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Good morning ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today for this timely and important discussion on the security challenges facing France and her key partners. We meet at a time of great uncertainty and change. Although the Cold War ended more than a decade and a half ago, there is little agreement among either scholars or practitioners about the nature of the threats and challenges facing us, or about the proper strategies we should adopt to shape our future. It is all the more important then, that the democratic partners of the Atlantic Alliance try to frame a common view of the strategic environment and our response, if we are to work together to meet the challenges that none of us acting alone can effectively address.

Since the end of the Cold War, some, especially in the United States, have sought to identify a new, over-riding threat to replace Communism as the organizing principle for national security strategy. Since 9/11, many have suggested that “terrorism” or “Islamofascism” represents such a new bipolar challenge; a threat that poses a mortal danger, like that of Communism, to the values and way of life of liberal democratic societies; a threat against which free societies must marshal their full military, political and economic resources to defeat. Others with a more traditional view of international relations view the emergence of new powers, especially China, as the core challenge of the future. They believe that human history is a never-ending saga of struggle between established and rising powers, which inevitably leads to periods of turmoil and conflict as the rising powers demand, and the established powers resist, a rearrangement of the global order – a story not unfamiliar to our friends here in Europe.

These perspectives on the international environment have a powerful appeal – by identifying a single, over-riding threat, the task of strategy is immensely simplified, even if debates about the precise tactics remain contentious. Whether such a simplified conception of the international environment was ever correct in the past – a proposition which could be challenged – I would argue that it represents a misguided and even dangerous view of the current international environment. It is perspective that is likely to unnecessarily deepen the prospect of conflict and instability, rather than provide a

roadmap to avoiding it. This of course, is a complex topic, and I would be happy to discuss it in more detail in questions. Given the shortness of time, however, I will concentrate my remarks on what I believe is a more promising approach.

I would argue that we face a much more diverse set of challenges and opportunities, although many of them have common roots in the dramatic evolution of a system of deepening global interdependence – a process driven by the explosive growth of information technology which has shrunk time and distance in ways never before seen. Only by understanding and accepting the diversity of the challenges, and by developing a multidimensional and flexible strategy, can we hope to secure the benefits of peace, freedom and prosperity for future generations.

Interdependence fueled by technology has of course, brought great benefits – enhanced economic opportunity not only for the fortunate few but for hundreds of millions in developing countries who can now participate in the global marketplace. It has fostered the spread of freedom and human expression by providing those in closed societies with new ways to access the outside world, and by handicapping their oppressors' ability to censor what they know and say. It has made us more aware of other cultures and histories, and thus contributed to a more cosmopolitan, multi-cultured world. It helps foster scientific advance in fighting disease, uncovering new environmentally friendly energy technologies and spreading knowledge.

At the same time, it has brought new dangers. The same Internet that carries the ideas of freedom is a vehicle for those who preach hate and death, and which fosters the transmission of information about deadly nuclear and biological technologies. The ubiquitous movement of goods and people can spread disease and crime and terrorists as well as wealth. Growth has posed unprecedented new challenges to the global environment.

Nor have the benefits of globalization been evenly spread. As hundreds of millions have benefited, so too have hundreds of millions been left behind. And those left behind are a concern not only for humanitarian reasons but also because in nations and regions still wrecked with lawlessness, illness and ignorance breeds many of the ills I've just mentioned.

Today, more than ever before in man's history, what happens elsewhere – no matter how far away – matters greatly to all of us. Chamberlain's infamous dismissal of "a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing" – used to be a maxim counseling avoidance of engagement. Today, it is a command to know more and to become more involved.

This is a grave challenge to strategy, for resources are finite, and the capacity of even the most well-intentioned is limited. And it is a special caution to the military dimension of strategy, because most of the serious problems we face are poorly, if at all, addressed by the tools of military strategy. After all, these tools have limited utility at best in

addressing the dangers of pandemic disease, global warming, or vulnerable minds poisoned by theologies of hate.

But the traditional tools of national strategy do have a place. First and foremost are the political tools – and in particular, the tools of diplomacy and international cooperation. If interdependence is the dominant strategic fact of our time, then the need for effective means of international cooperation is more urgent than ever.

To date we have seen only a modest evolution of the institutions and arrangements that were created in the aftermath of the Second World War to meet the needs of the Cold War. During my own time in the Clinton administration, one of the most important issues I worked on with colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic was the question of the future role of NATO. Although there were a few who argued that NATO had outlived its usefulness with the collapse of the Soviet Union and should be disbanded, many of us argued, rightly I believe, that the challenges of the post-Cold War era would continue to require the close collaboration of the transatlantic democracies in the both the political and the military field. I think history has born out that judgment in our work together in stabilizing the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, in ending the conflict in the Balkans, and in our on-going effort to help the government of Afghanistan.

But that adaptation of NATO remains incomplete. In the first instance, we are still struggling with how to evolve NATO institutions and procedures to adapt to the continued integration of Europe. Although this issue continues to be a matter of some debate within the US, I for one see closer security cooperation among EU countries as a pure gain for the United States, and for the Alliance as a whole. Given the range and diversity of the challenges we face, none of us alone has the means or the will to act in every case, and the pooling of resources, along with the flexibility for groups of alliance partners to work together, benefiting from the integrated structures without requiring the participation of all, will be essential to our ability to meet the challenges of tomorrow. We have seen this in the critical role that France has played in the Congo, which Britain played in Sierra Leone, and the like.

As my friends here know, I worked closely with many during the 1990s to find a path to bring France into NATO's integrated military structures, an effort which did not succeed at the time. But I believe that the EU's deepening security integration offers a new opportunity to achieve that goal in the context of a deeper embrace of the EU – and not just individual European nations – as the United States' and Canada's partner in NATO. Put simply, as France takes its place as a leading nation in strengthened EU military structures, it will naturally assume similar command roles in a NATO structure that increasingly reflects the central role of the EU military structures and units.

