Phl 347
Study Guide for the First Midterm

The following are some examples of the kind of questions to expect on the midterm, September 30. Bring a blue book.

 

  1. Are there any objections to the strict liability standard that do not apply with equal force to negligence liability? (Defend your answer by discussing one or two relevant objections.)
  2. Is the negligence standard of liability ever justified in the criminal law? Under what conditions, if any, would negligence be preferable to both the strict and the recklessness standard?
  3. Is the felony murder rule just? Does it make sense to puhish one who kills unintentionally in the course of committing a felony with the same severity as one who kills intentionally? Defend your answer.
  4. If a truck driver accidentally kills a small child in a traffic collision while committing a felony, such as smuggling, should the felony murder rule apply? Why or why not?
  5. Suppose that a woman's judgment has been seriously impaired by a mind-altering drug, which was added, without her knowledge, by fraternity member X at a party. If she later engages in what appears to be consensual sexual intercourse with frat brother Y (who suspects, but does not know, that she is under the influence of such a drug), is Y guilty of rape? Defend your answer.
  6. Does the rule of "ignorance of the law is no excuse" lead to something like the strict liability standard? Would it make sense to accept this rule, while being opposed to the use of strict liability standard in criminal law? Defend your answer.
  7. How do you explain the fact that we treat attempted murder differently from murder, even in cases where there is no doubt about the intentions and determination of the attempted murderer? Is it reasonable to take the actual effects, and not just the intentions, into account when assessing the severity of punishment that is deserved? Defend your answer.
  8. Is the common law reasonable in holding a person civilly liable for a death when a rescue is begun but then discontinued, but not liable when the rescue is not even begun? Discuss and evaluate at least one rationale for the common law rule.
  9. Is it reasonable to distinguish (for the purposes of assigning criminal liability) between failing to provide aid (which would involve only minimal inconvenience) to a drowning child and failing to contribute to a life-saving charity? Does the slippery-slope argument provide a good reason to oppose all "duty-to-rescue" or bad-samaritan laws? Defend your answers.
  10. In which of the following cases has the individual involved actually killed another human being? Explain why you draw the line where you do. (Note: the question concerns whether or not the individual has caused a death, not whether or not they should be held in some sense responsible for the death.)
    1. An arsonist who sets fire to a building, several residents of which die as a result of smoke inhalation (from smoke produced by the arsonist's fire).
    2. An accomplice of the arsonist in (A) who blocks the building's exits, preventing several residents from successfully escaping the fatal smoke.
    3. A second accomplice of the arsonist in (A) who deliberately disables the only fire engine in the vicinity of the building, preventing the timely arrival of fire fighters. Had the engine arrived in time, the deaths would have been prevented.
    4. A prankster who deliberately disables the only fire engine in the vicinity, completely unaware of the arson.
    5. A building inspector who negligently failed to detect the inoperable condition of the building's sprinkler system only days before the arson. Had the sprinkler system been working, the deaths would have been prevented.
    6. A neighborhood volunteer who normally spends an afternoon a month doing routine maintenance on the fire engine, but who decided to go golfing instead, with the result that the engine's inoperable condition was not detected until it was too late.
  11. If we accept that a person with severe mental illness is not responsible for his actions, should we say the same thing about someone whose social background during childhood was severely deprived? [Assume for the sake of this question that empirical research reveals a stronger causal link between deprived social background and crime than it does between mental illness and crime.] Is the fact that someone's behavior can be explained by a model of cause-and-effect absolve him of all responsibility? Defend your answer.
  12. Is there really such a thing as an "irresistible impulse"? If so, what would count as decisive evidence of its existence? How can we distinguish between an impulse that is irresistible and one that was simply not resisted? If not, is there some version of the "volitional prong" of the insanity defense whose use is justifiable?
  13. Should psychopathy (the lack of a conscience, lack of normal feelings of empathy) be covered by the insanity defense? Is there an important difference between those who do not know that what they are doing is wrong and those who merely cannot appreciate at an emotional level the wrongness of their acts?
  14. Should the burden of proof of establishing insanity with a preponderance of evidence be assigned to the defense in a criminal trial? Defend your answer against the most weighty objection to it.
  15. Is the doctrine that it is permissible for the government to discriminate on the basis of race, color or national origin when doing so is necessary and tailored for some "compelling state interest" defensible? Does doing so violate the rights of some to the "equal protection of the laws", as guaranteed by the 14th amendment? If the doctrine is defensible, how should the courts decide when a "compelling state interest" is involved?
  16. Does the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit all preferential treatment on the basis of race in employment and education? In defending your answer, explain how you believe the courts should go about interpreting such a statute, and defend your position against at least one alternative theory of interpretation.
  17. Is diversity in education a compelling state interest, and if so, is the use of race as a plus factor in admissions necessary for and narrowly tailored to this interest?
  18. Choose one of the following two positions, and present the strongest case you can on its behalf.

 

Last updated February 7, 2006
Created by: Robert C. Koons
Send comments to: koons at mail.utexas.edu

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