SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD
PEACE
Sustaining Peace in Central America:
The Challenges of the Central American
Alliance for Sustainable Development
by
Michael E. Conroy*
Ford Foundation
Office for Mexico and Central America
and
Department of Economics
University of Texas at Austin
* The analysis and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author
alone; they do not necessarily reflect the perspectives or the policies
of
the Ford Foundation.
The past 20 years have not been kind to Central America 1. The region has
suffered from repressive dictatorships, massive violation of human rights, insurgencies
and counter insurgencies, low-intensity warfare aided and abetted by external powers,
and a dramatic deterioration in the standard of living. Central American governments have
taken important initiatives to counter this spiraling deterioration in the region, including
unprecedented regional peace accords, negotiated ends to two of the three civil wars that
have plagued the area, and now a new Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development.
Central America now faces new challenges and new threats that are potentially
capable of casting it back into the political and economic turmoil of the
late 1970s and the
"Lost Decade" of the 1980s. The international assistance community
has become startlingly
shortsighted in its reduction of support for the Central American nations
since the onset of an
initial modicum of peace. The attention that Central America received during
the civil-
military strife of the 1980s, though mixed in intent and impact, has now
been replaced by
concerted international neglect that has produced a quieter, more subtle
isolation and
threatened economic strangulation of the region.
The Central American nations have, however, taken important steps to improve
this
set of circumstances. In 1987 five Central American presidents signed an
historic set of peace
accords that stimulated both a process of ending external intervention in
counter-
revolutionary strife and the onset of negotiated peace and reconciliation
that continue to this
date, albeit haltingly. Since 1990 the region has experienced presidential
elections and changes
of power in every country after reasonably open and contested elections,
something never
before seen in the history of the region. The end of civil war in Nicaragua
and El Salvador,
and the impending successful conclusion of negotiations in Guatemala, may
bring the region
more peace than it has seen in over 25 years. The domestic political space
for criticism of
human rights violations, condemnation of impunity, and the prosecution of
those responsible
for political crimes has grown more rapidly than most would have guessed
possible ten years
ago. Civil society is flourishing in the form of national and regional
organizations representing
indigenous peoples, small farmers and farmworkers, women, and environmentalists,
as well as
traditionally better-organized business and professional groups. And they
are being given a
place at the table in regional presidential and ministerial summits, even
if their analyses,
requests, and demands are still not often heeded.
This paper offers an analysis of one of the most encouraging developments
in the
region, the signing and initial implementation of the Central American Alliance
for Sustainable
Development. The paper describes the historical origins and the content
of the Alliance
(commonly known now by the shorthand name ALIDES, for ALIanza
para el DEsarrollo
Sostenible), and places it in the context of sustainable development trends
worldwide. The
paper offers an analysis of the links between contemporary peace processes
in the region and
social and economic policy, noting the need for sustainable development,
in its broadest
definition, as distinct from the harsher measures of contemporary stabilization
and structural
adjustment policies. The paper concludes with a series of suggestions for
policies needed
within Central America, among the international financial institutions,
and from other
international supporters of the region to assist the countries of the region
to consolidate peace
by implementing the sustainable development process it has already initiated.
Background: Central America's "Lost Decade"
Central America consists of six nations with relatively small, open economies.
The
total population of the region in 1990 was 31 million, only slightly larger
than that of
California and Oregon combined. Guatemala is the largest, with 30% of the
population of the
region; Costa Rica is the smallest, with a little more than 3 million.
The aggregate economic
size of the five countries, measured by total gross domestic product, in
1990 was less than
$25 billion dollars, about the same as an intermediate-size city in the
US or Europe.
Table 1: Central American Growth and Stagnation: 1960-1988 (PRIVATE)
| PRIVATE | Real per capita (1988) dollars | Change | Change | Change |
|---|
| Country | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1988 | 1960-70 | 1970-80 | 1980-88 |
| Costa Rica | 1435 | 1825 | 2394 | 2235 | 27.2% | 31.2% | -6.6% |
| El Salvador | 832 | 1032 | 1125 | 955 | 24.0% | 9.0% | -15.1% |
| Guatemala | 1100 | 1420 | 1865 | 1502 | 29.1% | 31.4% | -19.5% |
| Honduras | 619 | 782 | 954 | 851 | 26.3% | 22.0% | -10.8% |
| Nicaragua | 1055 | 1495 | 1147 | 819 | 41.7% | -23.3% | -28.6% |
| Panama | 1264 | 2017 | 2622 | 2229 | 59.5% | 29.9% | -15.0% |
| L.A. Region | 1374 | 1802 | 2512 | 2336 | 31.1% | 39.4% | -7.0% |
Source: IDB News (October-November 1989)
The historiography of Central America's political and economic turmoil
during the
1980's is rich and extensive. After more than 20 years of impressive economic
progress
during the 1960s and 1970s, including an apparently model process of regional
integration,
the 1980's brought an exploding debt crisis, falling income levels, brutal
structural adjustment,
and a severe deterioration in physical capital and social infrastructure2..
