Article:
George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 193 (1976).
 

Abstract:
In this article Professor Dix traces the present confusion in the law of waiver to two sources. First, courts have failed to distinguish the issue of waiver from the issues of the scope of procedural rights and of the requirements for implementation of those rights. Second, courts have employed an amorphous standard of voluntariness to determine the effectiveness of waivers. Professor Dix proposes a narrow definition of waiver that would focus on the effect to be given a defendant’s conscious choice to forgo a right and that would leave the other issues for the separate consideration they deserve. In place of the vague but traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test for voluntariness, he undertakes a policy analysis to determine the awareness a defendant must have and the considerations that must not affect his decision if a waiver is to be effective. The author concludes with an analysis of capacity to make an effective waiver.