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That Alexander's money and favour proved
insufficient and discontent grew are proved by the
two mutinies which he faced in 326 at the Hyphasis
(Beas) river and in 324 at Opis (on the use of the
term 'mutiny' see below). In 326 while at Taxila
Alexander heard that the Indian prince Porus was
defying him, and so marched to do battle at the
Hydaspes river. He was successful, and Porus was
defeated. Rather than return to Taxila to
recuperate and more importantly sit out the monsoon
weather, Alexander ordered his men to continue
their advance into India. His pothos --
personal longing (note again the personal element)
-- to conquer more territory was frustrated when
his men mutinied at the Hyphasis river.[16]
Perhaps more than just seventy days of marching
endlessly through monsoon rains into more unknown
territory was at the heart of the issue. After all,
Curtius says (9.2.3) that King Aggrammes
(sic) was reported to be waiting at the
Delhi gap with a force which included 3,000
elephants. Curtius believed this was true, and we
know that the Nanda kings of Magadha had a more
powerful state than any of the ones Alexander
tangled with so far. Thus, another battle loomed,
one in which Alexander's men had no desire to
participate, and they refused to follow him
further. Alexander sulked in his tent like his
Homeric hero Achilles for three days, but to no
avail. His bluff was called and Coenus,
representing the views of the men, prevailed.
Alexander was forced to turn back, and by late
September 326 he was once again at the Hydaspes.
Coenus' defiance of Alexander earned him little in
the way of reward as a few days after the Hyphasis
mutiny he was found dead in suspicious
circumstances (Arr. 6.2.1, Curt. 9.3.20). The
coincidence is too much, and, as with others who
flouted Alexander (see below), we can see the hand
of a furious and spiteful king at work here.
Athough Alexander might try to disguise the lack of
advance at the Hyphasis river as due to
unfavourable omens (Arr. 5.3.6), no one would be
unaware that the real reason was that the army
en masse simply did not want to go
further.[17] Again needless risk-taking
followed: instead of retracing his steps he went
for another route, through the Gedrosian
desert.[18] Starvation, heat, little water,
and flash flooding had their effects, and as the
march continued the baggage animals had to be
slaughtered for food (Arr. 6.25.2). Plutarch
(Alexander 66.4-5) talks of the army reduced
to a quarter of its original size; although this is
over-exaggeration, there is no doubt that this
march was a major logistical blunder on the part of
Alexander, and that it unnecessarily cost many
lives.
A few years later in 324 Alexander was faced with
another mutiny, this time at Opis, not far from
Babylon. At Opis Alexander announced that his
veteran soldiers and those injured were to be
discharged and that he had ordered new blood from
Macedon.[19] For some reason the older
soldiers saw Alexander's move as tantamount to a
rejection of them and of their capabilities, and
the remaining soldiers had no wish to remain and
fight with Persians and Iranians. For the second
time in his reign Alexander was hit with a mutiny,
this time over his orientalising policy. Once
again, Alexander sulked in his tent for two days,
and then he called his men's bluff by announcing
that Macedonian military commands and titles were
to be transferred to selected Persians. His men
capitulated at once, and the clash was resolved
with the famous banquet, in which Macedonian,
Greek, Persian and Iranian sipped from the same cup
and Alexander prayed for homonoia or concord
(Arr. 7.11.9).[20]
The term 'mutiny' for the army's resistance to
Alexander on both occasions has lately been
queried. For example, Bosworth has this to say on
the Opis incident: 'This protest can hardly be
dignified with the term mutiny that is universally
applied to it. The troops confined themselves to
verbal complaints, but they were contumacious and
wounding.'[21] It is important to look
beyond the immediate context of both 'protests' to
their full implications. The degree to which the
men mouthed insults at the king or criticised his
behaviour and plans is irrelevant. The crucial
point is that in both instances the army as a whole
stood fast against the orders of Alexander. This
was outright rebellion against the king and
commander; refusal to obey the orders of a superior
in this manner is mutiny. The 326 incident ended
only when Alexander agreed to his army's demands to
turn back. Although Alexander's bluff was
successful at Opis, it was only when he cunningly
played on the racial tensions that his men
capitulated. Until that time they had stood fast
against him, and there is no indication of a change
of mood until Alexander adopted the strategy he
did. The Macedonians might well have needed
Alexander in the far east (cf. Arr. 6.12.1-3), but
this did not stop them from defying him when they
felt the situation demanded it. Both incidents were
quite simply mutinies, and as such votes of no
confidence in Alexander as a military commander and
as a king.[22]
Alexander's generalship and actual military
victories may be questioned in several key areas.
