The University of Texas at Austin   School of Law

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Richard S. Markovits

  • John B. Connally Chair

Publications

Books

  • Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law, Vol. I, Basic Concepts and Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct (Springer, 2014).
  • Economics and the Interpretation and Application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law, Vol. II, Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Mergers, Vertical Practices, and Joint Ventures (Springer, 2014).
  • Truth or Economics: On the Definition, Prediction, and Relevance of Economic Efficiency (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
  • Matters of Principle: Legitimate Legal Argument and Constitutional Interpretation (New York: New York University Press, 1998).

Articles

  • Background (Fixed-Cost) Avoidance-Choices, Foreground (Variable-Cost) Avoidance-Choices, and the Economically Efficient Approach for Courts to Take in Marine-Salvage Cases: A Positive Analysis and Related Critique of Landes and Posner's Classic Study, 59 Buffalo Law Review 57 (2011). View Article
  • The Limits to Simplifying the Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 6 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 51 (2010).
  • On the Economic Inefficiency of a Liberal-Corrective-Justice Securing Law of Torts, 2006 Illinois Law Review 525.
  • Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of the Corrective-Justice-Securing Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society, 2006 Illinois Law Review 243.
  • Why Kaplow and Shavell's "Double-Distortion Argument" Articles are Wrong, 13 George Mason Law Review 511 (2005).
  • On the Possibly-Predatory Character of Nonsystems-Rivalry Investments and Systems Rivalry: Definitional, Functional, and Legal Analyses, 50 Antitrust Bulletin 1 (2005).
  • Learning from the Foreigners: A Response to Justice Scalia's and Professor Levinson's Professional Moral Parochialism [Symposium: Globalization and the Judiciary], 39 Texas International Law Journal 367 (2004).
  • Precommitment Analysis and Societal Moral Identity, 81 Texas Law Review 1877 (2003).
  • On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Research and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 Harvard Journal on Legislation 63 (2002).
  • On the Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions, 47 Antitrust Bulletin 571 (2002).
  • On the Relevance of Economic Efficiency Conclusions, 29 Florida State University Law Review 1 (2001).
  • Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to Legal-Rights Questions [Symposium on Taking Legal Argument Seriously], 74 Chicago-Kent Law Review 415 (1999).
  • Taking Legal Argument Seriously: An Introduction [Symposium on Taking Legal Argument Seriously], 74 Chicago-Kent Law Review 317 (1999).
  • "You Cannot Be Serious!": A Reply to Professors Balkin and Levinson [Symposium on Taking Legal Argument Seriously], 74 Chicago-Kent Law Review 559 (1999).
  • Second-Best Theory and the Obligations of Academics: A Reply to Professor Donohue, 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review 267 (1998).
  • The Professional Assessment of Legal Academics: On the Shift from Evaluator Judgment to Market Evaluations, 48 Journal of Legal Education 417 (1998).
  • Legal Scholarship: The Course, 48 Journal of Legal Education 539 (1998).
  • Introduction [Symposium on Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics], 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review 3 (1998).
  • The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting from a "Negligence" System to a "Strict-Liability" Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A Partial and Preliminary Third-Best-Allocative-Efficiency Analysis, 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review 11 (1998).
  • Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best-Allocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: The Whys and Some Therefores, 46 Case Western Reserve Law Review 313 (1996).
  • A Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of the Concept of "The Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency": Why the Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtually All Law-and-Economics Welfare Arguments Are Wrong, 1993 University of Illinois Law Review 485.
  • Second-Best Theory and the Standard Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a "Sociological" Account, and Some Illustrative Stories, 78 Iowa Law Review 327 (1993).
  • The Case for "Business as Usual" in Law-and-Economics Land: A Critical Comment, 78 Iowa Law Review 387 (1993).
  • The American Antitrust Laws on the Centennial of the Sherman Act: A Critique of the Statutes Themselves, Their Interpretation, and Their Operationalization, 38 Buffalo Law Review 673 (1990).
  • Ayres on "Markovits and Markets": A Reply, 64 Chicago-Kent Law Review 873 (1988).
  • International Competition, Market Definition, and the Appropriate Way to Analyze the Legality of Horizontal Mergers Under the Clayton Act, 64 Chicago-Kent Law Review 745 (1988).
  • Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements: a Reply to Professor Carlson, 8 Cardozo Law Review 601 (1986).
  • An Ideal Antitrust Law Regime, 64 Texas Law Review 251 (1985).
  • The Functions, Allocative Efficiency and Legality of Tie-Ins: A Comment, 28 Journal of Law & Economics 387 (1985).
  • Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 Stanford Law Review 1169 (1984).
  • The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 Texas Law Review 41 (1984).
  • Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency: A Response to Professor Posner's Reply, 11 Hofstra Law Review 667 (1983).
  • Tie-Ins and Reciprocity: A Functional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 58 Texas Law Review 1363 (1980).
  • Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency, 8 Hofstra Law Review 811 (1980).
  • Predicting the Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers in a Monopolistically Competitive World, 56 Texas Law Review 587 (1978).
  • The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 Harvard Law Review 1815 (1976).
  • Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare: A Response to Professor Posner, 28 Stanford Law Review 919 (1976).
  • Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare. Part IV: The Allocative Efficiency and Overall Desirability of Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, 28 Stanford Law Review 45 (1976).
  • The Allocative Efficiency and Overall Desirability of Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, 28 Stanford Law Review 45 (1976).
  • The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: A Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 Stanford Law Review 1 (1976).
  • A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wisconsin Law Review 950.
  • Some Preliminary Notes on the American Antitrust Laws' Economic Tests of Legality, 27 Stanford Law Review 841 (1975).
  • Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare. Part III: Proving (Illegal) Oligopolistic Pricing: A Description of the Necessary Evidence and a Critique of the Received Wisdom About Its Character and Cost, 27 Stanford Law Review 307 (1975).
  • Potential Competition, Limit Price Theory, and the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers Under the American Antitrust Laws, 1975 Wisconsin Law Review 658.
  • Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare. Part II: Injurious Oligopolistic Pricing Sequences: Their Description, Interpretation and Legality under the Sherman Act, 26 Stanford Law Review 717 (1974).
  • Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare. Part I: Oligopolistic Price and Oligopolistic Pricing: Their Conventional and Operational Definition, 26 Stanford Law Review 493 (1974).
  • Fixed Input (Investment) Competition and the Variability of Fixed Inputs (Investment): Their Nature, Determinants and Significance, 24 Stanford Law Review 507 (1972).
  • Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws, 80 Yale Law Journal 195 (1970).
  • Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 Yale Law Journal 1397 (1967).

