Ian N Proops
Professor — PhD, Harvard University
- E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
Professor Proops joined the Philosophy Department in 2009. He is affiliated with the Center for European Studies.
He works on Kant's theoretical philosophy (especially, The Critique of Pure Reason) and on History of Analytic Philosophy (especially, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein).
He has teaching interests in Early Modern Philosophy (especially Descartes and Leibniz), Hegel/German Idealism, Metaphysics, and the Philosophy of Language.
Professor Proops's recent publications include: "Kant on the Ontological Argument" Nous, 2015); "Russellian Acquaintance Revisited" (Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2014), "Kant on the Cosmological Argument" (Philosophers' Imprint, 2014); "Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions" (The Philosophical Review, April 2011); "Kant's First Paralogism" (The Philosophical Review, October 2010) and "What is Frege's 'conept horse problem'?" (in Sullivan and Potter eds., Wittgenstein's Tractatus" (2013)).
He is currently finishing up a book for Oxford University Press on Kant’s criticisms of speculative metaphysics in the "Dialectic" of the first Critique.
Professor Proops was for six years a founding editor of The Review of Symbolic Logic, where handled submissions on the history of analytic philosophy, and is currently serving as a section-editor (in the same subfield) for Philosophy Compass.
He earned his B.A. in PPE and a B. Phil. (on Kant's Transcendental Idealism under the supervision of Ralph Walker) at Oxford. He went on to earn a Ph.D. from Harvard, where he wrote a disseration on Wittgenstein's Tractatus under the supervision of Warren Goldfarb, Richard Heck, and Charles Parsons. Before coming to Texas, he taught for ten years at the University of Michigan.
This Fall he will be teaching a graduate seminar on Kant and a Plan II Honors Introduction to Philosophy.
"Kant's First Paralogism," The Philosophical Review, vol. 119, no. 4, October 2010, 449-495.
"Russell and the Universalist Conception of Logic," Noûs, 41: 1, 2007, 1–32.
"Russell‘s Reasons for Logicism," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2006, 44:2, 267–92.
"Soames on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Moore and Russell," Philosophical Studies, 2006, 129: 627–635.
"Kant‘s Conception of Analytic Judgment," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, May 2005, vol. 70, no. 3, 588–612.
"Wittgenstein on the Substance of the World,", European Journal of Philosophy, April 2004, 12: 1, 106–126.
"Kant's Legal Metaphor and the Nature of a Deduction", Journal of the History of Philosophy, April 2003, 41: 2, 209–29.
"The Tractatus on Inference and Entailment,"in Erich Reck, ed., From Frege to Wittgenstein: Essays on Early Analytic Philosophy (O.U.P.) 2002, 283–307.
"The New Wittgenstein: a Critique,"European Journal of Philosophy, December 2001, 9: 3, 375–404.
"Logical Syntax in the Tractatus," in Richard Gaskin, ed., Grammar in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy (Routledge), 2001.