, K. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head count in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Chandra, K. 2005, "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability." *Perspectives on Politics* . Vol 3(2): 235-252.
- Chandra, K. and D. Metz, 2002. "A New Cross-National Database on Ethnic Parties," Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston.
- Dahlerup, D. ed. 2006, *Women, Quotas and Politics*. New York: Routledge.
- Dahlerup, D. and Freidenvall, L. 2005. Quotas as a 'Fast Track' to Equal Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia is No Longer the Model. *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7 (1): 26-48.
- Diamond, L. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.
- Engstrom, R., 1987. District Magnitude and the Election of Women to the Irish Dail. *Electoral Studies* 6 (1), 123-132.
- Epstein D. and O'Halloran S. 1999 "Measuring the Electoral and Policy Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts" *American Journal of Political Science* 43: 367-95.

- Fish, M. S., 2002. Islam and Authoritarianism. *World Politics* 55, (1): 4-37.
- Hardy-Fanta, C., Lien, P., Sierra C.M., Pinderhughes, D.M. 2007. A New Look at Paths to Political Office: Moving Women of Color from the Margins to the Center. Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, August 30 – September 2, 2007.
- Hassim, S. 1999. *Women's Organizations and Democracy in South Africa: Contesting Authority*. Madison: Wisconsin Press.
- Highton, B. 2004. white votes and African-American Candidates for Congress. *Political Behavior*. 26 (1):1-25.
- Horowitz, D. 1985. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Htun, M. 2004. Is Gender like Ethnicity? The political Representation of Identity Groups. *Perspectives on Politics* 2 (3): 439-458.
- Inglehart, R and Norris, P. 2002. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. 2003. The True Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Policy*: 63-70.
- Ishiyama, J.T. 2003. Women's Parties in Post Communist Politics. *East European Politics and Societies* 17:266-304
- Jones, M. 2007. Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election of Women: Evidence from the Latin American Vanguard.
- Jones, M. 2006. The Desirability of Gender Quotas: Considering Context and Design. *Politics & Gender* 1 (4): 645-652.
- Jones, M. 2004. Quota Legislation and the Election of Women: Learning from the Costa Rican Experience. *Journal of Politics* 66 (4): 1203-1223.
- Kenworthy, L. and Malami, M. 1999. Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis. *Social Forces* 78 (1): 235-268.
- Kittilson, M. 2005. In Support of Gender Quotas: Setting New Standards Bringing Visible Gains. *Politics & Gender* 1 (4): 638-645.
- Krook, M. 2006. Reforming Representation: The Diffusion of Candidate Gender Quotas Worldwide. *Politics & Gender* 2 (3): 303-327.
- Kymlicka, W. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Kymlicka, W. 1999. "Liberal Complacencies," in Okin. *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?:* 31-34.
- Larsrud, S. and Taphorn, R. 2007. Designing for Equality: Women's quotas and women's political participation. *Development*. 50 (1): 36-42.
- Lijphart, A. 1984. *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian & Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lijphart, A. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lijphart, A. 2004. Constitutional Choices for Divided Societies. *Journal of Democracy* 15: 96-109.
- Linz, J., Stepan, A., 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lovenduski, J. and Norris, P. 1993. *Gender and Party Politics*. London: Sage.
- Lublin, D. 1999. Racial redistricting and African-American representation: A critique of 'do majority-minority districts maximize substantive black representation in Congress? *American Political Science Review* 93 (1): 183-86.
- Lublin, D. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Matland, R. E., 1993. Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures: The Case of Norway. *Journal of Politics* 55 (3): 737-755.
- Matland, R. E., 1998. Women's Legislative Representation in National Legislatures: A Comparison of Democracies in Developed and Developing Countries. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28 (1): 109-125.
- Matland, R. E., Studlar, D. T., 1996. The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single Member and Multi-Member Districts. *Journal of Politics* 58 (3): 707-733.
- Matland, R. E., Taylor, M. A., 1997. Electoral System Effect on Women's Representation: Theoretical Arguments and Evidence from Costa Rica. *Comparative Political Studies* 30 (2): 186-210.
- Moser, R. G. 2001. The Effects of Electoral Systems on Women's Representation in Postcommunist States. *Electoral Studies* 20 (3): 353-369.
- Moser, R.G. 2001. *Unexpected Outcomes*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

