Speech
U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy in 2009 - Challenges, Opportunities and their Implications for Taiwan and East Asia
Delivered Taipei, September 8, 2007
James B. Steinberg, Dean, LBJ School of Public Affairs
Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. This is a very timely moment to discuss the core challenges facing the United States as we move toward an election year in which foreign policy and national security promise to play central roles in the choices facing American voters. In modern history, only a few Presidential elections have focused on national security issues – in 1968 and 1972, at the height of the Vietnam War, and in 1952, in the middle of the Korean War. Unlike those earlier elections, the focus this time will not be primarily on East Asia but rather on the Middle East and the US approach to its global role and responsibilities. Although the election debate is unlikely to focus directly on the issues which are paramount to the mind of this audience, they will have broad ramifications for this region and are likely to have an impact on US grand strategy for years to come.
The importance of this election in shaping US national security is not simply a function of the intensity of the debate over the future of the US role in Iraq. Rather, it comes from a convergence of factors, both domestic and international, that promise to make this election a watershed. On the political front, this is the first election since 1952 in which neither an incumbent President nor Vice President will be on the ballot. That means that for both major political parties, there will be an intense internal political debate during the primary season, as well as the more typical contest in the general election. The “wide-open” character of the election is further enhanced by the very low popularity of the incumbent Administration, arguably the lowest in modern American Presidency.
The significance of this election is enhanced by two other factors. First, this election will be a moment of reflection and debate on the strategy pursued by the Bush Administration following the attacks of 9/11 – a strategy sometimes called the “Bush doctrine.” Although the reality is of course more complex and nuanced, the hallmarks of this strategy are three-fold: an intense focus on combating so-called Islamic terrorism as the organizing principle of US national security; a willingness to act unilaterally and with preventive military force to address the perceived threat; and a transformative approach to democracy promotion, which goes beyond hortatory support to the use of all tools of American power, including the military, to support the spread of democracy, especially in the Middle East.
This strategy is a far cry from the policies pursued by the Bush “41” Administration and the Clinton Administration, although the Clinton Administration was certainly more focused on democracy promotion than its predecessor. Recall the initial Clinton National Security Strategy was called a strategy of “engagement and enlargement” – enlargement referring to the spread of democracy.
Second, the election comes against the backdrop of a precipitous decline in the US global standing and prestige not just in the Middle East and Islamic world but even among many of America’s traditional allies. As the election unfolds, the whole world truly will be watching to see whether the United States is prepared to remain engaged in the world, notwithstanding the setbacks in Iraq, and how the United States intends to shape its relationships with its allies and the wider-international community going forward.
As the debate and discussion unfold, four key questions are likely to come to the forefront. The answers to these questions will shape America’s strategy for years to come. I want to begin by outlining the choices facing the United States and then explore their implications for East Asia.
You may be surprised to hear that, in my opinion, one of these four key questions is not what to do about Iraq. Despite the fierce debate in the United States, the range of real options is quite limited. Today our military forces, particularly Army and Marine personnel, are seriously overstretched, and the public is deeply disenchanted with goals of the war, not to mention its achievements. This means that all but a handful of the most ardent supporters accept that large-scale deployment of forces will end over the next year or so, no matter who becomes President. Even for the most passionate believers in the need to get out of Iraq, extricating US forces safely without a calamitous shock in Iraq and throughout the region means that the actual withdrawal will be gradual, even if there is a quicker transition of US forces away from counter-insurgency towards training and counter-terrorism.
What are the big questions?
The first is to what extent should US strategy continue to give pride of place to combating terrorism associated with Islamic radicals? And if not counter-terrorism, what is an alternative organizing principle should the US adopt? Recent polls in the United States continue to demonstrate that for the American public, terrorism is the over-riding threat. But in policy circles, there is beginning to be a broader debate about whether this is the appropriate organizing principle behind our security policy.
Let me say a word about what I mean by organizing principle. During the Cold War, containing Communism was an organizing principle. That meant that we saw virtually every aspect of our foreign policy through that lens. We built a military and a nuclear strategy around containing the Soviet Union. We built unprecedented alliance relationships – both multilateral, such as NATO, and bilateral, as in East Asia – around that strategy. We gave assistance to those who sided with against the Communists, even if they did not share our values or system of government. We built international political and economic institutions designed to bolster us for that Long War.