This new approach to integration must be accompanied by a careful examination of our missions. For many years, there was a debate on both sides of the Atlantic on whether NATO should expand its horizon to “out of area” missions or remain focused exclusively on security challenges in Europe. To my mind, that debate has been settled for two good reasons. First, with interdependence, the security of the transatlantic area is potentially

threatened by remote events – as NATO’s path breaking declaration under Article V after 9/11 so clearly demonstrates. Second, it is increasingly clear that NATO’s unique capabilities represents a global public good that can and should be put in service of broader global security interests – for example, as a capability available in support of the UN Security Council acting under Chapters VI or VII of the Charter, even if the immediate threat to peace and security does not directly affect the Atlantic partners.

If NATO is to play such an expanded role, there is an urgent need to address the question of NATO’s relations with non-NATO members – both on Europe’s periphery and beyond. NATO enlargement has been controversial since the mid-1990s. I believe that NATO must remain open to membership for countries that are central to Europe’s own territorial and political cohesion – including Ukraine and the Balkan states. But we must also think creatively about new ways to associate other countries, even far-flung countries like Japan and Australia, with NATO, in terms of strengthening our ability to act together militarily – in peacekeeping and conflict; in on-going political consultation; and in more formal decision making – if and when those countries choose to act together with NATO in specific cases, even if they are not destined to be full members of NATO as a whole.

I am mindful that a distinguished French leader once reminded us that NATO is not the Holy Alliance. We must take considerable care to assure countries that are not members of NATO and are suspicious of our intent – including Russia and China – that this is not an alliance against anyone, but rather a means of strengthening the global capacity to address challenges that affect all of us. We must also support alternative and overlapping structures of security cooperation, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum or the African Union, which may in any given case be a preferable institution for coordinating policy and action – and which can also involve the transatlantic partners.

But, as the recent dispute over the Chinese arms embargo demonstrates, the United States and our European partners must develop means to coordinate our security policies across the full range of political and security challenges of the future, and not just those that occur on the European continent. As Europe aspires to a greater global role, the need for this coordination becomes all the more imperative.

Adapting the institutions and arrangements for international cooperation is a task not just for NATO. If the Security Council is to play an effective role in the future, it too must be reformed, and the recommendations of the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Opportunities, which reported to the Secretary General prior to the 2006 UN summit, are a useful starting point. We also need to revitalize key informal arrangements, most notably the G-8, by bringing in the key emerging powers, including China, India, Brazil and South Africa.

Because the challenges facing France and her partners are increasingly multidimensional and can no longer comfortably be divided into “domestic” and “foreign” policy problems, policymaking processes must evolve to reflect that reality. What we in the United States call interagency coordination, and you call inter-ministerial, must be enhanced to

embrace the full range of relevant capabilities, ranging from the traditional organs of national security – foreign and defense ministries and intelligence – to the agencies responsible for internal or homeland security, and then beyond, to the economic agencies and the increasingly important dimensions of health, environment and energy. And we must find ways to enhance that coordination not only within individual nations but also among key partners by strengthening policy coordination between the United States and the EU.

Because my time is short, I want to comment on just one other feature of security policy that will affect France and the United States in the coming years and that is the role of nuclear weapons. For four decades, the United States and France, along with the UK, China and Russia, have played a unique role in the global nuclear order as the only sanctioned nuclear powers under the NPT. Our nuclear capabilities were nurtured in the context of the Cold War, but even then we understood the danger posed by nuclear proliferation, and solemnly committed to the goal of complete disarmament as part of the compact with the non-nuclear states to forswear their own weapons programs. The Cold War has come and gone, but our nuclear arsenals survive – somewhat reduced and reconfigured but surprisingly robust given the dramatic change in the international environment.

Worse still, the end of the Cold War has brought not only a movement away from nuclear weapons but also accelerated movement towards others acquiring them. I need not tell this audience why this poses such a great danger to global and peace and security, and I applaud the firm line that President Sarkozy has taken against Iran's nuclear program. I also recognized that the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and it is hard to foresee in the imaginable term that either France or the United States will entirely forswear the possession of nuclear weapons. Moreover, even if we were to take this step, I doubt that Iran or North Korea would necessarily give up their own programs. Indeed, in the world of the nuclear disarmed, the possession of even a tiny covert arsenal might be highly appealing to those states. But I am also convinced that by continuing to hold large arsenals of dubious strategic value, along with doctrines that continue to place significant importance on nuclear operations, and, at least in the case of the United States, continued research on new nuclear weapons, we are, intentionally or unintentionally, legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons as a tool of war not ultimate deterrence.

There are a number of concrete steps that we can take to devalue nuclear weapons if not to eliminate them entirely. The remarkable essay by former Secretaries Kissinger, Shultz, Perry and former Senator Nunn in the *Wall Street Journal* identified several such actions, including ratification of the CTBT, adoption of a fissile material cut-off treaty and restructuring of remaining forces, which would go a long way to showing seriousness of purpose. We also need to reopen the debate on missile defenses, which can have the unintended consequence of sustaining high levels of nuclear deployment. Although the United States and Russia should take the lead, it is time for the other three powers to become active participants in the process rather than waiting in the wings until the two nuclear superpowers reduce to levels comparable to the other three. And we must find

ways to bring India and Pakistan into these commitments to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons.

There are many equally important challenges facing us, ranging from issues very closely identified with the military – such as force posture and maintaining strong technological bases for our armaments industry – as well as critical security challenges like climate change and energy security that only indirectly touch on the military sphere. I look forward to the opportunity to answer your questions on any and all of these topics, and again, thank you for the privilege of appearing here.