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T
hat Alexander's money and favour proved insufficient and
discontent grew are proved by the two mutinies which he
faced in 326 at the Hyphasis (Beas) river and in 324 at Opis
(on the use of the term 'mutiny' see below). In 326 while at
Taxila Alexander heard that the Indian prince Porus was
defying him, and so marched to do battle at the Hydaspes
river. He was successful, and Porus was defeated. Rather
than return to Taxila to recuperate and more importantly sit
out the monsoon weather, Alexander ordered his men to
continue their advance into India. His pothos --
personal longing (note again the personal element) -- to
conquer more territory was frustrated when his men mutinied
at the Hyphasis river.[16] Perhaps more than just
seventy days of marching endlessly through monsoon rains
into more unknown territory was at the heart of the issue.
After all, Curtius says (9.2.3) that King Aggrammes
(sic) was reported to be waiting at the Delhi gap
with a force which included 3,000 elephants. Curtius
believed this was true, and we know that the Nanda kings of
Magadha had a more powerful state than any of the ones
Alexander tangled with so far. Thus, another battle loomed,
one in which Alexander's men had no desire to participate,
and they refused to follow him further. Alexander sulked in
his tent like his Homeric hero Achilles for three days, but
to no avail. His bluff was called and Coenus, representing
the views of the men, prevailed. Alexander was forced to
turn back, and by late September 326 he was once again at
the Hydaspes. Coenus' defiance of Alexander earned him
little in the way of reward as a few days after the Hyphasis
mutiny he was found dead in suspicious circumstances (Arr.
6.2.1, Curt. 9.3.20). The coincidence is too much, and, as
with others who flouted Alexander (see below), we can see
the hand of a furious and spiteful king at work here.
Athough Alexander might try to disguise the lack of advance
at the Hyphasis river as due to unfavourable omens (Arr.
5.3.6), no one would be unaware that the real reason was
that the army en masse simply did not want to go
further.[17] Again needless risk-taking followed:
instead of retracing his steps he went for another route,
through the Gedrosian desert.[18] Starvation, heat,
little water, and flash flooding had their effects, and as
the march continued the baggage animals had to be
slaughtered for food (Arr. 6.25.2). Plutarch
(Alexander 66.4-5) talks of the army reduced to a
quarter of its original size; although this is
over-exaggeration, there is no doubt that this march was a
major logistical blunder on the part of Alexander, and that
it unnecessarily cost many lives.
A few years later in 324 Alexander was faced with another
mutiny, this time at Opis, not far from Babylon. At Opis
Alexander announced that his veteran soldiers and those
injured were to be discharged and that he had ordered new
blood from Macedon.[19] For some reason the older
soldiers saw Alexander's move as tantamount to a rejection
of them and of their capabilities, and the remaining
soldiers had no wish to remain and fight with Persians and
Iranians. For the second time in his reign Alexander was hit
with a mutiny, this time over his orientalising policy. Once
again, Alexander sulked in his tent for two days, and then
he called his men's bluff by announcing that Macedonian
military commands and titles were to be transferred to
selected Persians. His men capitulated at once, and the
clash was resolved with the famous banquet, in which
Macedonian, Greek, Persian and Iranian sipped from the same
cup and Alexander prayed for homonoia or concord
(Arr. 7.11.9).[20]
The term 'mutiny' for the army's resistance to Alexander on
both occasions has lately been queried. For example,
Bosworth has this to say on the Opis incident: 'This protest
can hardly be dignified with the term mutiny that is
universally applied to it. The troops confined themselves to
verbal complaints, but they were contumacious and
wounding.'[21] It is important to look beyond the
immediate context of both 'protests' to their full
implications. The degree to which the men mouthed insults at
the king or criticised his behaviour and plans is
irrelevant. The crucial point is that in both instances the
army as a whole stood fast against the orders of Alexander.
