Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal
Volume 18
Issue 1 - Fall 2009
One Trademark Per Source
| | Citation:
18 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. J. 1 (2009) |
| | About:
Distinguished Research Professor of Law at Seton Hall University. |
| | Abstract:
This article proposes and justifies a radical restructuring of trademark law limiting trademark protection to one mark per source, a “single signal” rule. It argues that the proper scope of trademark law requires emphasizing source-indicating function of trademarks and liberating the product-describing function. It suggests a program for minimizing the dislocation costs to consumers and suppliers that result from removing trademark protection from many famous marks. |
So Long as You Live Under My Roof, You'll Live by... Whose Rules?: Ending the Extraterritorial Application of Patent Law
| | Citation:
18 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. J. 53 (2009) |
| | Author:
Jacob A. Schroeder |
| | About:
J.D., The George Washington University Law School, May 2009; B.S., Computer Engineering, Purdue University, May 2005. |
| | Abstract:
Addresses, from an international law perspective, how intellectual property protection has changed and should continue to change in today’s globalized economy. Changes should ensure that incentives remain in place for inventors as the world shifts from independent national markets to the flourishing of international trade on the global marketplace. |
Single-Firm Opportunism and the FTC's Rambus Defeat: Implications for Section 2 of the Sherman Act
| | Citation:
18 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. J. 93 (2009) |
| | Author:
Christopher Hardee |
| | About:
Christopher Hardee is an Attorney in the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice. J.D., 1994, Yale Law School. The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not purport to reflect the views of the United States Department of Justice. |
| | Abstract:
This article explores the implications of the Rambus, Inc. v. FTC decision for SSO cases and attempts to outline a proper, limited role for antitrust enforcement against single-firm conduct involving breaches of contractual duties or vague ethical obligations. |
Star Power in the Lone Star State: The Right of Publicity in Texas
| | Citation:
18 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. J. 117 (2009) |
| | About:
Of Counsel, Patterson & Sheridan, LLP. The author would like to thank Professor Paul Stancil of the College of Law at the University of Illinois, David Clark, Esq., and Jackob Ben-Ezra of the Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal for their invaluable assistance with substantive ideas and the editing of this article. This article is dedicated to my wife, Amy, and my children, Ella, Juliana, and Henry. |
| | Abstract:
This article discusses the elements of a right of publicity claim for both living and deceased individuals under Texas law, as well as issues regarding damages and attorneys’ fees, federal preemption, and sovereign immunity. In addition to detailing the current state of Texas law, this article suggests that the right of publicity should not be extended to business entities, that courts should be flexible in considering damages claims based on right of publicity violations, and that the right of publicity for the deceased terminates on the fiftieth anniversary of that individual’s death given the Texas Property Code’s clear statement that names or likenesses of individuals may be used for “any purpose” fifty years after that person’s death. Moreover, this article argues that courts applying Texas law should not follow the holding of the Ninth Circuit in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., in which the court held that Vanna White’s “identity” had been appropriated by Samsung’s use of a robot with a blond wig in an advertisement featuring the “Wheel of Fortune” set, where it could not be argued reasonably that White was endorsing Samsung TVs. Lastly, this article suggests that courts should proceed with caution when analyzing whether commercial uses of photographs of the non-famous are used for the “value” associated with their images. |
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