Article:
Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions
on Political Parties in the Wake of Cousins v. Wigoda, 53
Texas L. Rev. 935 (1975).
Abstract:
Cousins v. Wigoda, arising out of a 1972 credentials challenge
to Mayor Daley’s Illinois delegation at the Democratic National
Convention, foreshadows the Supreme Court’s stance on the
complex issues surrounding a credentials contest, which is a
vehicle for challenging the seating of delegates to nominating
conventions. In response to the unseating of Mayor Daley and his
loyalists by the convention’s Credentials Committee, the Court
held that the national interest in selecting candidates for
national office and the party members’ freedom of association
overcame an admitted state interest in the integrity of its
election process; thus party rules on delegate selection might
legitimately disqualify delegates selected according to state
law. Arguably, Cousins may be read to urge, if not require,
courts and legislatures to stay out of the national nominating
convention process at any stage. In context, however, Cousins
offers a carefully circumscribed holding: party rules should
control prenomination activities, and the legislature and courts
should abstain from interference (a) if there is no claim that
the party acted unconstitutionally; or (b) if a state statute
conflicting with the party rule is an extraterritorial extension
of the state’s jurisdiction and if the state has no special
interest justifying the burden its extraterritorial statute
places on the national party. In all other cases state
regulation and judicial review have a place.
The major issue that arises in determining the content of
judicial review of the presidential prenomination process is the
functional reach of intervention—the standards to be applied in
placing constitutional limitations on a political party and in
protecting the party from unduly restrictive state legislation.
Ancillary to the determination of functional standards are two
preliminary jurisdictional inquires affecting the scope of
judicial review—whether state action exists or is even a
necessary prerequisite to judicial review, and whether the
political question doctrine conclusively militates against
judicial intervention. Cousins seemingly established a simple
standard of review and offered no opinion on the jurisdictional
issues; yet when considered in light of surrounding case law,
the opinion intimates a complex constitutional balancing of
interests and serves to suggest the future parameters of the
judicial questions.