For example, after the battle of Issus in 333
Darius fled towards Media, but Alexander pressed on
to Egypt. He did not pursue Darius, as he surely
ought to have done and thus consolidate his gains,
especially when so far from home and with the mood
of the locals so prone to fluctuation, but left him
alone. He was more interested in what lay to the
south: the riches of Babylon and then Susa, or as
Arrian describes them (3.16.2) the 'prizes of the
war'. However, a war can hardly be seen as won if
the opposing king and commander remains at large
and has the potential to regroup. Alexander's
action was lucky for Darius, then, as he was able
to regroup his forces and bring Alexander to battle
again almost two years later, at Gaugamela (331).
It was not lucky for Alexander, though, and
especially so for those men on both sides who fell
needlessly that day in yet another battle.
We have also the various sieges which Alexander
undertook and which were often lengthy, costly, and
questionable. A case in point is that of Tyre in
332 as Alexander made his way to Egypt after his
victory at Issus. In Phoenicia Byblos and Sidon
surrendered to Alexander, as did the island town
(as it was then) of Tyre until the king expressed
his personal desire to sacrifice in the main temple
there. Quite rightly considering his demand
sacrilegious, the Tyrians resisted him and
Alexander, his ego affronted and refusing to back
down, laid siege to the town.[23] The siege
itself lasted several months, cost the king a
fortune in money and manpower, and resulted in the
slaughter of the male Tyrians and the selling of
the Tyrian women and children into slavery. There
is no question that control of Tyre was essential
since Alexander could not afford a revolt of the
Phoenician cities, given their traditional
rivalries, as he pushed on to Egypt. Nor indeed, if
we believe his speech at Arrian 2.17, could he
allow Tyre independence with the Persian navy a
threat and the Phoenician fleet the strongest
contingent in it. However, there was no guarantee
that the destruction of Tyre would result in the
Phoencian fleet surrendering to him as he only
seems to have expected it would (Arr.
2.17.3). Moreover, laying siege to Tyre was not
necessary: he could simply have left a garrison,
for example, on the mainland opposite the town to
keep it in check. Another option, given that the
Tyrians had originally surrendered to him, would
have been the diplomatic one: to recognise the
impiety of his demand in their eyes and thus
relinquish it, thereby continuing on his way
speedily and with their goodwill. Ultimately no
real gain came from his siege except to Alexander
on a purely personal level again: his damaged ego
had been repaired; the cost in time, manpower and
reputation mattered little.
Alexander's great military victories over his
Persian and Indian foes which have so long occupied
a place in popular folklore and been much admired
throughout the centuries are very likely to have
been embellished and nothing like the popular
conceptions of them. A case in point is the battle
of Issus in 333. Darius threw victory away at that
battle and he was, to put it bluntly, a mediocre
commander -- the battle might have been very
different if Alexander had faced a more competent
commander such as Memnon, for example. Alexander
was lucky, but this does not come in the 'official'
account we have of the battle, probably since he
told Callisthenes, the court historian, what to
write about it.
Luck again is the principal factor in Alexander's
victory at Granicus the previous year (334). His
river crossing is commendable, no doubt against
that, but against an outnumbered and hastily-levied
Persian contingent, and with no Great King present
in order to exhort and to lead the troops in
person, it comes as no surprise that the
Macedonians and their superbly drilled phalanx were
victorious. Similarly embellished, perhaps
distorted out of all proportion even, is the
'great' battle against Porus in India at the
Hydaspes river in 326.[24] Alexander
effected a brilliant river crossing against his
Indian foe, given the swelling of that river by the
seasonal rains and melting of the snow in the
Himalayas, but in reality the battle was over
before it began. Porus was outnumbered and
outclassed, and he and his army never stood a
chance. However, we would never know this from our
sources or indeed from the commemorative coinage
which Alexander struck to mark his defeat of Porus,
and which are pure propaganda to exaggerate that
defeat.[25]
The king's own men would know. And word would
filter through to the Macedonians back home.