Table 1 provides an
unusually clear portrait of both economic boom and bust in each of the nations
of the region.
Table 2 illustrates the highly varied and fundamentally limited nature of
economic recovery in
more recent years. What these tables don't display is the concomitant social
and
environmental deterioration brought about by the direct affects of war in
Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and Guatemala, the 1989 US invasion of Panama, and the indirect
effects upon
neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica of this civil strife in neighboring
nations. By virtually
every measure, Central America lost during the 1980s all of the progress
that had been made
during the 1970s, and was left without the further progress expected in
the decade of the
1980s itself.
Table 2: Central American Partial Economic Recovery: 1989-95 (PRIVATE)
| PRIVATE | Real per capita (1988) dollars |
|---|
| Country | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1991-95 |
| Costa Rica | 2.6% | 0.7% | -0.4% | 4.6% | 3.5% | 1.9% | 0.2% | 10.1% |
| El Salvador | -1.5% | 2.4% | 0.3% | 4.9% | 4.0% | 2.0% | 4.0% | 16.0% |
| Guatemala | 0.8% | 0.0% | 0.6% | 1.9% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.6% | 5.8% |
| Honduras | 1.6% | -3.4% | -0.7% | 3.0% | 3.6% | -4.8% | 0.7% | 1.6% |
| Nicaragua | -4.3% | -3.0% | -0.7% | 3.0% | 3.6% | -4.8% | 0.7% | 1.6% |
| Panama | -2.1% | 4.3% | 6.6% | 4.1% | 2.2% | 0.0% | 1.0% | 14.6% |
| L.A. Region | -1.0% | -1.6% | 1.4% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 2.7% | -1.1% | 5.1% |
Source: ECLAC, Preliminary Overview of the Latin American and Caribbean Economy, 1995
What was the cause of the collapse? According to both the Kissinger Commission
in
1984 and the Sanford Commission in 1989, the failure of the economies to
continue the
growth pattern of the 1960s and 1970s was linked closely to the "superimposition"
of a
small amount of growth upon a society characterized by fundamental and abject
poverty for
the vast majority of the population3.. "Despite periods of strong economic
growth," the
Sanford Commission noted, "the gains from that growth were distributed
extremely
inequitably." The 1979 Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua and the onset
that same year of
civil war in El Salvador were combined with the recoil of international
financial flows from all
of Latin America after the onset of the Brazilian and Mexican economic crises
of 1981 and
1982. It has subsequently become clear that environmental deterioration
has also been a
ravaging contributor to the deepening of Central American poverty, as deforestation,
pesticide buildup, and the deterioration of coastal and marine resources
have left Central
Americans with less of a basis for meeting their own needs, much less participating
in an
increasingly open global economy4..
The changing structure of the global economy is also a multifaceted threat
to Central
America. The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
favors Mexico
for production of much of the limited set of industrial goods that Central
America once
exported to the US (largely apparel, electrical equipment, and electronic
assembly), reducing
profoundly the amount of direct foreign investment that now flows to the
region. The
creation of the World Trade Organization, for example, has led to the phasing
out of the
Multifiber Agreement under which much Asian investment in the apparel industry
had taken
place in Central America, undermining the region's most rapidly growing
industry. These
conditions have left many Central American analysts concerned that there
remains no role for
the region other than as a repository for environmentally-objectionable
industries producing
under socially-objectionable conditions.
Central American Peace Processes and Their Links to Sustainable Development
Nicaragua negotiated a peace agreement ending the contra war in
1988. But the
Nicaraguan economy has continued to decline; the expectations of the ex-combatants
for land
and jobs and social support are far from having been met; and there have
been repeated
outbreaks of resurgent guerrilla activity, fueled by the continuing failure
of the nation's
political and economic recovery.
El Salvador negotiated a peace agreement ending its civil war in 1991.