- Moser, R. G. and Holmsten, S. 2008. Do Ethnic Parties Discriminate Against Women? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.
- Norris, P. 1985. Women in European Legislative Elites. *West European Politics*. 8 (4): 90-101.
- Norris, P., 1987. *Politics and Sexual Equality*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder.
- Norris, P., 1993. Conclusions: Comparing Legislative Recruitment. In: Lovenduski J., Norris P. (Eds.), *Gender and Party Politics*. Sage, London, pp. 314-315.
- Norris, P., 2004. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Okin, S. M. 1999. *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Philpot, T. and Walton, H. 2007. "One of Our Own: Black Female Candidates and the Voters Who Support Them," *American Journal of Political Science*, 51, 1: 49-62.
- Reeves, K. 1997. *Voting Hopes or Fears? White Voters, Black Candidates and Racial Politics in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Reynolds, A., "The Case for Proportionality," *Journal of Democracy*, (October 1995), 86-99.
- Reynolds, A. 1999. *Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Reynolds, A. 1999. Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World. *World Politics* 51 (4): 547-572.
- Rule, W. 1987. Electoral systems, contextual factors and women's opportunity for election to parliament in 23 democracies. *Western Political Quarterly* 40: 477-498.
- Rule, W. and Zimmerman J.F., eds. 1994. *Electoral systems in comparative perspective: Their impact on women and minorities*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Sanbonmatsu, K. 2002. Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice. *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (1): 20-34.
- Schmidt, G. and Saunders, K. 2004. "Effective Quotas, Relative Party Magnitude, and the Success of Female Candidates." *Comparative Political Studies* 37, 6: 704-724.
- Terkildsen, N. 1993. When White Votes Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice and Self-Monitoring. *American Journal of Political Science* 37(4): 1032-53.
- Young, I. 2002. *Inclusion and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Williams, L. 1989. White/Black Perceptions of the Electability of Black Political Candidates. *National Political Science Review* 2:45-64.

Zipp J.F., and Plutzer E. 1985. Gender Differences in Voting for Female Candidates: Evidence from the 1982 Election. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49(2): 179-97.

Notes

¹ The literature on the political effects of female and minority representation is less well developed than the literature on its causes. For effects of gender and/or ethnic representation see Bratton and Ray 2002; Carroll 2001; and Norris 2004. Moreover, there is a lively debate, particularly in American politics, regarding whether steps taken to increase minority representation enhance or inadvertently undermine minority interests. See Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1999; and Epstein and O'Halloran 1999.

² Excluding ethnic minorities from legislative representation has long been considered a threat to democratic consolidation. See, for example, Lijphart 1984, 22-23. Recent cultural studies of the relationship between Islam and democratization have emphasized the central role of gender equality in democratization. Both Fish 2002 and Norris and Inglehart 2002 emphasize gender inequality rather than the infusion of religious and state authority as the central cultural obstacle facing the introduction of democracy in predominantly Islamic countries.

³ See, for example, op-ed articles such as Maureen Dowd, "Duel of Historical Guilts," *New York Times*, March 5, 2008 and Mark Leibovich, "Rights vs. Rights: An Improbable Collision Course," *New York Times*, January 13, 2008.

⁴ The classifications of cross-cutting versus coinciding cleavages are taken from Htun 2004, 441-444. In this paper, we use the terms ethnic group, ethnic minority, and ethnic category interchangeably to refer to those social categories that form a subgroup of a country's population defined by ascriptive characteristics and based on what Max Weber called "a subjective belief in their common descent" (Weber 1978, 389). We follow the definition proposed by Chandra and Metz (2002, 10) who define an ethnic group as "an impersonal social category in which

