Observation:
Michael H. Graham, The Relationship Among Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A), and 403: A Reply to Weinstein’s Evidence, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 573 (1976).
 

Abstract:
The circumstances under which a party may impeach by prior inconsistent statements a witness he or she called to the stand remains an issue under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 607 clearly allows a party to attack the credibility of his or her own witness. Since rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not permit the substantive admission of all prior inconsistent statements, however, there exists a danger that a calling party will attempt to use impeachment as a technique to place before a jury prior statements that are not substantively admissible.

In an earlier article—Graham, Examination of a Party’s Own Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 Texas L. Rev. 917 (1976)—Professor Graham argued that federal courts should meet this problem by continuing to require surprise and damage as a prerequisite for a party to impeach his or her own witness by nonsubstantively admissible prior inconsistent statements. The new supplement to Weinstein’s Evidence—3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence 607[01], at 19-21 (Cum. Supp. Dec. 1976)—while recognizing the problem, suggests a different approach: courts should apply rule 403 to balance the probative value of the impeaching evidence against its prejudicial impact. In this article Professor Graham responds with a comparison of the two alternative approaches. He points out practical difficulties with a case-by-case balancing of complex factors and urges the use of established common-law principles to aid in applying the generalities of the new Rules.