The same can be seen in the “so-called war on terrorism”, where virtually everything else has been subordinated to that goal. Friends are judged by whether they’re cooperating with us on terrorism, even if they are a flawed democracy – Pakistan, Egypt – or non-democracy, and here I’d include China as well as, at least until recently, Russia and the countries of Central Asia. Elections are encouraged unless they result in governments seen as friendly to the terrorists – for example, Hamas. Engagement with other key areas of the world beyond the Middle East is either limited – Latin America – or with a heavy counter-terrorism overlay – as in the case with Southeast Asia.
The critics of this approach – and I count myself as one – focus on four arguments. First, they argue that while vital, counter-terrorism is a tactical problem of defeating a small group of violent anti-Americans, but not a long-term strategic problem. By elevating counter-terrorism to a strategic problem the United States unintentionally tends to validate the argument of the terrorists that this an ideological war, or a clash of civilizations. Second, critics contend that the formula “global war on terrorism” (GWOT) leads to over-emphasis on the military dimension of counter-terrorism. Third, they point to the irony that the focus on counter-terrorism has led to a serious erosion of US commitment to the rule of law and civil liberties at home, thus undercutting the very argument advances in favor of the war – the preservation of our way of life and governance. Finally, and perhaps most important for this audience, they suggest that this strategy has caused us seriously to ignore or underplay other important challenges.
Given the strong visceral American reaction to 9/11 it is unlikely that any candidate will explicit downplay terrorism as part of US national security strategy. And of course, the terrorist do pose a serious threat. But in a more subtle way, there is likely to be a sharp divide on redefining other priorities. The challenge for critics of the current approach is to come up with a concept which shares the simplified appeal of containment or the GWOT.
The second, how should the US relate to international institutions and international law? The role of international law and international institutions has been fiercely debated in the United States – arguably back to the Declaration of Independence when our founders felt it necessary to set forth the legal basis for their separation from Great Britain. Support for a strong commitment to international law has swung from the highs of President Wilson’s Fourteen Point Speech and the Versailles Conference during the First World War, and America’s instrumental role in creating the UN and GATT/WTO following the Second, to lows of the defeat of the League of Nations and the United States decision to intervene in Iraq without UN support and to reject the application of the Geneva Conventions to so-called “enemy combatants.”
For the current Administration, the existential struggle against what they call “Islamo-fascists” justifies subordinating the niceties of international law to the tactics necessary for survival. For some of them, this is part of a broader view which challenges the very idea of an international community, and which insist that the only legitimate constraints on the actions of the US President reside in the US Constitution. In the coming election, there will be a strong challenge to current posture from those who believe, as did President Truman, that it is in the United States interest to take into account the judgment of others even when it constrains the United States, for both principled and practical reasons. Principled, because as a nation committed to the rule of law, it is inconsistent to reject the force of law when it fails to suit our convenience. Practical, because our exceptionalism earns the mistrust of others, making it harder for us to gain their support and cooperation in a world where none of the big challenges can be met by one country, even a superpower, acting alone.
Public opinion polling strongly suggests that the American people accept the desirability of subordinating US power to broader principles. And even among many Republicans, such as Senator McCain, US unwillingness to accept broadly accepted international constraints, such as the ban on torture, is damaging to our national security. But in practice there are wide divergences on this issue, with a strong tinge of American exceptionalism very much alive in the body politic.
The third big question is what international economic strategy the United States will pursue. The United States has been the global champion for free trade ever since FDR and Secretary of State Cordell Hull rejected the catastrophic protectionism of the early 1930’s and paved the way for the GATT and WTO. But free trade has always been controversial in the United States, and conflicts with economic competitors, such as Japan in the 1980’s and 1990’s, have stoked protectionist impulses. Now there are voices in both parties that view the economic rise of China (and to a lesser extent, India) with alarm, and fret about outsourcing and undermining of labor and environmental standards. Nor is the protectionist impulse limited to trade. Anxieties about attempted Chinese acquisitions of American companies – from Unocal to IBM to Maytag – have raised doubts about American commitment to a global investment regime. Although some of these objections have national security overlays, they are reminiscent of the debate over Japanese acquisitions of high profile US assets, like Rockefeller Center, in the 1980’s.