membership is determined by inherited attributes and which comprises a subgroup of a country's population." According to this definition, ethnicity is something inherited "that one acquires at birth from one's parents ... [including] physical and biological features (height, hair, skin colour) as well as the sum total of the histories of one's parents and ancestors (e.g. parents occupation, place of birth, religion, language, etc.)" (Chandra and Metz 2002, 10). Such a definition captures the fixed nature of ethnic identity through inherited characteristics as well as the dynamic nature of this same social category through the passing down of attributes acquired during one's lifetime (e.g., a new language, religion, region) to future generations (see Chandra and Metz 2002, 10-12). By emphasizing ascription, rather than self-identity or mobilization, this definition of ethnicity also emphasizes the proximity of this social classification to gender (also an ascriptive and predominantly inherited social category).

⁵ Taylor 1994.

⁶ Kymlicka 1995

⁷ Young 1999

⁸ Okin 1995, 9

⁹ Okin 1995, 17

¹⁰ Okin 1995, 22

¹¹ Philpot and Walton 2007. See also Reeves 1997, Terhildsen 1993, Williams 1989, Highton 2004

¹² See Alder 2001

¹³ See Tate 1993

¹⁴ Philpot and Walton 2007. See also Sanbonmatsu 2002, Zipp and Pluttzer 1985

¹⁵ Philpot and Walton 2007: 51

¹⁶ Philpot and Walton. See also Gurin 1985

¹⁷ Hardy-Fanta, Lien, Sierra and Pinderhughes 2007, 29.

¹⁸ Htun 2004.

¹⁹ Mieke Verloo, 2006, Multiple Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union, *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13 (3): 211-228, 213.

²⁰ Mona Lena Krook & D. O'Brien. 2007. The Politics of Group Representation: Quotas for Women and Minorities Worldview. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 12-15.

²¹ Hughes 2007.

²² Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," pp. 99-100. For similar advocacy of PR for ethnically divided societies see, Linz and Stepan, pp. 33-34 and Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1999), 104.

²³ Matland and Taylor 1997.

²⁴ Bacchi in Dahlerup 2006

²⁵ See, for example, Norris 1985; Rule and Zimmerman 1992; Reynolds 1999; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; and Norris 2004. However, Matland 1998 found that PR did not have the same positive effect on women's representation in less developed states that it did in developed democracies and Moser 2001 found that in mixed electoral systems the PR tier tended to promote the election of women in established democracies but not in new democracies in post-communist states.

²⁶ Norris 2004, 187.

²⁷ Matland and Studlar 1996, 709.

²⁸ This is not to say that all parties tend to nominate women to an equal degree. Absent formal or informal rules requiring all parties to meet certain levels of female nomination, studies have shown distinct variations among parties in the number of women nominated and their placement in winnable positions on party lists. In general, leftist parties have tended to be more “women-friendly” than others. See Lovenduski and Norris 1993, Caul 1999, and Norris 2004, 187. Such differentiation does not negate the tendency toward balancing since the strategy signifies only that female nominations are spread across parties rather than concentrated in a single party specifically designated for the purpose of electing women.

²⁹ Norris 1993, 314-315; Matland and Studlar 1996, 709.

³⁰ While it is still possible to balance nominations according to gender in first-past-the-post elections, incentives to produce a balanced set of nominations based on gender or any other ascriptive quality is severely limited because each district contest takes on its own individual character and is typically insulated from all other contests. Local party elites tend to be focused on winning their local contest and thus nominate candidates with little regard to how they fit into a party’s national slate of candidates. See Norris 2004, 188-189.

³¹ In first-past-the-post elections, margin of victory does not matter. Since many incumbents are in districts with safe seats losing even a significant number of votes to a party nominating a different type of candidate (e.g. a woman) is unlikely to arouse a strategic reaction from large parties. However, in PR elections loss of even a small proportion of the vote may lead to a shift in the distribution of seats and thus will more likely lead to strategic emulation of gender balancing. See Matland and Studlar 1996, 712-713.

³² See Engstrom 1987, Matland 1993, Rule 1987

³³ Matland and Taylor 1997. For empirical verification of the impact of party magnitude see Jones 2004 and Schmidt and Saunders 2004.

