Speech
The National Security of Taiwan, Japan and the United States - How Best to Achieve It.
Delivered Taipei, September 8, 2007
James B. Steinberg, Dean, LBJ School of Public Affairs
The dramatic changes in the international environment since the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks have ushered in a world with dramatically altered dangers and opportunities for the United States, Japan and Taiwan. The collaboration among the three partners had its roots in the Cold War confrontation with Communism, but now must adapt to this new environment. In this era, the need for international cooperation has grown as the challenges – ranging from terrorism, to global economic stability, to public health and the environment – have multiplied, but the mechanisms to address them have not kept pace with these challenges. Moreover, the economic, political and security equilibrium in East Asia will be profoundly affected by the path that China takes over the coming years, both in its internal developments and its external policies.
There are strong reasons to foster enhanced cooperation between Taiwan, the United States and Japan because of shared values and interests at the bilateral, regional and international levels. The security and well being of all three partners will benefit from strategies that foster international stability and economic growth, as well as the spread of democracy and the rule of law. This will require creative approaches at both the governmental and non-governmental levels in the coming decades. As Taiwan and the United States prepare for their elections next year, this is an opportune time to develop the ideas that can bring about a bright future for all.
FULL TEXT
We meet at a time of great change in the international community – a time of enormous opportunity for people around the world to live safer, more prosperous lives, but also a time of great challenges and risks.
To take advantage of these opportunities and navigate the shoals of these dangers, political leaders and the public must understand the great transformations that are taking place in our international system and develop the policies and strategies that are needed to cope with this new environment.
Nowhere are the implications of these great sea waves of change greater than in East Asia. The United States, Japan and Taiwan are on the frontlines of this great political, economic and social transformation.
Before turning to the specifics of the challenges and opportunities in East Asia, it is important to understand the broadly changed international environment which affects us all.
In particular, I want to focus on four great changes: First, the end of the Cold War ideological confrontation between the West and Communism; second, the deepening of global interdependence driven by the spread of information technologies and the emergence of global marketplace for trade and investment; third, the growing role of non-state actors in global affairs; and fourth, at the same time, the emergence of important and influential new state actors on the global landscape.
The story of the end of the Cold War is of course well-known. Taiwan has been in the forefront of that confrontation and your own political evolution as well as your security environment was profoundly shaped by the contest between the two systems and between their state champions for more than forty years.
The collapse of Communism has had many broad repercussions. On the geopolitical front, it has meant the end of a bipolar world of superpower competition, where the danger of a global, perhaps nuclear conflict, remained high and all of the world’s nations and people were caught up in the global chess game either as allies of one or the other superpower, or carefully walking a tightrope between the two elephants. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar world ended, the risk of global war dramatically receded, and the United States emerged as the sole global superpower.
But the victory was more than a geopolitical one; it was a triumph of values and principles as well. The totalitarian Communist model failed to deliver on its great promise of social justice and prosperity, and instead left a legacy of denial of personal freedom and expression.
The collapse of the Soviet Union was the most visible sign of that ideological failure, but it also had more subtle expressions elsewhere – in the decline of Communist parties in the West both in Europe and East Asia and the implicit rejection of Communism in its greatest East Asian avatar, China, with Deng Xiaoping’s era of reform. It also helped usher in the era of democracy in East Asia, where Japan and the United States served as the model, but Taiwan and South Korea were the shining achievements that came to full fruition only with the end of the Cold War.
Some proclaimed the collapse of Communism as the end of history. Before the ink was even dry on the eponymous book, the critics began to chide the proponents of this view as naïve. But, as I will elaborate a bit later, the end of history advocates were not entirely wrong.
Although conflict remains in the world today, there is no serious ideological challenge to primacy of the basic values of democracy and personal freedom – not even in the Islamic world, though some see fundamentalist Islam as just such a rival.
