The Court:

Given that according to the judgment under attack the engine of Martin’s motor cycle caught fire after it collided with Veidt’s motor-car, and when its petrol tank exploded

Sandrock, who had been on the scene and was attempting to extinguish the flames, was injured;

Given that the Court of Appeal is criticised for holding Martin liable to Sandrock on the ground that a contract of assistance had been formed between them, whereas there cannot be a contract without agreement of the parties and the judgment did not find that Martin had ever agreed;

But given that the Court of Appeal had no need to find that Martin ever expressed his agreement, since an offeree is presumed to have accepted an offer which is exclusively in his own interests, and that having concluded, as it had power to do, that a contract of assistance had been formed between Sandrock and Martin, the judges were quite correct to hold that the party assisted was bound to repair the harm suffered by the person providing gratuitous assistance;

For these reasons, DISMISSES the application for review.

Subsequent developments

TThis note on subsequent developments reflects the legal situation as of October 2005.

Civ 1, 1 December 1969, Martin v Sandrock [An offeree is presumed to have accepted an offer which is exclusively in his own interests: a volunteer who was injured while putting out a fire in a burning vehicle can therefore sue the silent owner under a "contract of assistance"]: In principle, a service given gratuitously to another person does not constitute the implementation of a contract. (There is thus no contract of carriage concluded between a motorist and a person to whom he gives a lift). Case law generally takes the line that the same applies in respect of voluntary and timely assistance provided to a relative, neighbour or friend (Com 25 September 1984, Bull no 242). However, this rule is not an absolute one inasmuch as the Cour de cassation, although sometimes criticised for doing so by legal writers, relies essentially on the sovereign powers of appreciation of the lower courts in assessing the parties' intention to infer the existence of an agreement for assistance, which could require the person assisted to compensate for the harm suffered by the person who decides to come to his assistance. (This is the solution in the judgment of 1969, which had already been expressed in a judgment of the 27 May 1959; see likewise CA Paris 25 January 1995). This solution, likewise criticised by legal writers on the ground that indemnification of the person who comes to help would be better based on management of affairs (gestion d'affaires) or quasi-contract is nevertheless found more generally for different types of voluntary assistance (Civ 1, 27 January 1993, Bull no 42 and 16 July 1997, Bull no 43). This demonstrates the pragmatism of a case law which favours an objective assessment of the facts (consideration of the parties' intentions, the opportunity of intervention etc) or the relatively unpredictable character of that case law - however one chooses to regard it.

Translation by Raymond Youngs

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