Alexander's growing orientalism, as seen in his
apparent integration of foreigners into his
administration and army, was a cause of great
discontent as the traditional Macedonian
warrior-king transformed himself into something
akin to a sultan. He began to change his
appearance, preferring a mixture of Persian and
Macedonian clothing, despite the obvious
displeasure of his troops (Arr. 7.8.2), and he had
also assumed the upright tiara, the symbol of
Persian kingship (Arr. 4.7.4). Some saw the writing
on the wall and duly pandered to the king. Thus,
Peucestas, the Macedonian satrap of Persis, was
well rewarded by the king for adopting Persian
dress and learning the Persian language (Arr.
6.30.2-3). However, he was the only Macedonian to
do so according to Arrian.
Significant also was Alexander's attempt to adopt
the Persian custom of proskynesis --
genuflection -- at his court in Bactra in 327, and
his expectation that his men would follow
suit.[26] Proskynesis was a social
act which had long been practised by the Persians
and involved prostrating oneself before the person
of the king in an act of subservience, and thereby
accepting his lordship. The custom however was
regarded as tantamount to worship and thus
sacrilegious to the Greeks -- worship of a god or a
dead hero was one thing, but worship of a person
while still alive quite another. Callisthenes
thwarted Alexander's attempt (Arr. 4.10.5-12.1),
something which the king never forgot and which
would soon cost Callisthenes his life in sadistic
circumstances (Arr. 4.14.1-3, Curt. 8.6.24).
Why Alexander tried to introduce proskynesis
is unknown. Perhaps he was simply attempting to
create a form of social protocol common to
Macedonians, Greeks and Persians. However, he would
have been well aware of the religious connotations
associated with the act and hence its implications
for his own being. It was plain stupidity on his
part if he thought his men would embrace the custom
with relish, and his action clearly shows that he
had lost touch with his army and the religious
beliefs on which he had been raised. Evidence for
this may be seen in the motives for the Pages'
Conspiracy, a serious attempt on Alexander's life,
which occurred not long after Alexander tried to
enforce proskynesis on all. A more likely
explanation for the attempt to introduce
proskynesis is that Alexander now thought of
himself as divine (cf. Arr. 4.9.9, Curt. 8.5.5),
and thus proskynesis was a logical means of
recognising his divine status in public by all men
(see below).
Indeed, Alexander's belief that he was divine
impacts adversely on any evaluation of him. History
is riddled with megalomaniacs who along the way
suffered from divine pretensions, and the epithet
'Great' is not attached to them. Regardless of
whether his father Philip II was worshipped as a
god on his death,[27] Alexander seems not
to have been content with merely following in his
footsteps but to believe in his own divine status
while alive.[28]
Alexander had visited the oracle of Zeus Ammon in
the oasis at Siwah in the winter of 332, shortly
after his entry into Egypt, and there he apparently
received confirmation from the priests that he was
a son of Zeus.[29] From that time onwards
he openly called himself son of Zeus as opposed to
descendant of Zeus. It is important to stress the
distinction since he was technically a descendant
of Zeus through Heracles. That sort of association
the people would have accepted, but they baulked at
Alexander at first setting himself up as a son of a
god even though born from a mortal mother. Later,
as his megalomania increased, he would believe he
was divine while alive. Thus, during the Opis
mutiny Arrian indicates that his men mocked their
king's association with Zeus Ammon (Arr. 7.8.3).
This took place in 324, so obviously over the
intervening years the situation had grown from bad
to worse, with little or nothing on the part of
Alexander to pour oil on troubled waters.
If anything, Alexander ignored the displeasure of
his men if his move to introduce proskynesis
at his court in 327, as noted above, was meant to
be a means of recognising his divinity. The setback
here was soon forgotten as in 326 Alexander was
again adamant about his divine status (Arr. 7.2.3).
Moreover, Alexander did not restrict his superhuman
status to the army with him; by 324 we know from
our sources that the Greeks of the mainland were
debating his deification,[30] and that
there was widespread resistance to it.[31]
Evidently his divine status was a serious source of
contention amongst his people back home and those
with him, yet Alexander ignored it -- hardly the
mark of a great king, commander and statesman
intent on maintaining the loyalty of his troops and
indeed of his people.
Footnotes
- Diod. 17.94.3 ff., Arr. 5.25.2 ff., Curt.