Trade has been a particularly thorny issue for Democrats. Nearly fifteen years ago, President Clinton opened a rift in his party with his support for NAFTA. Today, the ranks of “free trade” Democrats are even further reduced. On the Republican side, national security concerns have also dampened ardor for some aspects of free trade, and regional concerns ranging from agriculture to manufactures to textiles have also cut into support. Major bilateral agreements, including the Korea-US free trade agreement, languish in the Congress, and at least for the present, there is limited support for extending multilateral so called “fast-track” negotiating authority to the President.
The fourth, and final big question is, how should the US respond to emerging new powers? With the end of the bipolar world, some in the United States advocated a policy of primacy – a strategy to make sure that no peer competitors would arise. This was an explicit goal of the Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy. This view is fueled by a belief that international affairs are a zero sum competition in which rising powers inevitably threaten established ones. From this perspective, the rise of China is seen as the most significant potential long-term threat to US security, a concern exacerbated by China’s authoritarian political system, military modernization and lack of transparency. Others argue that with the spread of globalization and interdependence, the global system in no longer a zero sum competition, but rather one characterized by mutual interdependence that requires enhance cooperation of all states, and which welcomes new capable actors as potential partners, rather than rivals. For advocates of this approach, conflict is not inevitable, though cooperation is not guaranteed.
I think it is fairly obvious that the outcome of each of these debates will have profound implications for East Asia and Taiwan. Let me take each in turn.
The first is whether the US will continue to make counter-terrorism the centerpiece or organizing principle of US national security policy. I think it’s clear to most in East Asia that, while terrorism is real danger – whether it is JI in Indonesia, Abu Sayef in the Philippines, or Aum Shin Rykyo in Japan – terrorism is not on the top of the preoccupations of regional leaders. For many East Asians, a variety of traditional challenges – ranging from North Korea’s nuclear program to China’s military modernization – as well as new challenges – such as climate change, energy security and global public health – are seen as much more central threats. As long as counter-terrorism is the centerpiece of US foreign policy, East Asia and its concerns will be on the periphery, and risks causing a distortion in US relations with countries in the region, as countries are judged primarily by their counter-terrorism cooperation, rather than on other, more important, metrics.
To say that a shift away from a counter-terrorism preoccupation is potentially of great benefit to East Asia, does not answer the question of what should take its place. For understandable reasons, some in Taiwan might argue that dealing with China should become the central challenge. But even here, and certainly throughout the region, such a single minded pre-occupation would be a hard sell. Non-proliferation, economic prosperity, environment, energy, and health are all issues of great concern to the well-being of people in Taiwan, in Japan and throughout the rest of East Asia. There is a risk that if the US replaces one central pre-occupation with another – even something as compelling as non-proliferation – other central concerns might go unaddressed. For example, there is understandable concern in the region that a focus on non-proliferation might unintentionally empower China at the expense of other regional concerns. And, as the debate over the recent nuclear agreement between the US and India, as well as the renewed interest in nuclear power to address climate change demonstrate, there may be competing interests that vie with non-proliferation for priority.
Thus, from an East Asian perspective, a multi-faceted US strategy that includes both regional geopolitical, economic and transnational challenges is likely to best serve the region’s interest. But whether that can be sustained in the American public remains to be seen.
The second challenge I identified was the role of international law and international institutions. This is closely related to the first, in part because some in the United States, including colleagues such as Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter and John Ikenberry of Princeton, have argued that building liberal international institutions and the rule of law should be the organizing principles of US foreign policy.
A greater attachment of the United States to the rule of law and stronger international institutions could have important benefits in East Asia. First, such an approach might make it easier for America’s friends to support US global policies. Even among staunch allies such as Australia and Japan, anxieties about US exceptionalism have made it hard for leaders to sustain domestic support for pro-US policies. The fierce debates in South Korea are vivid example of the problem. Second, for the democracies of East Asia, greater attention to international law and international institutions can help address some of the great challenges of the region – from dealing with the lawlessness of North Korea to meeting global challenges like non-proliferation, global public health and climate change. It could also be helpful in tempering potential crises over territorial disputes that remain very much alive in the region.
A greater focus on international law and international institutions might be seen as problematic from the perspective of Taiwan, given the raging debates over Taiwan’s participation in international institutions. Certainly, there is a risk from Taiwan’s perspective that the growing power of international institutions including only recognized states might disadvantage Taiwan. But not all international institutions are the exclusive province of states, and as Taiwan’s participation in APEC, the WTO and other organizations shows, creative solutions remain possible. More broadly, a focus on international law, with its emphasis on the peaceful resolution of disputes, is indisputably in Taiwan’s long-term interest. And it is certainly in Taiwan’s interest that US prestige be restored, since the United States’ long-term engagement in East Asia will depend on it.
