Phl 303
Lecture 8: Butler on Love; The Culture Wars

Today's Lecture: Butler on Human Nature

Human Nature as a Constitution

Mental principles, impulses form a system or constitution. The parts are mutually adjusted to each other, for the sake of a final end. (see footnote 1, p. 42)

Distinction between the power of an impulse and its authority

The conscience (the power of rational reflection & of moral judgment) has supreme authority in our mental constitution.

It does not always have its way: it can be usurped by more powerful rebels.

Like a diseased tree or a machine out of order: the malfunctioning does not mean that the constitution is dissolved.

Why are we obliged to follow our conscience?
It is the law of our own nature (p. 43).

Wouldn't we be better off without our conscience? Doesn't it interfere with our pursuit of happiness, and add unnecessary pain, in the form of guilt and shame?

Compare: losing your sense of pain. This would be a terrible loss, resulting in a shortened life span and much suffering.

Butler argues that for the most part and in the long run, virtue and self-interest coincide in this life. (Taking into account the afterlife, they coincide perfectly.)

The Possibility of the Love of Others

Butler could be taken as arguing against two kinds of positions:

  1. The eudaemonistic theory of Aristotle and Aquinas must be false, because it entails that everyone is selfish.
  2. Everyone really is selfish (universal egoism).
Butler insists (as did Aristotle), that from the fact that everyone pursues his/her happiness as the sole ultimate end, it does not follow that everyone is selfish, incapable of genuine love of others.

The Hedonistic argument for Universal Egoism

  1. Everyone always acts (ultimately) for the sake of obtaining the greatest pleasure (and avoiding the most pain), and for no other reason.
  2. Pleasure and pain are internal states of the self.
  3. If one is concerned (ultimately) only about one's own internal states, then one is selfish.
  4. Therefore, everyone is always selfish.
Butler rejects premise 1. He insists that we often seek the external objects of our desires and affections, not just the pleasure or satisfaction of fulfilling them.

Hunger is a desire for food, not for the sensation of eating.

Ambition is the desire for success and position, not for the accompanying feelings.

Loneliness is the desire for companionship, and not just for the good feelings that result from companionship.

Suppose we had a form of chewing gum that gave us all the sensations of eating a wonderful meal, including the cessation of hunger, but provided no nutrition. Would the gum satisfy our hunger, or only mask its unsatisfaction?

Consider again the Experience Box. Would this satisfy all our longings and desires, or only fool us into thinking they were satisfied?

A Non-Hedonistic Argument for Universal Egoism

  1. Everyone always acts (ultimately) for the sake of obtaining his/her own (objective) happiness, and for no other reason.
  2. If one is concerned (ultimately) only about one's own happiness, then one is selfish.
  3. Therefore, everyone is always selfish.
Premise 1 is ambiguous, in a very subtle way.

Happiness (here we are talking about happiness in this life, Aquinas's "imperfect happiness") is a large and complex thing, made up of many parts:

To say that the desire for one's own happiness is one's only ultimate end, one could mean one of two things:

  1. every action is taken with the single ultimate goal in mind of achieving one's own happiness (considered as a whole).
  2. every action is taken with some ultimate goal in mind that is included as one of the parts of one's happiness (e.g., the desire to engage in philosophy, the desire to do good to one's friends, etc.).
In the first case, one would have only own passion or affection -- the passion for one's own happiness. Every action would be calculated with this end in mind.

Mr. Spock from Star Trek? He clearly had a passion, or he wouldn't have been so zealous in his duties. But he appeared (most of the time) to lack any particular affections (as Butler describes them).

In the second case, one has many particular affections, each passion being a passion either for the whole of happiness (the passion of "self-love") or for one of its parts.

We humans cannot function without many particular passions.

Butler argues that if the passion for happiness as a whole (self-love) becomes too strong, it becomes counter-productive.

We can be made miserable by an excessive desire for happiness! (Butler's Paradox)

Love for other human beings is one of our particular affections. This love really is a desire for the good of that other person as an ultimate end.

Our happiness includes the happiness of our loved ones. Their happiness is not merely a means to ours.

Last updated February 13, 2001
Created by: Robert C. Koons
Send comments to: koons@la.utexas.edu

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