But, despite
strong economic growth (fed importantly by remittances from emigrants in
the United
States), many dimensions of that peace agreement have remained unimplemented,
partly
because of the lack of will on the part of the government, partly because
of lack of
international financing for the land-transfer and job training programs
for ex-combatants that
were part of the UN mediated settlement. There has also been a conflict
in El Salvador
between the economic policy stipulations and requirements imposed by the
international
financial institutions for stabilization and structural adjustment policies
and the programs
required for consolidation of peace5.
Guatemala is expected to sign a peace agreement in 1996, ending more than
40 years
of civil war, the longest armed conflict in 20th Century Latin American
history and a
rebellion, the roots of which are linked invariably to the 1954 overthrow
of the government
of President Jacobo Arbenz. The United Nations Development Program, the
Inter-American
Development Bank, and the World Bank have all had close links to this negotiated
settlement,
and it is expected that international support for the outcome will be managed
somewhat
better than was the case in either Nicaragua or El Salvador.
It is widely recognized that the origins of the conflicts in all three
countries were
closely linked to prevailing social and economic conditions. Inequity in
the distribution of
land, lack of democratic processes, and vast inequality in levels of wealth
and income were
sustained in each by police and military forces whose violations of human
rights are now
well-established history. Consolidation of peace in all three countries
will require social and
economic policies and programs that address the root causes of the conflicts.
There are those
who would argue that contemporary economic policy in the region, based upon
orthodox
doctrine, will generate economic growth and resolve the underlying problems.
There is a more
convincing case that suggests that the reduced ability of the state to meet
social needs, the
deepening income and wealth inequality associated with orthodox policies,
and the deepening
of urban and rural poverty because of degradation of natural resources preclude
the
consolidation of peace and create conditions where violence, either the
inchoate violence of
the street or the organized violence of armed groups and governments, will
characterize the
remainder of the decade. The Central American governments have decided
that contemporary
conditions require a new and alternative response to the needs of all of
the countries of the
region. They have defined that approach as an unusually clearly stipulated
form of
sustainable development, differing from the orthodox economic growth
strategies of recent
years.
The Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development
In 1989 the Central American governments created CCAD, a regional commission
on
environment and development, designed initially to lead the preparation
of a unified regional
presentation for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
In
August 1994 the Central American presidents, gathered at Guácimo
in Costa Rica, issued a
joint declaration calling for the creation of an "Alliance for Sustainable
Development," as a
"comprehensive Central American initiative that addresses political,
moral, economic, social,
and environmental issues" which they hoped would become a model for
other regions6..
On October 12, 1994, the region's presidents (and a representative of Belize's
Prime
Minister) met in Nicaragua to sign the fundamental document of the Alliance
for Sustainable
Development (ALIDES), which is attached as Annex 1. Vice President Gore
of the United
States witnessed the signing and promised wide-ranging US support for the
effort. In
December 1994 the ALIDES became the focal point for a public agreement between
the US
and the Central American governments. The so-called CONCAUSA Agreement
(based on
the somewhat awkward mixed-language acronym for CONvenio CentroAmérica-USA)
pledged the United States to partnership with Central America in the pursuit
of sustainable
development in the region. The differences between the content of the
ALIDES and the
principal tenets of CONCAUSA, however, illustrate important differences
in perception of
the meaning of sustainable development.
The Central American presidents committed themselves to a sustainable development
process defined much more broadly than the Brundtland Commission definition7..
For the
ALIDES,
Sustainable development is a process that pursues progressive change in
the
quality of human life and which targets human beings as the central and
primary target of development. It is achieved through economic growth with
social equity and changes in production and consumption patterns, based
on
ecological equilibrium and the support of the region. This implies respect
for regional, national and local ethnic and cultural diversity, and the
enhanced and full participation of all citizens, living together in peace
and harmony with nature, not jeopardizing but rather guaranteeing the
quality of life of future generations.
This definition is especially interesting, for it encompasses far more than
the sustainable
management of natural resources. It recognizes explicitly that social equity
is a critical
characteristic of preferred economic growth processes and that changes will
be needed in
production and consumption patterns. It also addresses the very delicate
topic (in Central
America) of respect for ethnic diversity, as well as the importance of enhanced
democratic
participation.
The Central American presidents reiterated their commitment to the ALIDES
and
their explicit linking of it to the consolidation of peace in the region
in a further formal
declaration, issued in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on October 25th, scarcely
two weeks after the
signing of ALIDES. "Convinced that peace is a prerequisite for sustainable
development,"
they expressed support for the prompt conclusion of Guatemalan peace negotiations,
"the
last remaining internal conflict in the region." 8.
