LBJ School News Brief

February 17, 2004

Elspeth Rostow photo

Elspeth Rostow is a policy historian who teaches courses on the American presidency and U.S. foreign policy at the LBJ School of Public Affairs.

The rhetoric of presidential campaigns:
a historical perspective

by Elspeth Rostow

During the Cold War, a British friend of mine observed: “I find it helpful to realize that you people go quite mad every four years when you are electing a president. Especially when there is also a war going on!” Madness is an overstatement, but it is true that an upcoming election usually trumps other serious policy matters—although it may not grab as much attention as Michael Jackson or the Super Bowl.

Take 1864, for example, when a beleaguered Republican incumbent, Abraham Lincoln, faced General George McClellan, who campaigned as a war hero standing on a peace platform. The campaign was bitter, with McClellan’s divided Democrats unable to craft a tactic capable of unseating the Commander-in-Chief. What turned the election to Lincoln was the capture of Atlanta by General Sherman, in effect ending the strategic hopes of General Lee and the Confederacy. Lincoln’s Union Party, an underdog in mid-summer 1864, parlayed subsequent military victories into a November success, with its 212 electoral votes overwhelming the Democrats’ 21. Six weeks after his second inaugural, Lincoln was assassinated.

War had a decisive impact on many twentieth century elections. Consider 1916 when Woodrow Wilson, a Democratic progressive, was fighting for reelection two years after the outbreak of World War I. The Democratic mantra of 1916, “He kept us out of war,” helped earn Wilson the task of managing the U.S. wartime role and to attempt (less successfully) to shape the postwar period.

In 1940, Franklin Roosevelt fought for a third term while a second World War was in bitter contention abroad. The campaign pitted advocates of neutrality against those favoring support of the Allies. Again, an American president appeared to pledge U.S. noninvolvement with a promise: “I have said this before but I shall say it again and again and again: your sons are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.” Republican hopes were dimmed by the fact that FDR’s opponent, Wendell Willkie, was nearer to the internationalist position of the president than to the views of many of his isolationist fellow Republicans. Increasingly as the campaign progressed, Roosevelt centered on national defense. Despite other matters—(the Third Term question was a hot button)—the campaign was increasingly war-driven and the outcome significant: 449 Democratic electoral votes versus 82 Republican.

Are there lessons to be learned from these three electoral campaigns? Notice that in two of them, (1916 and 1940) foreign strategists appeared to take American campaign rhetoric at face value. An underlying assumption behind German escalation of submarine warfare by 1917 was that a president who had kept his country neutral would continue to stay out of foreign squabbles. A later misreading of American intent came in the second World War. How did it sound to Japanese ears when, as late as November 2nd, FDR stated “Your president says this country is not going to war”? It would be simplistic to argue that Pearl Harbor resulted from a “Lost in Translation” communications problem yet, as in 1916, presidential rhetoric geared to the task of winning an election could appear to outside observers to be a guarantee of future policy. Americans, on their part, have learned that what a candidate says while campaigning is not necessarily a clue as to his performance after the inaugural. (In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt promised the country a balanced budget but suffered no political damage in ’36 when he had failed to produce one. Conversely, when the senior President Bush broke his pledge to oppose new taxes, conservatives who had read his lips so recently were infuriated.)

Confusing? Somewhat. But remember that ours is a presidential, not a parliamentary, system. U.S. voters tend to choose the individual whose character, leadership skills and record they find preferable. Issues matter, especially in wartime, and party identification is a determinant. But these elements are not policy-specific.

Like presidents before him, the man who will be inaugurated next January will come with a “Limited Warranty”, good for four years. Voters are wise to examine the fine print of campaign rhetoric for signs that the issues that matter to them will be faithfully handled. But, as with any major purchase such as an SUV, there are bound to be surprises when the machine is actually on the road.

Election 2004 is once again a test of the voters’ capacity to deconstruct campaign rhetoric in the context of war. On this Presidents Day, it is heartening to think that, despite all its quiddities and quirks, our presidential system is still working. But it may be equally heartening to realize that we have less than nine months to go before Election Day. Stay tuned.

Related Links:

Elspeth Rostow bio

LBJ School expert guide: 2004 election

17 February 2004

Comments to: lbjweb@uts.cc.utexas.edu

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