³⁴ The authors searched the Binghamton University Election Archive database for parties that had “women,” “woman,” or “feminist” in their names. We also searched the Elections Around the World dataset for women’s parties. This website has a list of political parties from all countries classified by ideology, which was used to identify feminist parties competing in elections.

³⁵ Hardason and Kristinsson 2001.

³⁶ Ishiyama 2003, 280-281.

³⁷ See Moser 2001. The top three candidates on party lists were important because their names appeared on the ballot under the names and symbols for each party.

³⁸ Ishiyama 2003, 289.

³⁹ Ishiyama 2003, 290-291.

⁴⁰ Hassim 2006, 176

⁴¹ Hassim 2006, 195

⁴² Hassim 2006, 216.

⁴³ Hassim, 2006 219

⁴⁴ Dahlerup 2006, 45.

⁴⁵ Chandra 2005, 236.

⁴⁶ Horowitz 1985, 83-85.

⁴⁷ Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” *Perspectives on Politics* (2005), 3: 235-252.

⁴⁸ Reynolds argues that the PR system used in South Africa resulted in ethnically balanced party lists and the introduction of proportional representation contests as part of the mixed electoral system in New Zealand produced significantly more minority nominations and representation, resulting in a three-fold increase in the number of Maori representatives. See Reynolds 1995 and Miller 2005, 203-205.

⁴⁹ It should be noted that Chandra's study of India examined a country with a plurality electoral system, which arguably provides greater incentives to nominate minority candidates in districts with large numbers of geographically concentrated ethnic minorities.

⁵⁰ The empirical evidence on the hypothesis that PR systems provide for greater minority representation than majoritarian systems is mixed. Majoritarian electoral systems may provide certain advantages when minorities are geographically concentrated. Barkan has found that ethnic minorities are so geographically concentrated that majoritarian elections could produce levels of minority representation equal to that of PR systems. However, Lijphart and others argue that PR systems are preferable because they provide opportunities for representation through the mobilization of minorities irrespective of geographic concentration. Moreover, Taagepera argues that parties devoted to the representation of ethnic minorities are counterproductive in countries with single-member-district elections because minor parties do not win enough seats to play a meaningful role in governing coalitions in the two-party systems that typically emerge under such electoral systems. See Barkan 1995, Lijphart 2004, and Taagepera 1992.

⁵¹ Norris 2004, 210-213. Norris includes a fourth step, increased support for governance structures, because she examines the political consequences of the increased representation that is presumed to derive from PR systems.

⁵² See Lijphart 2004.

⁵³ The authors classified ethnic parties as those that appealed to a particular ethnic group or set of ethnic groups based on religion, race, language, ethnicity, or region. We used *Europa World Yearbook*, which provides descriptions of political parties for countries around the world, and election reports in *Electoral Studies* to determine whether a party made appeals to an ethnic group a central element of its party program. Only parties that won seats to the legislature were considered.

⁵⁴ These figures match findings by Kanchan Chandra who is assembling a new database on ethnic parties worldwide. Initial results based on European countries suggest that ethnic parties are a common occurrence (119 ethnic parties were reported to exist in 1996) and most of these (over 75%) were parties appealing to ethnic minorities. See Chandra and Metz 2002.

⁵⁵ For some of our cases (Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Sri Lanka), ethnicity or religion (in the case of Sri Lanka) was provided in deputies' biographies. In other cases (Bulgaria, Ukraine, Israel), we relied on expert analysis to determine the ethnicity of individual deputies.

⁵⁶ Specifically, for each deputy we recorded the size and the share of women and minorities elected by his or her party.

⁵⁷ By calculating a country's average party size and female and minority concentration in this way we exclude from our analysis parties that do not elect any women or minorities. We think this is justified because we are attempting to compare the parties through which women and minorities are elected and parties that did not elect any women or minorities are not relevant and would skew our analysis. Moreover, by calculating the mean using data at the level of individual legislator we weight the average by the number of women or minorities elected from each party.