The complete ALIDES document develops at considerable length the principles,
key
bases, objectives, and instruments that underlie it. The principles include:
- Respect for all life forms, as a first principle, responding to the
concerns of many ecologists;
- Improvement in the quality of human life, including explicit mention
of democratic participation, cultural diversity, and social equity;
- Respect for sustainable use of the vitality and diversity of the earth,
including protection of biodiversity, pursuit of regeneration, and sustainable
management of natural resources;
- Promotion of peace and democracy, including explicit reference to the
struggle against violence, corruption, and impunity;
- Respect for cultural plurality and ethnic diversity, including explicit
reference to the overlap between indigenous peoples and the location of
sites with great biodiversity;
- Pursuit of greater economic integration, including a call for incorporation
of Central America in broader regional trade blocs; and
- Explicit recognition of the intergenerational equity issues that underlie
sustainable development.
The principal instruments called for were the creation of national councils
on sustainable
development, in a manner comparable to the instruments recommended in UNCED
Agenda
21 documents.
What did the Central American governments have to lose in signing a document
with
such breadth and lack of specificity? By signing the agreement, the presidents
have called
attention to the continuing problems of the region with respect to social
equity, human rights,
and indigenous peoples. There are important components of the ALIDES that
are directly at
odds with the tenets of the agreements that each has had to sign with the
international
financial institutions. Rather, they have asserted that their development
will require greater
social equity, greater protection of natural resources, expanded democratic
participation, and
expansion of governmental programs for social development. And they have
committed
themselves to pursuing that approach.
This is also a critical dimension of what they gain from signing
the ALIDES. The
signing of the agreement, it is hoped, will create a modest amount of international
political
space for the development of social and economic policy alternatives that
may be other than
those required by stabilization and adjustment packages9.. Just as the peace
agreements of
1987 created domestic political space for closing down the contra camps
in Honduras and
Costa Rica, over the objections of the US administration at that time, the
ALIDES is seen as
providing potential bases for strengthening environmental protection, labor
laws, and social
programs over the continued objections of the domestic and international
business sector.
The official US interpretation of the ALIDES, reflected in the CONCAUSA
Declaration of December 1994 [reproduced here as Annex 2], provides additional
evidence of
the courage of the Central American presidents in signing a document based
on such a broad
definition of sustainable development. The CONCAUSA provides a list of
tangible, concrete
commitments on the part of the Central American presidents and the US president
"to
achieve the objectives of the Alliance for Sustainable Development, as
established in the
attached Action Plan..." (emphasis added). The Action Plan provides
great detail on issues of
biodiversity conservation, energy development, environmental legislation
designed to raise the
standards in Central America, and sustainable economic development defined
narrowly to
focus on eco-friendly processes. There is no reference, however, in any
part of the Action
Plan to questions of social equity, democratic participation, respect for
cultural diversity, or
protection of human rights. It is as though the US delegation to the Summit
of the Americas
simply chose to ignore the extent to which those concepts permeate the ALIDES
document10..
International recognition of the uniqueness of the ALIDES has been widespread.
Jonathan Lash, president of the World Resources Institute, wrote11.: [The Central
American isthmus] is now characterized by burgeoning democracies that have
joined in unprecedented efforts to link regional economic viability, political
stability, and natural resources protection. Sustainable development has
emerged as a unifying and mobilizing idiom for these efforts -- bringing
together the region's governments in a struggle to preserve a future for
their people. It offers hope of a
more equitable way of life based on environmental awareness in the context
of social change and increased economic opportunity...
The challenges to the fulfillment of that vision are nonetheless formidable
Principal Challenges to Peace and Sustainable Development
In the time that has passed since the signing of both the ALIDES agreement
itself and
the CONCAUSA Declaration, it has become apparent that implementation of
the agreements
faces a wide range of serious challenges. Those challenges may be divided
into two broad
categories: challenges to implementation of the ALIDES in the Central American
nations
themselves and challenges to international financial institutions, other
governments and
nongovernmental institutions.
Challenges to the Central American nations themselves. Within the
region, the
problems facing the ALIDES begin with the fact that it is widely seen as
a politically
important agreement negotiated and signed solely by the executive branches
in each country.