This was outright rebellion against the king and commander;
refusal to obey the orders of a superior in this manner is
mutiny. The 326 incident ended only when Alexander agreed to
his army's demands to turn back. Although Alexander's bluff
was successful at Opis, it was only when he cunningly played
on the racial tensions that his men capitulated. Until that
time they had stood fast against him, and there is no
indication of a change of mood until Alexander adopted the
strategy he did. The Macedonians might well have needed
Alexander in the far east (cf. Arr. 6.12.1-3), but this did
not stop them from defying him when they felt the situation
demanded it. Both incidents were quite simply mutinies, and
as such votes of no confidence in Alexander as a military
commander and as a king.[22]
Alexander's generalship and actual military victories may be
questioned in several key areas. For example, after the
battle of Issus in 333 Darius fled towards Media, but
Alexander pressed on to Egypt. He did not pursue Darius, as
he surely ought to have done and thus consolidate his gains,
especially when so far from home and with the mood of the
locals so prone to fluctuation, but left him alone. He was
more interested in what lay to the south: the riches of
Babylon and then Susa, or as Arrian describes them (3.16.2)
the 'prizes of the war'. However, a war can hardly be seen
as won if the opposing king and commander remains at large
and has the potential to regroup. Alexander's action was
lucky for Darius, then, as he was able to regroup his forces
and bring Alexander to battle again almost two years later,
at Gaugamela (331). It was not lucky for Alexander, though,
and especially so for those men on both sides who fell
needlessly that day in yet another battle.
We have also the various sieges which Alexander undertook
and which were often lengthy, costly, and questionable. A
case in point is that of Tyre in 332 as Alexander made his
way to Egypt after his victory at Issus. In Phoenicia Byblos
and Sidon surrendered to Alexander, as did the island town
(as it was then) of Tyre until the king expressed his
personal desire to sacrifice in the main temple there. Quite
rightly considering his demand sacrilegious, the Tyrians
resisted him and Alexander, his ego affronted and refusing
to back down, laid siege to the town.[23] The siege
itself lasted several months, cost the king a fortune in
money and manpower, and resulted in the slaughter of the
male Tyrians and the selling of the Tyrian women and
children into slavery. There is no question that control of
Tyre was essential since Alexander could not afford a revolt
of the Phoenician cities, given their traditional rivalries,
as he pushed on to Egypt. Nor indeed, if we believe his
speech at Arrian 2.17, could he allow Tyre independence with
the Persian navy a threat and the Phoenician fleet the
strongest contingent in it. However, there was no guarantee
that the destruction of Tyre would result in the Phoencian
fleet surrendering to him as he only seems to have
expected it would (Arr. 2.17.3). Moreover, laying
siege to Tyre was not necessary: he could simply have left a
garrison, for example, on the mainland opposite the town to
keep it in check. Another option, given that the Tyrians had
originally surrendered to him, would have been the
diplomatic one: to recognise the impiety of his demand in
their eyes and thus relinquish it, thereby continuing on his
way speedily and with their goodwill. Ultimately no real
gain came from his siege except to Alexander on a purely
personal level again: his damaged ego had been repaired; the
cost in time, manpower and reputation mattered little.
Alexander's great military victories over his Persian and
Indian foes which have so long occupied a place in popular
folklore and been much admired throughout the centuries are
very likely to have been embellished and nothing like the
popular conceptions of them. A case in point is the battle
of Issus in 333. Darius threw victory away at that battle
and he was, to put it bluntly, a mediocre commander -- the
battle might have been very different if Alexander had faced
a more competent commander such as Memnon, for example.
Alexander was lucky, but this does not come in the
'official' account we have of the battle, probably since he
told Callisthenes, the court historian, what to write about
it.
Luck again is the principal factor in Alexander's victory at
Granicus the previous year (334). His river crossing is
commendable, no doubt against that, but against an
outnumbered and hastily-levied Persian contingent, and with
no Great King present in order to exhort and to lead the
troops in person, it comes as no surprise that the
Macedonians and their superbly drilled phalanx were
victorious. Similarly embellished, perhaps distorted out of
all proportion even, is the 'great' battle against Porus in
India at the Hydaspes river in 326.[24] Alexander
effected a brilliant river crossing against his Indian foe,
given the swelling of that river by the seasonal rains and
melting of the snow in the Himalayas, but in reality the
battle was over before it began. Porus was outnumbered and
outclassed, and he and his army never stood a chance.
