Keeping a strong military requires adding troops
by Edwin Dorn
Op ed, Austin American-Statesman, January 2, 2004
When I arrived at the Pentagon in the spring of 1993, one of my first conversations was with Colin Powell, who was serving his last six months as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I asked him for advice about my job as Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. He didn't mince words: "Ed, the Clinton Administration is inheriting the finest military force ever assembled. Your job is, don't screw it up."
Powell's admonition was a major challenge, given the circumstances. We were downsizing the force dramatically, from 2.1 million people on active duty to 1.4 million. During previous major reductions -- after WWII, Korea and Viet Nam -- military readiness had suffered and the nation found itself unprepared to deal with the next international conflict. We were determined to keep that from happening. In the end, we succeeded in maintaining military readiness and improving soldiers' quality of life.
One of the things we had to pay special attention to was personnel tempo -- the length and frequency with which military personnel were deployed away from home base. In the 1990s, the U.S. military was as busy as any "peacetime" force had ever been, with tens of thousands of troops deployed to deal with a host of contingencies: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and enforcing the "no-fly" zones over northern and southern Iraq.
Today, the pressures on our soldiers are even greater than during the 1990s. If we do not find ways to ease "perstempo", the military will start a downward spiral that will be very difficult to reverse.
First, with nearly half of the active Army's combat brigades committed to Iraq, we do not have a robust rotation base. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced late last fall that the troops currently deployed will be replaced by next spring by "fresh" troops. If we keep a heavy presence in Iraq for another two years, the troops that will be brought back next May will be at home for barely a year before being deployed again. Two tours in a combat zone in three years is likely to cause severe morale problems, especially for soldiers with families. The result is likely to be a significant decline in reenlistments. The problem is likely to be even more pronounced among the reserve components. Reservists and National Guardsmen expect to be used for brief emergencies; they did not sign up for duty that takes them away from their families and careers for year-long tours in dangerous areas.
Second, as the Iraq occupation drags on and military casualties mount, public support will decline. This is likely to be reflected in reduced first-term enlistments, a problem that will be compounded by a long-awaited economic recovery that improves employment prospects for enlistment-age men and women.
Third, military operations are as hard on equipment and on support infrastructure as they are on soldiers. For every American soldier killed in Iraq, several more suffer injuries that require weeks of hospital care and months of rehabilitation -- burdens imposed on a military health care system that, even before Iraq, was underfunded and overworked.
On November 6, Secretary Rumsfeld announced that US troop levels in Iraq will decline from 132,000 to 105,000 by next may -- a concession that we will retain a substantial force there for quite some time. Left unsaid was that sustaining the occupation force will require another hefty appropriation on top of the $87 billion increase that Congress approved last fall.
Unfortunately, more money for military operations will not address the underlying dynamics affecting the troops. Our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere simply are not sustainable at current force levels. And until the daily dangers subside, our soldiers cannot expect relief to be provided by other countries' military forces or by civilian contractors.
Thus, a consensus is growing in Congress and among military experts outside the Pentagon that the only viable solution is to increase the size of the force, especially the Army. Estimates on the low side are for an additional 30,000 to 40,000, although one expert, Representative Heather Wilson (R-AZ), has suggested increasing the force by more than 100,000.
These increases cannot happen quickly. It takes many months to recruit and train soldiers. Still, if the services were to increase their recruiting targets by a few thousand a month, the effects on the rotation base would start to be felt within a year. That is a good time frame to keep in mind, because by next winter, some of the soldiers just now being brought back from Iraq will be confronting choice of going again, or getting out of the military altogether.
These increases cannot happen quickly. It takes many months to recruit and train soldiers. Still, if the services were to increase their recruiting targets by a few thousand a month, the effects on the rotation base would start to be felt within a year. That is a good time frame to keep in mind, because by next winter, some of the soldiers just now being brought back from Iraq will be confronting choice of going again, or getting out of the military altogether.
