LBJ School News Brief

November 10, 2004

Nuclear Proliferation
Rogue States and
Lessons from the Past

Imagine—your implacable foe is on the verge of successfully developing nuclear weapons. The regime is infused with ideological extremism and is led by a ruthless “madman.” This totalitarian dictator has killed and tortured countless numbers of his own citizens, brooks no dissent, fosters a bizarre cult of personality, and has pursued an expansionist foreign policy for years. Your soldiers have faced his on the battlefield during the previous decade, but despite America’s power and ideals, you fear he cannot be deterred. A groundswell builds in Washington to eliminate his nuclear weapons before they become operational.

Iraq in 2003? Try the People’s Republic of China in 1964. Forty years ago this week, the PRC exploded an atomic device, setting off panic within the U.S. government that led the Johnson administration to create a top-secret, blue-ribbon committee led by former Undersecretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. This committee—staffed by some of the nation’s best minds—successfully wrestled with the complex and critical issue of nuclear proliferation, and their recommendations paved the way for a new U.S. policy that led, against all odds, to a worldwide treaty that stands to this day.

Frank Gavin photo

Francis J. Gavin

What lessons do the deliberations of this committee hold for current policy? Both George W. Bush and John Kerry have identified nuclear proliferation as the most important threat the United States faces today. Yet the Bush administration, in its 2002 National Security Strategy document, argues that the lessons of the Cold War are largely irrelevant to the making of contemporary U.S. strategy. The United States faced a “status quo, risk adverse” adversary—the Soviet Union—that believed weapons of mass destruction should be used only as a last resort. In contrast, the United States is currently confronted by “rogue states” that “brutalize their own people,” “threaten their neighbors,” “sponsor terrorism,” and “hate the United States and everything for which it stands.” Most important, rogue states “are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction” to “achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes,” resulting in a world that is far “more complex and dangerous” than the international system of the 1960s. According to the National Security Strategy, Cold War concepts such as deterrence will not work in a “security environment that has undergone profound transformation.”

U.S. policymakers assessing international politics following the testing of an atomic device by the People’s Republic of China in October 1964 would have been puzzled by the Bush administration’s characterization of their world. Four decades ago, the threat posed by a nuclear-armed China under Mao Zedong was far more terrifying than anything Iraq’s Sadaam Hussein or any current rogue ruler could muster. China—with a population of more than 700 million in 1964—had already fought the United States in Korea, attacked India, and threatened Taiwan, Indochina, and Indonesia. It supported violent revolutionary groups around the globe whose goals clashed with U.S. interests. Mao’s internal policies had led to the death of millions of his own citizens, and he had already declared that nuclear war with the United States was not to be feared. According to Mao, “If the worse came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist.” To the United States such actions and statements made the PRC appear not only irrational but also perhaps undeterrable.

Before the Gilpatric committee met 40 years ago, many U.S. policymakers believed that nuclear proliferation was inevitable and the United States could gain political currency by managing and in some cases aiding the process by providing allies with these weapons. Through its thoughtful and intensive deliberations, the Gilpatric committee initiated a reconceptualization of the proliferation question and analyzed the painful tradeoffs that were necessary to implement a more active nonproliferation policy. The committee was not naïve about bureaucratic politics and took great care to take the interests of various government stakeholders seriously.

This process led to more thoughtful, less reactive policy options that were in America’s long-term interest. Consider U.S. policy towards China, the ultimate “rogue” state. Before the committee deliberated, U.S. policymakers considered an attack, alone or with the Russians, against China’s nuclear facilities. Mao’s regime did not appear “rational” or deterrable, and some analysts believed an extreme policy of “counter-proliferation” would deter other states from developing nuclear weapons. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ early analysis of China mirrored the Bush administration’s public portrayal of Iraq in the run up to the war.

After thoughtful consideration, the Gilpatric committee and the Johnson administration rejected pre-emption, both for China and in general. This turned out to be a wise policy. China has not, as was once feared, used its nuclear weapons, and although it retained an active foreign policy, it did not become reckless or undeterrable. By 1969, China and the United States began a dialogue that flourished into a tacit anti-Soviet alliance by 1972, a mere eight years after the PRC went nuclear. This relationship played an important role in ending the Cold War on terms favorable to the United States.

Compare this policy with the results of the Bush administration’s preventive war against Iraq, an action largely justified by fears of Sadaam Hussein developing nuclear weapons. Iraq’s desire for nuclear weapons was understandable, surrounded by potential nuclear adversaries (Iran and Israel) and threatened with regime change by the most powerful country in the world. North Korea and Iran have since increased the pace of their nuclear weapons program, and Iran has exploited the present power vacuum to increase its support of terrorism while interfering with U.S. interests in Afghanistan and Iraq. A more thoughtful policy process, similar to the Gilpatric committee’s efforts 40 years ago, could have produced policies that better served long-term U.S. interests. It still can.

Francis J. Gavin
LBJ School of Public Affairs
The University of Texas at Austin
fgavin@mail.utexas.edu
512/779-3885

2004-05 LBJ School Policy Research Project

10 November 2004

Comments to: lbjweb@uts.cc.utexas.edu

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