Of course, the three partners we are discussing today are direct beneficiaries of this first great development. The end of the Soviet Union created an environment which offered great security and less risk for all three. And the triumph of democracy and individual liberty vindicated the long struggle in all three to develop and protect our democracies. The consolidation of democracy in Japan and Taiwan along with other partners in East Asia, most notably South Korea, has had a particularly important impact. It has demonstrated to the world that democracy and liberty are not the sole province of the European enlightenment, but a universal creed valid for people everywhere.
The second great transformation has been the extraordinary rush of globalization and interdependence. Now I know it’s fashionable for scholars to observe that there have been other periods of so-called globalization, particularly at the beginning of the 20th century, and that those trends, once thought irreversible, came crashing down with the advent of World War I and the Great Depression. Like the critics of the end of history thesis, these analysts are right to caution against over-optimism and straight-line projections from today’s situation. But I am convinced that this era of globalization is quite different from the past, and more pervasive. This is largely due to the spread of new technologies, notably information technology, which has so transformed the economy and knitted nations together in ways that the steamship, airplane and telegraph could never do. We are largely one global community and economy – as some prosper their success improves the prospects for others, and when one catches a cold, we all sneeze. This march of globalization has fostered enormous economic growth, and again, nowhere is that impact more evident than here in Taiwan, where you have been at the forefront of the economic and technological revolution that has lifted lives and brought great opportunity.
This technological transformation has had more than just economic effects; it has contributed to the spread of democracy and freedom by making these ideas more widely available, as well as making it harder for repressive governments to hide and distort the truth or eradicate dissent. It has also fueled the impressive military strength of the United States and her allies.
The third great trend is the growing role of non-state actors. Since 9/11, nations have all focused on the most malign dimension of this trend – the emergence of violent terrorists, particularly those who claim to act in the name of extreme fundamentalist Islam, to challenge not just the West but the whole international order. They have been able to take advantage of the second great trend – globalization and technological transformation – to spread their impact through the internet and to seek even more lethal weapons.
Like Communism of the past, this challenge has both geo-political and ideological dimensions. But it is important to recall that even in largely Islamic states, this is a minority view – the vast majority of Muslims share our hopes and aspirations for free and prosperous lives in which they have a say in their own governance. A few radical Islamist theoreticians may justify their actions in terms of establishing a new Caliphate, but this ideological goal has little appeal even for most of their followers, who may sympathize with the terrorists not because they share their goals, but rather out of frustration and disillusionment that they have not been able to share in the benefits of free governments and free markets.
It’s also important to remember the emergence of non-state actors has a benevolent side as well – such as the emergence of global NGOs promoting democracy, human rights and economic well-being for the poor. It also has a positive side in the potential benefits of transnational economic actors who can bring prosperity and improved standards across the world.
Now the fourth great change has been the emergence of important new state actors on the global scene, most notably China and India, but also Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. Their emergence is directly a function of two of great trends I have already identified. The end of Communism (and the less visible waning of Socialism as an economic system) directly fueled the economic growth of the two sleeping giants, India and China, whose economies had been hobbled by unsustainable economic systems which exalted the role of government over individual initiative. Similarly, the rise of the global market offered an opportunity for both India and China to tap into their enormous human capital potential to spur economic development at impressive rates. We are still at the early days of understanding the implications of this fourth great trend. As China and India grow economically, they are increasingly seeking a greater voice in the international community, and not just on economic affairs. How to address the challenges and opportunities of their emergence is clearly one of the most important issues for Taiwan, the United States and Japan.
On each of the four dimensions I have outlined, there is an important opportunity for Taiwan, the United States and Japan to work together to achieve common goals and interests.
The first common opportunity concerns the possibilities offered by the end of the Cold War. With the triumph of democracy and liberty, Taiwan, the United States and Japan stand on the right side of history. But we cannot afford to rest on our laurels. Our long-term security depends on demonstrating both to our own people and to others that democracy and freedom work for the benefit of all. This means we need to safeguard our democracies at home, assure opportunity for all our citizens, and have a respect for debate and dissent. It also means that we have a responsibility to protect and support democracy abroad, both because it is in our interests and because it is right.