On the economic front, the spread of global trade and investment has clearly benefited this region, which for several decades has been the most dynamic area of growth in the world. Some in East Asia, including in Taiwan and Japan, have come to question the value of further spread of free trade and investment, fearing that economic powerhouses like China and India, and other low wage, low social safety states might achieve overwhelming economic advantage. As I noted before, economic protectionist sentiments are also on the rise in the US, with a particular focus on China.
Yet East Asia, with its vibrant economies like Japan and Taiwan, has the most to lose in the long run if the United States beats a retreat on trade. To sustain the fragile support for this approach in the United States, our East Asian partners will need to work with us to overcome parochial interests in favor of the broader global trade and investment regime. And while enhanced regional cooperation can be valuable, it should not come at the expense of global institutions like the World Bank and IMF, or the WTO.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for this region, is the outcome of the US debate on strategies toward rising powers. This is important because the growth of China and India is clearly transforming every aspect of this region and with change comes anxiety.
Let me begin with the easy part. I think we can all agree that an enhanced role for India in Asia is both inevitable and desirable. As a growing economic power that is increasingly embracing market oriented policies, and a stable democracy, India has much to contribute to prosperity and stability in the region. India is deepening its ties with countries throughout the region, as the visit of Prime Minister Abe to India so vividly attests. Although some in the US and elsewhere may be excessively optimistic about the prospects of a strategic alignment between the US and India, there can be little doubt that India’s growing regional and global role can be a force for good.
China, of course, has been, is, and will be a more contentious issue.
In virtually every election in the United States since the late 1940’s, US policy toward China has featured as a more or less prominent issue of debate. Typically this has taken the form of Presidential challengers attacking incumbents for being “too soft” on China. Yet for all the “sturm und drang,” our policies have remained relatively consistent, particularly since the early 1970s.
I think we can all agree that the first best outcome – a prosperous, democratic and peaceful China, along with a prosperous, already democratic India, taking their place as constructive members of the regional and global communities is the best long result for the region. That’s the easy part. The tougher question is how best to assure that outcome, and at the same time safeguard ourselves against the real possibility that the outcome does not come to pass.
I want to suggest to you that there must be twin pillars to our strategy. First, it is incumbent on all of us to make clear that we would in fact welcome this best outcome we all desire. It is, and will be tempting to many both here and the United States, to focus on the dangers that a growing, more active China can present to the region. But the surest way to bring about a more dangerous, confrontational environment in the region is to start from the assumption that conflict is inevitable, and therefore we must prepare for it as inevitable. Together, we should be prepared to sketch out a future for the emerging nations that shows that positive developments will be met with enthusiasm by us all.
But we must also have a second pillar – if, despite our best efforts, things do not develop as we would hope. Some have called this hedging, but I don’t much care for the term, since it conveys a sense of lack of confidence for a better result. I prefer to call it readiness – being alert to both good and bad developments, and retaining the capacity to respond to adverse ones when and as needed. We need to make clear to China in particular that there are steps that China could take that will be reassuring, and steps that China could take that could cause anxiety – and that our reactions will be governed by the choices China itself makes either to reassure or unsettle. In a recent article, my colleagues and friends Bill Perry and Ash Carter sketched out one such attempt at distinguishing between the natural and acceptable growth of Chinese power and influence, and those actions, which if they occurred, would signal an unacceptable escalation of threat that required a counter-response.1 Their article focused on military modernization and strategy, but it is possible to develop a similar list of acceptable and worrisome actions in the political and economic sphere which could provide a road map for developing a long-term strategy of adjustment to China’s rise: one that would both open the path for cooperation while protecting the United States and our friends from complacency.
On each of the core challenges I’ve discussed today, the outcome of the US debate is uncertain. Foreign policy factors will not be the only ones that determine the outcome of our election. But the one certainty I leave you with is that we face what my colleague Dean Elspeth Rostow calls a “nodal moment” in US foreign policy that will have profound consequences for years to come.
Copyright 2007 The Lyndon B. Johnson
School of Public Affairs