In none of the countries has it been re-affirmed by the legislatures; nor
has the Central
American Parliament played a role in analyzing, proposing policy, or monitoring
implementation. Although the links between executive and legislative branches
vary
considerably from country to country within the region, it is reasonable
to suggest that the
ALIDES would be supported more broadly if the national and regional legislative
powers,
including the newly-formed Central American Parliament were involved more
directly.
Efforts are presently underway to meet these challenges.
Both the ALIDES and the CONCAUSA Declaration were developed rapidly, over
a
period of very few months, with virtually no participation by Central American
civil society.
The notion of sustainable development, nonetheless, is entering regional
and national debates
among organizations as diverse as the regional association of national campesino
organizations
(ASOCODE) and regional and national indigenous peoples' organizations, such
as CICA, the
Confederación Indígena Centroamericana12.. The Central
American Commission on
Environment and Development has developed public education campaigns to
the the majority
of the Central American public learns of the Alliance, and so that its gradual
implementation
receives greater attention in the media.
There is planning underway at one regional organization, ASIES (Asociación
para
Investigación y Estudios Sociales) in Guatemala, for a series of
"national consultations" on
the ALIDES in each country of the region. These meetings will bring together
a wide range of
government, business, and other nongovernmental organizations to discuss
the steps needed
in each country to advance the implementation of the agreements. Reports
from this process
will then be presented to the Central American presidents at their semi-annual
regional
summit meetings.
The most important locus of active resistance to the notions of sustainable
development in the region comes from the business community. In El Salvador,
the region's
first Business Council for Sustainable Development has been established.
It is beginning to
lead national discussions of questions such as whether the pursuit of alternative
energy
sources, the harmonization of environmental regulations toward a higher
least common
denominator, and increased enforcement of existing environmental legislation
will do little but
increase costs of production and reduce the attractiveness of foreign and
domestic investment
in the region, or whether greater environmental sensitivity and improved
technology will
enhance the nation's entry into an ever-more-environmentally-conscious global
market. The
devastating reductions in foreign direct investment encountered in 1994
and 1995 increase the
importance of these concerns, even if those reductions in investment cannot
be directly linked
to changes in environmental regulations.
There is, nevertheless, very little expertise available in the region on
technologies such
as "pollution prevention" techniques; and there is little awareness
among government officials
of the full range of environmental protection measures that may be required,
either for
accession to NAFTA or for fulfillment of obligations under the WTO.
Challenges for international institutions. The challenge for international
financial
institutions (IFIs) posed by the Central American Alliance is directly related
to the effort that
it represents to open political space for alternative social policies.
If the IFIs continue to
insist on both stabilization and structural adjustment policies that effectively
preclude the
expansion of social programs by establishing, for example, early target
dates for the
elimination of deficits, the privatization of parastatal enterprises, and
the reduction of
government employment, neither the social equity component of the sustainable
development
process nor the consolidation of peace to which it may contribute are likely
to be furthered.
The importance of the critical constraints placed by IFI conditionality
upon government
policy is expanded greatly by the tendency of the private banking and investment
community
to use IFI agreements as critical tests of the appropriateness of the investment
climate.
Explicit recognition by the IFIs that broader social equity concerns may
be consistent with
more rapid long term growth processes and support for measures that contribute
to reducing
inequality may have multiplied impacts upon sustainable development by encouraging
further
private financial and investment flows toward those countries that make
progress in this
sphere.
The challenge for the remainder of the international support community,
including
governments with bilateral assistance programs, the United Nations, and
private foundations
is to accept the directions for Central American development set by the
presidents in the
ALIDES and to find ways to support that process explicitly. The pressure
placed upon the
Central American nations by the United States, Canada, and the European
Union since 1990
to respect and improve democratic processes is a positive example which
has produced
tangible results. The failure of President José Elias Serrano of
Guatemala to maintain
international support, when he unilaterally closed the Guatemalan Congress
in 1994 and
decreed dictatorial powers for himself, is another illustration of how far
other governments
have gone in the direction of a pro-democracy conditionality for assistance.
The changes that have occurred in the US Congress since the 1994 signings
of the
ALIDES and the CONCAUSA Declaration may now seriously undermine the ability
of the
US government to fulfill its commitments to support even the more-narrowly-defined
sustainable development steps in biodiversity, alternative energy, and environmental
legislation. Of the $24 million initially pledged by USAID for regional
support of ALIDES,
only a little more than $1 million had been appropriated by early 1996.
And the oft-projected
impending demise of USAID would, in fact, create a major setback to regional
efforts for
more sustainable development.
