Reply:
Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Psychology of First Amendment Scholarship: A Reply, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 819 (1993).
 

Abstract:
In their essay Commerce and Communication, Professors Collins and Skover propose that the traditional justifications for the protection of free speech, to guarantee individual liberty and to preserve the possibility of an even and rational discourse, fail to rationalize protecting modern commercial speech under the First Amendment. The paper generated widespread discussion, which gave rise to a general critique that Professors Collins and Skover would throw commercial speech outside the orbit of constitutional protection and in so doing commit a great crime. In their reply, they point out that they hesitate, in fact, to say that commercial speech should not be protected, and rather than contribute a policy proposal are more interested in spurring discussion. Specifically, they feel that the arguments typically used to justify broad First Amendment protections do not and cannot work in the context of commercial speech, which is more interested in subverting and shaping sentiments than forging ideas, and that a new rationale is needed if commercial speech protection is to be handled honestly. They suggest that the academy’s inability to create such a rationale may stem from the peculiar psychology of First Amendment scholarship, which holds the idea of free speech sacrosanct and tolerates very little speech on the subject of free speech itself. Perhaps, Professors Collins and Skover suggest, if protecting commercial speech were less of a shibboleth it could be considered more thoughtfully.