Truth or Economics: On the Definition, Prediction, and Relevance of Economic Efficiency (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
Matters of Principle: Legitimate Legal Argument and Constitutional Interpretation (New York: New York University Press, 1998).
Articles
Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of the Corrective-Justice-Securing Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society, 2006 Illinois Law Review 243.
On the Economic Inefficiency of a Liberal-Corrective-Justice Securing Law of Torts, 2006 Illinois Law Review 525.
On the Possibly-Predatory Character of Nonsystems-Rivalry Investments and Systems Rivalry: Definitional, Functional, and Legal Analyses, 50 Antitrust Bulletin 1 (2005).
Why Kaplow and Shavell?s ?Double-Distortion Argument? Articles are Wrong, 13 George Mason Law Review 511 (2005).
Learning from the Foreigners: A Response to Justice Scalia?s and Professor Levinson?s Professional Moral Parochialism [Symposium: Globalization and the Judiciary], 39 Texas International Law Journal 367 (2004).
Precommitment Analysis and Societal Moral Identity, 81 Texas Law Review 1877 (2003).
On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Research and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 Harvard Journal on Legislation 63 (2002).
On the Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions, 47 Antitrust Bulletin 571 (2002).
On the Relevance of Economic Efficiency Conclusions, 29 Florida State University Law Review 1 (2001).
Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to Legal-Rights Questions [Symposium on Taking Legal Argument Seriously], 74 Chicago-Kent Law Review 415 (1999).
Taking Legal Argument Seriously: An Introduction [Symposium on Taking Legal Argument Seriously], 74 Chicago-Kent Law Review 317 (1999).
?You Cannot Be Serious!?: A Reply to Professors Balkin and Levinson [Symposium on Taking Legal Argument Seriously], 74 Chicago-Kent Law Review 559 (1999).
The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting from a ?Negligence? System to a ?Strict-Liability? Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A Partial and Preliminary Third-Best-Allocative-Efficiency Analysis, 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review 11 (1998).
Introduction [to the Symposium on Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics], 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review 3 (1998).
Legal Scholarship: The Course, 48 Journal of Legal Education 539 (1998).
The Professional Assessment of Legal Academics: On the Shift from Evaluator Judgment to Market Evaluations, 48 Journal of Legal Education 417 (1998).
Second-Best Theory and the Obligations of Academics: A Reply to Professor Donohue, 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review 267 (1998).
Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-Allocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: The Whys and Some Therefores, 46 Case Western Reserve Law Review 313 (1996).
The Case for ?Business as Usual? in Law-and-Economics Land: A Critical Comment, 78 Iowa Law Review 387 (1993).
A Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of the Concept of ?The Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency?: Why the Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtually All Law-and-Economics Welfare Arguments Are Wrong, 1993 University of Illinois Law Review 485.
Second-Best Theory and the Standard Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a ?Sociological? Account, and Some Illustrative Stories, 78 Iowa Law Review 327 (1993).
The American Antitrust Laws on the Centennial of the Sherman Act: A Critique of the Statutes Themselves, Their Interpretation, and Their Operationalization, 38 Buffalo Law Review 673 (1990).
Ayres on ?Markovits and Markets?: A Reply, 64 Chicago-Kent Law Review 873 (1988).
International Competition, Market Definition, and the Appropriate Way to Analyze the Legality of Horizontal Mergers Under the Clayton Act, 64 Chicago-Kent Law Review 745 (1988).
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements: a Reply to Professor Carlson, 8 Cardozo Law Review 601 (1986).
The Functions, Allocative Efficiency and Legality of Tie-Ins: A Comment, 28 Journal of Law & Economics 387 (1985).
An Ideal Antitrust Law Regime, 64 Texas Law Review 251 (1985).
Duncan?s Do Not?s: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 Stanford Law Review 1169 (1984).
The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 Texas Law Review 41 (1984).
Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency: A Response to Professor Posner?s Reply, 11 Hofstra Law Review 667 (1983).
Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 8 Hofstra Law Review 811 (1980).
Tie-Ins and Reciprocity: A Functional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 58 Texas Law Review 1363 (1980).
Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and The Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, 77 Michigan Law Review 567 (1979) (reviewing The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself, by Robert Bork).
Predicting the Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers in a Monopolistically Competitive World, 56 Texas Law Review 587 (1978).
The Allocative Efficiency and Overall Desirability of Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, 28 Stanford Law Review 45 (1976).
The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: A Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 Stanford Law Review 1 (1976).
Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare. Part IV: The Allocative Efficiency and Overall Desirability of Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, 28 Stanford Law Review 45 (1976).
Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare: A Response to Professor Posner, 28 Stanford Law Review 919 (1976).
The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 Harvard Law Review 1815 (1976).
A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wisconsin Law Review 950.
Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare. Part III: Proving (Illegal) Oligopolistic Pricing: A Description of the Necessary Evidence and a Critique of the Received Wisdom About Its Character and Cost, 27 Stanford Law Review 307 (1975).
Potential Competition, Limit Price Theory, and the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers Under the American Antitrust Laws, 1975 Wisconsin Law Review 658.
Some Preliminary Notes on the American Antitrust Laws? Economic Tests of Legality, 27 Stanford Law Review 841 (1975).
Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare. Part II: Injurious Oligopolistic Pricing Sequences: Their Description, Interpretation and Legality under the Sherman Act, 26 Stanford Law Review 717 (1974).
Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare. Part I: Oligopolistic Price and Oligopolistic Pricing: Their Conventional and Operational Definition, 26 Stanford Law Review 493 (1974).
Fixed Input (Investment) Competition and the Variability of Fixed Inputs (Investment): Their Nature, Determinants and Significance, 24 Stanford Law Review 507 (1972).
Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws, 80 Yale Law Journal 195 (1970).
Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 Yale Law Journal 1397 (1967).
Reviews
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives, ed. by M.D. Adler & E.A. Posner, 115 Ethics 593 (2005).
Contributions
Public Policy Analysis from an Economic, Political-Economic and Ethical Perspective, in 1985/86 Die Wissenschaftskolleg Jahrbuch 155 (Berlin: Quadriga, 1987).
Monopolistic Competition and Second Best: Some New Conceptual Schemes, in Essays in Honour of Basil Yamey 181 (Dover, NH: Croom-Helm, 1986).
Antitrust: Alternatives to Delegalization, in Juridification of Social Spheres 333 (Gunther Teubner ed.; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986).