For example, in Israel 17 women were elected in six different parties with party sizes of: 5, 7, 12, 14, 19, and 32. If we took the standard (unweighted) mean of these parties we would get an average party size for parties electing women of 14.8. However, the six parties electing women in Israel did not do so in equal shares. Six women came from the party with 32 total legislators while only one woman came from the parties with 5 and 7 legislators. By calculating the mean weighted by the number of female deputies elected for each party we get a mean party size for parties electing women of 20.5. We believe our weighted mean is a more accurate measure for both party size and female and minority concentration.

⁵⁸ The Movement of Rights and Freedoms elected only two women or 5.9 percent as compared to an average of 28.4 percent females for parties electing women in Bulgaria. The UDMR in Hungary elected no women compared to an average of 18.0 percent women elected in Romanian parties electing women. See also Moser and Holmsten 2008.

⁵⁹ Htun 2004, 439.

⁶⁰ Philpot and Walton 2007, Gurin 1985

⁶¹ Horowitz takes the most extreme position regarding the connection between ethnic voting and ethnic parties by defining the latter in terms of the former. See Horowitz 1985 and Chandra 2005 for a critique of this conceptualization of ethnic parties.

⁶² Moreover, in some contexts scholars have shown that there are only tenuous ties between political parties and ethnic minorities and sometimes political parties take ethnic minority groups' support for granted. Carol Hardy-Fanta, P. Lien, C. Sierra and D. Pinderhughes, "A New Look at Paths to Political Office: Moving Women of Color from the Margins to the Center," Prepared for the Annual Meeting of APSA, 2007: 12. See also Wong 2006, Jones-Correa 1998, and Frymer 2005.

⁶³ In the 2006 elections, out of a total of twelve parties winning seats, seven parties representing ethnic and religious groups won representation as did a party representing pensioners, which won seven seats. Women's parties have existed in Israel and even gained representation but have not been able to sustain a lasting presence. For the history of women's parties in Israel see Hertzog 2005.

⁶⁴ Chandra 2005, 236.

⁶⁵ For example, it has been well-established that left-wing parties tend to nominate more women than right-wing parties but that the latter are not immune to pressures to nominate women. See Reynolds 1999, 566-569 and Caul 1999.

⁶⁶ This can be seen in the diverse ideological views of the recent wave of prominent female presidential candidates in Latin America (not to mention the success of conservative female politicians such as Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain). Michelle Bachelet Jeria, the recently elected president of Chile, is the leader of the Socialist Party and was the candidate of the center-left Concertacion coalition while Lourdes Flores Nano, a leading candidate for president in Peru, is running as the nominee of the more centrist Movimiento Unidad Nacional.

⁶⁷ For an examination of the diffusion of gender quotas see Krook 2006.

⁶⁸ See, for example, two special issues on gender quotas in *Politics & Gender* (December 2005 and March 2006).

⁶⁹ Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, Kittilson 2005, Larsrud and Taphorn 2007, Bauer 2007.

⁷⁰ Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005

⁷¹ Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005. See also Jones 2006 and 2007.

⁷² Jones 2007.

⁷³ Schmidt and Saunders 2004.

⁷⁴ Jones 2007

⁷⁵ See also, Matland and Taylor 1997, Reynolds 1999.

⁷⁶ Matland and Taylor identify two types of seats: winnable and ornamental. They draw from Haaio-Mannila et al's three categories: mandate, fighting and ornamental. The party is certain to hold on to mandate seats, but is hoping to gain swing, "fighting" seats. There is no chance that ornamental seats will be elected.

⁷⁷ Also see Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005

⁷⁸ It should be noted that this argument is predicated upon certain additional characteristics of gender quotas. In addition to the already noted benefit of placement mandates, a national legislative quota that applies to all parties would be more effective than party quotas since the latter could exclude parties that would be most likely to exclude women.

⁷⁹ National legislative quotas would most likely be necessary for this outcome since research has shown that ethnic parties are less likely to adopt gender quotas than their non-ethnic counterparts. See Moser and Holmsten 2008.

⁸⁰ See Ciprian-Calin Alionescu, "Parliamentary Representation of Minorities in Romania," *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. V, No. 1 (2004): 64.