Now, I know it’s fashionable to criticize the Bush administration’s democracy promotion efforts. That criticism is well placed in so far as it speaks to the inappropriateness of trying to achieve democracy through military intervention or heavy handed foreign pressure – as has been the case in Iraq. But it is right if it means that the world’s democracies have a responsibility to speak out clearly on behalf of those whose rights are denied, and those who are struggling to achieve our shared goals in places that are not free. Here in Taiwan you yourselves know how important it was for foreign friends to champion your democratic cause at an early stage of your political development, just as you know that at the end of the day, the fight for freedom and democracy must be one by the people directly concerned themselves.
Taiwan, Japan and the United States can work together towards this great end – by serving as a model for others, by offering economic assistance and technical support to struggling new democracies, and by providing training and encouragement for those seeking to plant democracy where it does not yet exist. Your Taiwan Democracy Foundation, established in 2003 is an example of this model. By coordinating our efforts, we have an opportunity not only to stretch our resources, but also to demonstrate that these values are not just made in the United States, but have universal applicability.
On the second great opportunity, the globalized marketplace, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States too have an important opportunity to further our common interests. As leading economies whose economic fortune is tied to the global trade and finance system, we all share a deep interest in expanding the reach of trade and investment and insulating the global economy from short sighted protectionism. In particular, we have a strong interest in seeing a revival of the Doha round of the WTO, and in reinvigorating APEC through the achievement of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). In general, these global and open regional approaches are the best way to assure trade creation rather than diversion. But they are particularly important for Taiwan, because the WTO and APEC are two forums where you have the opportunity to actively participate and to have your interests protected. For this reason, we – including Japan – should be wary of “Asia only” trade strategies – for example, “ASEAN plus Three” free trade agreements.
Now I know that there is considerable interest in Taiwan in the question of a free trade agreement with the United States – an interest that is only partially driven by economic concerns. But as a friend of Taiwan, I caution against an approach that exalts bilateral free trade agreements over the more important work of multilateral trade and investment liberalization, both on economic and political grounds – because in a world where bilateral agreements predominate, Taiwan is not likely to be the beneficiary. I also say to my friends in Japan that greater leadership in addressing the barriers to global trade liberalization is in Japan’s long-term interest as well. And cognizant about the admonition to those who live in glass houses, I should also acknowledge that the United States has a lot more to do to get its trade house in order if the United States wants to lead the world.
The third great challenge is the rise of non-state actors. Here again, the interests of Taiwan, Japan and the United States converge. We have a common interest in addressing the challenges of radical extremists who use the tools of terror. We have worked together on issues like port security and information sharing, and these efforts must be strengthened. We also need to work together to demonstrate to the people in Islamic countries that we are committed to helping them have better lives – a path that cannot be achieved by turning one’s back on modernity, but rather by embracing it while continuing to respect ancient values – an experience which both Taiwan and Japan can share with those countries.
This is particularly important for the countries in Southeast Asia which have a large or even majority Muslim population – and which can be the next proof that differences in culture, history, and religion are compatible with freedom and open markets. Here Taiwan and Japan are especially valuable partners for the United States given your geographic proximity and cultural, political and economic ties to the region.
The fourth great opportunity and challenge is perhaps the one that is most on your minds, and for good reason. Although our nations are preoccupied with the threat of terrorism – but particularly the United States, in the long run, how China and India evolve – both internally and as global actors – is almost certainly the most important question affecting economic prosperity and security – but especially for Taiwan, Japan and the United States.
It’s important to understand our choices and our opportunities. I think all three of us – Taiwan, Japan and the United States, can agree with our first best outcome: a prosperous, democratic and peaceful China, along with a prosperous, already democratic India, taking their place as constructive members of the regional and global communities. That’s the easy part. The tougher question is how best to assure that outcome, and at the same time safeguard ourselves against the real possibility that the outcome does not come to pass.