9.3.3-5.
- See now Philip O. Spann, 'Alexander at the
Beas: Fox in a Lion's Skin', in Frances B.
Titchener and Richard F. Moorton, Jr. (eds.),
The Eye Expanded. Life an the Arts in
Greco-Roman Antiquity (Berkeley 1999),
62-74, puts forward the highly unlikely view
that Alexander himself encouraged the mutiny
because he did not wish to proceed further into
India yet had to save face amongst his men. He
concludes (p. 69) that the mutiny was a 'perfect
piece of public relations bunkum.' Coenus would
not be alone in disagreeing with this view!
- On this march see A.B. Bosworth, Conquest
and Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great
(Cambridge 1988) 139-146, citing sources and
modern bibliography.
- Arr. 7.8.1-12.3, Diod. 17.109.2-3, Plut.
Alexander 71-.2-9, Curt. 10.2.3 ff.,
Justin 12.11.
- On the incident see Bosworth, Conquest
and Empire, 159-161, citing sources and
modern bibliography. See further below for this
prayer being mistaken for part of a brotherhood
of mankind 'policy'.
- Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 160;
on p. 133, Bosworth's treatment of the Hyphasis
mutiny makes it sound like a mere dispute
between management and union executive.
- Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 160,
goes on to talk of the Opis 'protest' as a
challenge to Alexander's regal authority, yet
continues to deny the term mutiny for it! It
should be mentioned that Alexander was never
faced with a large-scale desertion as had
happened to his father following his defeat by
Onomarchus at the Battle of Crocus Field in 352
(Diod. 16.35.2). However, Diodorus states
specifically that military defeat not any
pothos or orientalising policy had caused
this desertion, and he goes on to imply that
Philip soon rallied his men. Their loyalty to
him stayed assured after this.
- Arr. 2.1 5 ff.; Curt. 4.3 ff.; Diod. 17.42
ff.
- On the battle see Bosworth, Conquest and
Empire, 126-30, citing sources and
bibliography.
- On this see in detail Bosworth, Alexander
and India, 6-21.
- Arr. 4.10.5-7, Plut. Alexander
54.3-6, Curt. 8.5.9-12.
- E. Fredricksmeyer, 'On the Background of the
Ruler Cult', Ancient Macedonian Studies in
Honour of C.F. Edson, ed. H.J. Dell
(Thessaloniki 1981) 145-56 (arguing for divine
honours on Philip ), and E. Badian, 'The
Deification of Alexander the Great, Ancient
Macedonian Studies in Honour of C. F. Edson,
ed. H.J. Dell (Thessaloniki 1981) 27-71 (arguing
against).
- On this see further below, with E.
Fredricksmeyer, 'Alexander and Philip: Emulation
and Resentment', CJ 85 (1990) 300-15.
- Callisthenes, apud Strabo 17.1.43,
Arr. 3.3-4, Plut. Alexander 27.8-10, cf.
Diod. 17.51, Curt. 4.7.25, Justin 11.11.2-12.
See P.A. Brunt's excellent discussion of this
visit in the Loeb Classical Library Arrian Vol.
1 (London 1976), Appendix V, 467-80.
- Athenaeus 12.538b; cf. Hyp. 5.18-19, Diod.
18.8.7, Curt. 10.2.5-7, Justin 13.5.1-6. See E.
Badian, 'The Deification of Alexander the
Great', in Ancient Macedonian Studies in
Honor of C. F. Edson, ed. H. J. Dell
(Thessaloniki 1981) 27-71, G.L. Cawkwell,
'The Deification of Alexander the Great: A
Note', in Ventures into Greek History. Essays
in Honour of N.G.L. Hammond, ed. Ian
Worthington (Oxford 1994) 293-306, and E.
Badian, 'Alexander the Great Between Two Thrones
and Heaven: Variations on an Old Theme', in
Subject and Ruler: The Cult of the
Ruling Power in Classical Antiquity, ed. A.
Small (Ann Arbor 1996) 11-26.
- Polybius 12. 12b3, [Plutarch]
Moralia 219e, 804b, 842 and Aelian,
VH 5. 12 show that the Greek states had
attempted to resist Alexander's deification.
Demades, who proposed Alexander's deification in
Athens, was later fined ten talents.
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