Whether the Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development becomes
a well-
intended, well-written, but futile attempt to alter the course of development
in a group of
closely linked nations or whether it becomes the model for future development
and global
economic integration intended by its co-signers now depends on the abilities
of both Central
American societies and their international supporters to respond to these
challenges. It is
increasingly clear that without sustainable development of the sort defined
and selected by
the Central American presidents, the fundamental causes of the civil strife
of the past 20
years will not be eliminated. The region is small, however, and the global
resources needed to
assist the Central Americans to become a model for the global linking of
sustainable
development and peace by implementing the programs outlined in the Sustainable
Development Alliance are also relatively quite small. There is growing
evidence of Central
American commitment to those goals. What seems most lacking is a concerted
willingness on
the part of the region's international partners to provide the external
support, both political
and financial, that is now more critically needed than ever.
Endnotes
1. For purposes of this paper, Central America will be defined to include
the five nations traditionally associated
with the region, plus Panama; from north to south they are: Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, and Panama. Belize began to participate in regionwide activities
when it sent a representative of
the Prime Minister to several summit meetings in 1994; and it became a signatory
of the Central American
Alliance for Sustainable Development. But it's recent social, economic,
and political history remains quite
different from that of the rest of the nations of the traditionally-defined
region.
2. Cf., for example, Richard Fagen, Forging Peace: The Challenge of Central
America, (New York:
Blackwell/PACCA, 1987); Héctor Pérez-Brignoli, A Brief History
of Central America, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1989; John A. Booth and Thomas W. Walker, Understanding
Central America, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1989; Valerie Miller, High Hopes, Harsh Realities: The Challenge
of Development in Central
America, (Cambridge, Mass.: Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, 1992);
and the forthcoming Michael
E. Conroy, Douglas L. Murray, and Peter M. Rosset, A Cautionary Tale:Failed
U.S. Development Policy in
Central America, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).
3. Kissinger Commission, Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America, (Washington
DC, 1984); International Commission on Central American Reconstruction and
Development, Poverty,
Conflict, and Hope: A Turning Point in Central America, (Durham: Duke University,
1989).
4. USAID, Environmental and Natural Resource Management in Central America: A Strategy for AID
Assistance. USAID Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1989.
5. Cf., J. Boyce, "External Assistance and the Peace Process in El
Salvador," E. Wood and A. Segovia,
"Macroeconomic Policy and the Salvadoran Peace Accords," and M.
Pastor and M.E. Conroy, "Distributional
Implications of Macroeconomic Policy: Theory and Applications to El Salvador,"
all in a Special Section of
World Development entitled Adjustment Toward Peace: Economic Policy and
the Salvadoran Peace Accords,
Volume 23, Number 12; December 1995.
6. The documents of the Central American Alliance for Sustainable Development
are available in a number of
places and publications; one of the most convenient is a WorldWideWeb site
in Costa Rica organized by Earth
Council: www.ecouncil.ac.cr.
7. The Brundtland Commission, known more formally as the World Commission
on Environment and
Development (WCED), provided the now-famous specification of the meaning
of sustainable development:
"Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs." WCED, Our
Common Future, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987).
8. http://www.ecouncil.ac.cr/centroam/sica/teguceng.htm; 3/16/96.
9. One central bank official, who preferred to remain anonymous, described
it as "seeking entry to the World
Bank through the sustainable development 'side door' rather than having
to enter through the narrower front
door."
10. A less charitable interpretation, offered by some Central American diplomatic
sources, is that the U.S.
government focused on that interpretation of sustainable development most
consistent with its trade interests,
seeking conservation of biodiversity for pharmaceutical firms, an emphasis
on energy development that favored
privatization and the importation of foreign technology, and higher environmental
legislative standards to lessen
the competitiveness of apparel and assembly firms in the region.
11. Jonathan Lash, "Remarkable Events in Central America" International
Perspectives on Sustainability,
World Resources Institute, March 1995.
12. ASOCODE's III Regional Congress of campesino organizations, held in Tegucigalpa
in January 1995,
adopted a Plan of Action which adopts sustainable agricultural development
as the principal goal for its
regionwide activities, using language drawn directly from the ALIDES. The
meeting also began the process of
defining campesino-based agricultural policy that would be appropriate to
that goal. CICA is presently
working with European Union funding to develop both its own institutional
structure so that it can participate
representatively in on-going regional summit meetings and to expand sustainable
productive activities for its
member organizations.
Sustaining Peace in Central America
Sustainable Development Symposium
Sustainable Development Symposium Papers