I want to suggest to you that there must be twin pillars to our strategy. First, it is incumbent on all of us to make clear that we would in fact welcome this best outcome we all desire. The surest way to bring about a more dangerous, confrontational environment in the region is to start from the assumption that conflict with emerging powers is inevitable, and therefore we must prepare for it as an inevitability. Together, we should be prepared to sketch out a future for the emerging nations – in this region, China and India – that shows that positive developments will be met with enthusiasm by us all.
But we must also have a second pillar – if despite our best efforts, things do not develop as we would hope. Some have called this hedging, but I don’t much care for the term, since it conveys a sense of lack of confidence in a better result. I prefer to call it readiness – being alert to both good and bad developments, and retaining the capacity to respond to adverse ones when and as needed.
We need to make clear to China in particular that there are steps that China can take that will be reassuring, and steps that China could take that could cause anxiety – and that our reactions will be governed by the choices China itself makes either to reassure or unsettle. In a recent article, my colleagues and friends Bill Perry and Ash Carter sketched out one such attempt at distinguishing between the natural and acceptable growth of Chinese power and influence, and those actions, if they occurred, would signal an unacceptable escalation of threat that requires a counter-response.
Their article focused solely on military modernization and strategy, but it is possible to develop a similar list of acceptable and worrisome actions in the political and economic sphere that could provide a road map for developing a long-term strategy of adjustment to China’s rise that would both open the path for cooperation while protecting the United States and our friends from complacency. Clearly, how China acts toward Taiwan should be an important element of any set of benchmarks.
To pursue these twin pillars, we all need to assess how the changed global environment should shape our approach. The end of Communism and the rise of global economy, suggests that we need to adapt our international institutions to the new environment. For example, it is time that Japan took its rightful place on the Security Council, and we need to find a way to bring in India as well as other important global actors. We need to strengthen inclusive regional organizations, like APEC, and be wary of giving too prominent a role to some that include some and exclude others, like the Asian regional summit. For northeast Asia, the time has arisen to go past the ad hoc approach of the six party talks to a more broad based and on-going security dialogue. There is also an important opportunity to begin, at least informally, a trilateral dialogue between China, Japan and the United States on regional security issues, while maintaining transparency with other friends in the region, notably South Korea and Taiwan.
To secure the pillar of readiness, it is important that Japan and the United States sustain their close collaboration on every dimension of policy – security, political, economic and global issues – not as an alliance directed against any country, but rather as a source of strength in support of our common interests and values. This partnership benefits not just Japan and the United States, but all of the region, including both Taiwan and the mainland. For Taiwan, its importance is manifest, as it is the anchor of United States security involvement throughout the region. Although the form of the United States and Taiwan’s bilateral relations will remain “unofficial” there is no reason why we can’t strengthen communications to enhance mutual understanding and avoid unwonted, unproductive surprises.
The United States’ partnership with Taiwan has a strong foundation in the Taiwan Relations Act, and the commitment through many successive administrations to a policy that insists that differences in the region must be resolved through exclusively peaceful means, with the consent of all involved. This is a framework designed to promote dialogue and avoid destabilizing confrontation to the benefit of everyone in the region.
But the most important element of this twin pillar strategy is the active engagement of the United States. I regret that in recent years, preoccupation with addressing the problem of terrorism, compounded by the United States intervention in Iraq, has diverted United States attention from East Asia, and has caused us to view what engagement we do have through a rather unidimensional, counter-terrorism lens. While there have been some exceptions – for example, the efforts of former Deputy Secretary Bob Zoellick – the lack of focus by the United States has created a degree of uncertainty and anxiety that worries our friends and confuses others. Given the United State’s enduring strengths, an unshakeable commitment by the United States to constructive, sustained involvement on both bilateral and multi-lateral levels will provide great reassurance and greatly increase the prospect that the first track of our combined strategy will be achieved.
United States citizens everywhere are proud of the accomplishments of the people of Taiwan, and value our close ties with democracies of East Asia. A secure, prosperous future for all our nations’ people depends on a close coordination and cooperation among us all as we confront the challenges of the 21st century.
Copyright 2007 The Lyndon B. Johnson
School of Public Affairs
