Key claim: it is impossible for fundamental moral principles to be both
(i) the criterion for one's decision, and
(ii) up for grabs in that decision: i.e., to be one of the consequences of one's decision.
A moralizing Conditioner tries to have it both ways:
(i) Claiming that the decisions guiding the re-fashioning of human nature are under the guidance of moral values, and
(ii) Presupposing that moral values are merely the projections of human nature as presently consituted, and so, could be radically changed through the very re-fashioning under consideration.
This supports the need for a fixed reference point -- a cosmic Tao to which the Conditioners' actions are morally accountable (if they are to be subject to moral evaluation at all).
Bacon: jettisons final causation, emphasizes control over nature, rather than respect for its integrity.
Lewis uses Buber's contrast:
Bacon: I/it relationship to nature
Aristotle: I/thou relationship to nature.
He seems to assume that any ethical discoveries come through reflection on the Tao by sages, poets, prophets, etc.
No room for the relevance of scientific knowledge of human nature.
Perhaps a result of Lewis's assuming a Baconian model of science.
However, an Aristotelian biology/anthropology, by telling us more about human nature and its final cause, can provide us with ethical information.
Can discover how language/thought/the family/politics/morality are supposed to work, by understanding their biological functions.
Tolstoy's Principle (from War and Peace):
all happy marriages are happy in the same way; each unhappy marriage is unhappy in its own unique way.
Generalized Principle:
all happy lives are happy in the same way; each unhappy life is unhappy in its own unique way.
Consequence: if two people are different, the difference must be either:
(i) merely accidental (like skin color, fingerprints), and so trivial, or
(ii) a consequence of imperfection: one or the other or both must be somehow imperfect.
What about the difference between males and females?
Dilemma: if we say that these differences are accidental, we trivialize them.
If we say that we are essential, we divide humanity into separate species.
Unsolved problem for Aristotelian philosophy.
What's needed is a third category:
1. Accidental difference
2. ?
3. Essential difference.
Sociobiology/evolutionary psychology:
analyze human behaviors and institutions in terms of biological adaptiveness.
Typically, evolution per se has little to do with this work.
Little emphasis on vestiges or on design imperfections.
So, much of it is/should be acceptable to an Aristotelian, even a creationist, so long as they recognize that the final cause of human life includes successful reproduction.
History of evolution and values:
1. Progressive evolutionism (Herbert Spencer).
Evolution has a built-in direction, toward greater and greater happiness & perfection.
Morality consists in cooperating with evolution.
2. John Dewey. Evolution tells us that change is fundamental. Therefore, changeability/flexibility are the highest moral values.
Guilty of "the naturalistic fallacy"(G. E. Moore)
Can we derive an "ought" from an "is"?
Yes.
I am pursuing wealth.
The best way to pursue wealth is to invest for the long-term in equities.
Therefore, I (qua wealth-seeker) ought to invest for the long-term in equities.
I am pursuing happiness (eudaemonia).
The best way to pursue happiness is to develop moral virtue.
Therefore, I (qua happiness-seeker) ought to develop moral virtue.
But, I am essentially a human being, and happiness is the final cause of human life.
Thus, I am essentiallly a happiness-seeker.
The "qua" clause can be dropped.
Consequently, by filling in gaps in our knowledge of our final cause, biology can verify "ought" and "must" statements.
Alternative view:
E. O. Wilson & Michael Ruse argue:
1. Belief in objective values has adaptive value.
2. So, natural selection has fashioned us to believe in objective values.
3.But, there really are no such objective values.
Therefore, evolution has foisted an illusion upon us.
What's the argument for 3? Look to J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's three arguments:
1. The argument from queerness -- objective values aren't like "normal" physical facts.
2. The argument from relativity: if there were objective values, we wouldn't disagree about them so much.
3. The argument from the inertness of objective values.
If there were objective values, they could have no effect on the course of the physical world.
All of our knowledge derives from interacting with the physical world.
So, if there were objective values, we could have no knowledge of them.
This overlooks the possibility of final causation: argues only that objective values cannot enter into material and efficient causation.
1. Is this phenomenon explainable in biological terms (either as an adaptation or as the by-product of adaptations)?
Biological vs. extra-biological phenomena.
2. Is this phenomenon adaptive or only a by-productive of adaptations?
(i.e., is reproduction the final cause of the phenomenon?)
Adaptive vs. non-adaptive phenomena.
3. Is reproduction the ultimate and complete final cause of the phenomenon?
Does it have any final cause that is over and above its function in reproduction?
Merely biological vs. supra-biological phenomena.
For example: is there a cosmic purpose behind the existence of human life, in relation to which natural selection is merely a means to an end?
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