However, we would never know this from our sources or indeed
from the commemorative coinage which Alexander struck to
mark his defeat of Porus, and which are pure propaganda to
exaggerate that defeat.[25]
The king's own men would know. And word would filter through
to the Macedonians back home. Alexander's growing
orientalism, as seen in his apparent integration of
foreigners into his administration and army, was a cause of
great discontent as the traditional Macedonian warrior-king
transformed himself into something akin to a sultan. He
began to change his appearance, preferring a mixture of
Persian and Macedonian clothing, despite the obvious
displeasure of his troops (Arr. 7.8.2), and he had also
assumed the upright tiara, the symbol of Persian kingship
(Arr. 4.7.4). Some saw the writing on the wall and duly
pandered to the king. Thus, Peucestas, the Macedonian satrap
of Persis, was well rewarded by the king for adopting
Persian dress and learning the Persian language (Arr.
6.30.2-3). However, he was the only Macedonian to do so
according to Arrian.
Significant also was Alexander's attempt to adopt the
Persian custom of proskynesis -- genuflection -- at
his court in Bactra in 327, and his expectation that his men
would follow suit.[26] Proskynesis was a
social act which had long been practised by the Persians and
involved prostrating oneself before the person of the king
in an act of subservience, and thereby accepting his
lordship. The custom however was regarded as tantamount to
worship and thus sacrilegious to the Greeks -- worship of a
god or a dead hero was one thing, but worship of a person
while still alive quite another. Callisthenes thwarted
Alexander's attempt (Arr. 4.10.5-12.1), something which the
king never forgot and which would soon cost Callisthenes his
life in sadistic circumstances (Arr. 4.14.1-3, Curt.
8.6.24).
Why Alexander tried to introduce proskynesis is
unknown. Perhaps he was simply attempting to create a form
of social protocol common to Macedonians, Greeks and
Persians. However, he would have been well aware of the
religious connotations associated with the act and hence its
implications for his own being. It was plain stupidity on
his part if he thought his men would embrace the custom with
relish, and his action clearly shows that he had lost touch
with his army and the religious beliefs on which he had been
raised. Evidence for this may be seen in the motives for the
Pages' Conspiracy, a serious attempt on Alexander's life,
which occurred not long after Alexander tried to enforce
proskynesis on all. A more likely explanation for the
attempt to introduce proskynesis is that Alexander
now thought of himself as divine (cf. Arr. 4.9.9, Curt.
8.5.5), and thus proskynesis was a logical means of
recognising his divine status in public by all men (see
below).
Indeed, Alexander's belief that he was divine impacts
adversely on any evaluation of him. History is riddled with
megalomaniacs who along the way suffered from divine
pretensions, and the epithet 'Great' is not attached to
them. Regardless of whether his father Philip II was
worshipped as a god on his death,[27] Alexander
seems not to have been content with merely following in his
footsteps but to believe in his own divine status while
alive.[28]
Alexander had visited the oracle of Zeus Ammon in the oasis
at Siwah in the winter of 332, shortly after his entry into
Egypt, and there he apparently received confirmation from
the priests that he was a son of Zeus.[29] From that
time onwards he openly called himself son of Zeus as opposed
to descendant of Zeus. It is important to stress the
distinction since he was technically a descendant of Zeus
through Heracles. That sort of association the people would
have accepted, but they baulked at Alexander at first
setting himself up as a son of a god even though born from a
mortal mother. Later, as his megalomania increased, he would
believe he was divine while alive. Thus, during the Opis
mutiny Arrian indicates that his men mocked their king's
association with Zeus Ammon (Arr. 7.8.3). This took place in
324, so obviously over the intervening years the situation
had grown from bad to worse, with little or nothing on the
part of Alexander to pour oil on troubled waters.
If anything, Alexander ignored the displeasure of his men if
his move to introduce proskynesis at his court in
327, as noted above, was meant to be a means of recognising
his divinity. The setback here was soon forgotten as in 326
Alexander was again adamant about his divine status (Arr.
7.2.3). Moreover, Alexander did not restrict his superhuman
status to the army with him; by 324 we know from our sources
that the Greeks of the mainland were debating his
deification,[30] and that there was widespread
resistance to it.[31] Evidently his divine status
was a serious source of contention amongst his people back
home and those with him, yet Alexander ignored it -- hardly
the mark of a great king, commander and statesman intent on
maintaining the loyalty of his troops and indeed of his
people.