Reviews

  • Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives, ed. by M.D. Adler & E.A. Posner, 115 Ethics 593 (2005).
  • Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and The Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, 77 Michigan Law Review 567 (1979) (reviewing The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself, by Robert Bork).

Contributions

  • How American Legal Academics’ Positions on Economic-Efficiency Analysis, Moral Philosophy, and Valid Legal Argument Disserve Law and Society Empirical Research in Law, Society, and History: Themes in the Legal Sociology and Legal History of Lawrence M. Friedman (Robert W. Gordon & Morton J. Horwitz, eds.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
  • Monopolistic Competition and Second Best: Some New Conceptual Schemes, in Essays in Honour of Basil Yamey 181 (Dover, NH: Croom-Helm, 1986).
  • Public Policy Analysis from an Economic, Political-Economic and Ethical Perspective, in 1985/86 Die Wissenschaftskolleg Jahrbuch 155 (Berlin: Quadriga, 1987).
  • Antitrust: Alternatives to Delegalization, in Juridification of Social Spheres 333 (Gunther Teubner ed.; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986).

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Contact Information

Richard S. Markovits

rmarkovits@law.utexas.edu

Work (512) 232-1348

Fax (408) 554-4426

Office: JON 6.253
The University of Texas at Austin
727 E Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705

Faculty Assistant

Sally A. Zaleski szaleski@law.utexas.edu

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