Phl 347
Lecture 24: Natural Law Theory

Two Alternatives to Legal Positivism

Legal Realism

Natural Law Theory

Three Versions of NLT

Weak vs. Strong NLT

Weak or Minimal NLT

Strong or Maximal NLT

Hart's critique, and an NLT response

What is it to be a Law? (According to NLT)

To be an X, a thing must be capable of at least partially fulfilling the function of X.

NLT and Anarchy

Judges and the Enforcement of Unjust Statutes

Natural Law and the American Constitution

Aristotle on Equity and the Law

...all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, if it is necessary to speak universally but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error....

When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission -- to say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put into his law had he known. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality. (NE, Bk. V, sec. 10)

Equitable Construction

Early appeals to natural law by Supreme Court

Chief Justice Chase, in Calder v. Bull

The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact. An Act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority....

It is against all reason and justice for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers [as ex post facto laws, impairing contracts, making someone a judge in his own case]; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the Spirit of our State Governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation....[Legislatures] cannot change innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime." (at 388)

Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck:

"It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power ... the question, whether the act of transferring the property of an individual to the public, to be in the nature of the legislative power, is well worthy of serious reflection....

It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments."

Riggs v. Palmer, 115 NY 506 (1889)

Test Cases


Last updated May 5, 1999
Created by: Robert C. Koons
Send comments to: koons@la.utexas.edu

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