Footnotes
- Diod. 17.94.3 ff., Arr. 5.25.2 ff., Curt.
9.3.3-5.
- See now Philip O. Spann, 'Alexander at the Beas: Fox
in a Lion's Skin', in Frances B. Titchener and Richard F.
Moorton, Jr. (eds.), The Eye Expanded. Life an
the Arts in Greco-Roman Antiquity (Berkeley 1999),
62-74, puts forward the highly unlikely view that
Alexander himself encouraged the mutiny because he did
not wish to proceed further into India yet had to save
face amongst his men. He concludes (p. 69) that the
mutiny was a 'perfect piece of public relations bunkum.'
Coenus would not be alone in disagreeing with this
view!
- On this march see A.B. Bosworth, Conquest and
Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great (Cambridge
1988) 139-146, citing sources and modern
bibliography.
- Arr. 7.8.1-12.3, Diod. 17.109.2-3, Plut.
Alexander 71-.2-9, Curt. 10.2.3 ff., Justin
12.11.
- On the incident see Bosworth, Conquest and
Empire, 159-161, citing sources and modern
bibliography. See further below for this prayer being
mistaken for part of a brotherhood of mankind
'policy'.
- Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 160; on p. 133,
Bosworth's treatment of the Hyphasis mutiny makes it
sound like a mere dispute between management and union
executive.
- Bosworth, Conquest and Empire, 160, goes on to
talk of the Opis 'protest' as a challenge to Alexander's
regal authority, yet continues to deny the term mutiny
for it! It should be mentioned that Alexander was never
faced with a large-scale desertion as had happened to his
father following his defeat by Onomarchus at the Battle
of Crocus Field in 352 (Diod. 16.35.2). However, Diodorus
states specifically that military defeat not any
pothos or orientalising policy had caused this
desertion, and he goes on to imply that Philip soon
rallied his men. Their loyalty to him stayed assured
after this.
- Arr. 2.1 5 ff.; Curt. 4.3 ff.; Diod. 17.42 ff.
- On the battle see Bosworth, Conquest and
Empire, 126-30, citing sources and bibliography.
- On this see in detail Bosworth, Alexander and
India, 6-21.
- Arr. 4.10.5-7, Plut. Alexander 54.3-6, Curt.
8.5.9-12.
- E. Fredricksmeyer, 'On the Background of the Ruler
Cult', Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honour of C.F.
Edson, ed. H.J. Dell (Thessaloniki 1981) 145-56
(arguing for divine honours on Philip ), and E. Badian,
'The Deification of Alexander the Great, Ancient
Macedonian Studies in Honour of C. F. Edson, ed. H.J.
Dell (Thessaloniki 1981) 27-71 (arguing against).
- On this see further below, with E. Fredricksmeyer,
'Alexander and Philip: Emulation and Resentment',
CJ 85 (1990) 300-15.
- Callisthenes, apud Strabo 17.1.43, Arr. 3.3-4,
Plut. Alexander 27.8-10, cf. Diod. 17.51, Curt.
4.7.25, Justin 11.11.2-12. See P.A. Brunt's excellent
discussion of this visit in the Loeb Classical Library
Arrian Vol. 1 (London 1976), Appendix V, 467-80.
- Athenaeus 12.538b; cf. Hyp. 5.18-19, Diod. 18.8.7,
Curt. 10.2.5-7, Justin 13.5.1-6. See E. Badian, 'The
Deification of Alexander the Great', in Ancient
Macedonian Studies in Honor of C. F. Edson, ed. H. J.
Dell (Thessaloniki 1981) 27-71, G.L. Cawkwell,
'The Deification of Alexander the Great: A Note', in
Ventures into Greek History. Essays in Honour of
N.G.L. Hammond, ed. Ian Worthington (Oxford 1994)
293-306, and E. Badian, 'Alexander the Great Between Two
Thrones and Heaven: Variations on an Old Theme', in
Subject and Ruler: The Cult of the Ruling Power
in Classical Antiquity, ed. A. Small (Ann Arbor 1996)
11-26.
- Polybius 12. 12b3, [Plutarch] Moralia
219e, 804b, 842 and Aelian, VH 5. 12 show that the
Greek states had attempted to resist Alexander's
deification. Demades, who proposed Alexander's
deification in Athens, was later fined ten talents.
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