Article:
Mark V. Tushnet, Deviant Science In Constitutional Law, 59 TEXAS. L. REV. 815 (1981).
 

Abstract:
In his article Professor Tushnet responds to Professor Ball’s critical commentary of his theories. Tushnet begins with the core assertion that the vast majority of constitutional law scholarship is oriented around a version of what he terms “normal science.” The basic element of “normal science” in constutional law as Tushnet uses the term is the implication that all the standard arguments and counter-arguments are well-entrenched and accepted. Thus, all a “serious” reader of constitutional law can attemt to do is recognize the particualr topic at hand and search for the the accepted topics and key phrases. This reduces the commentary of the reader to a sort of “artistic criticism” of a scholars novel version of the standardized twists and turns in argumentation. Tushnet asserts that this “normal science” has generally accepted flaws-stemming from the fact that it is itself a low level liberal political theory, which is itself internally inconsistent. He applauds the appearance of articles , scattered throughout Law Reviews, that practice a new “deviant science” in that they reject or make problematic the liberal political theory that is the basis of the “normal science” constitutional theory. He condones this new recognition that the anomolies iherent in “norma science” are serious enough to warrant efforts at creating alternative ways of thinking about constitutional law.