Article:
Michael M. Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write Into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 Texas L. Rev. 167 (1979).
 

Abstract:
In his article “Inherent Judicial Power,” Professor Martin analyzes the separation of powers implications of Congress’ 1973 comprehensive prescriptive and adjective law. By involving itself in the Supreme Court’s rule-making process, Congress, for the first time in 35 years, ended its deference to the Court’s procedural rule-making authority. Despite the substantial flexibility retained in the structure of the federal rules after Congress’ intervention, it was clear that the purpose of many of the Congressional changes was to exclude evidence that would have been admissible under the rule prescribed by the Supreme Court. Professor Martin questions whether or to what extent a federal court is bound by the explicit and implicit restrictions placed by Congress on a court’s power to admit evidence. In answering this question Martin analyzes specific rules and argues that the federal courts are supreme over Congress regarding at least some rules of evidence, and that a court may, on some occasions, disregard explicit directions in the rules. His argument is grounded in the Constitutional grant of judicial power to the courts and a determination that some evidence rules are inherent in those powers.