Note:
Lee Keller, Antitrust—Vertical Restraints—Schwinn “Per Se” Doctrine Extended to Location Clauses. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc. (9th Cir. 1974), 53 TEXAS L. REV. 127 (1974).
 

Abstract:
In U.S. v. Schwinn, the Supreme Court ostensibly held that vertically imposed territorial restraints are per se prohibited under the Sherman Act. This comment attacks the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sylvania v. Continental as an inappropriate reliance on the per se doctrine of U.S. v. Schwinn. The author draws a distinction between the factual setting of the two cases, with Schwinn involving direct territorial restraints, and Sylvania involving an indirect definition of classes of customers. Further, the so-called “location clause” in Sylvannia is not clearly within the ambit of Schwinn’s per se prohibition. Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the policy underlying Schwinn was simply misplaced. The author concludes that for cases of vertical restraints not clearly within the per se rule of Schwinn, the rule of reason, employed by the Supreme Court in White Motor Co. v. U.S., should be employed in order to ascertain the competitive effects of the restriction and more adequately implement the policy goals of the Sherman Act.