Speech
U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy in 2009 - Challenges, Opportunities and their Implications for Southeast Asia
ASEAN-US Symposium - Singapore, October 15, 2007
James B. Steinberg, Dean, LBJ School of Public Affairs
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you this morning. I want to thank CNAS and the ASEAN organizers, IPS and ISEAS, for bringing together such a thoughtful group of analysts and practitioners from both sides of the Pacific. It’s a great privilege to be here in connection with the 40th anniversary of ASEAN and the 30th anniversary of the US-ASEAN dialogue to reflect on the state of our relationship and on its future.
It’s especially timely from an American perspective because, as you may have noticed, we are in the middle of an election campaign in which foreign policy and national security promise to play a central role in the choices facing American voters.
In modern history, only a few Presidential elections have focused on national security issues – in 1968 and 1972, at the height of the Vietnam War, and in 1952, in the middle of the Korean War. Unlike those earlier elections, the focus this time will not be primarily on Asia, but rather on the Middle East and the US approach to its global role and responsibilities. But though the election debate is unlikely to focus directly on the issues which are paramount to the mind of this audience, they will have broad ramifications for US grand strategy for years to come, and therefore will have an important impact on our bilateral relationships in Southeast Asia, and throughout Asia as a whole.
In my remarks today I want to focus on how this next election might affect our relations with our friends in ASEAN. I speak wearing two hats so to speak – as a former government official from a previous Democratic Administration, but also as a current professor.
I’d like to discuss a number of the key choices facing the United States and the next President. Despite the current focus in Washington and the campaign trail, I don’t see Iraq as one of the key choices, largely because the range of choice is heavily constrained, no matter who next occupies the White House. I’d be happy to discuss this in more detail, but I want to move on to the choices which will have the most direct impact in this region.
In the long term, what will be far more important than the debate about timetables for withdrawing from Iraq will be the underlying debate about US grand strategy. In my view, more than anything else, this election will be a referendum on the basic national security strategy pursued by the Bush Administration since the attacks of 9/11.
Despite the unpopularity of the Iraq war, virtually all of the Republican candidates embrace the basic premise of what has come to be known by some as the Bush Doctrine. At the risk of the oversimplification, there are three core elements to the strategy: an intense focus on combating so-called Islamic terrorism as the organizing principle of US national security; a willingness to act unilaterally, and with preventive military force if necessary, to address the perceived threat; and a transformative approach to democracy promotion, which goes beyond hortatory support to the use of all tools of American power, including the military, to support the spread of democracy, especially in the Middle East.
The Republican candidates largely endorse the emphasis the Bush Administration places on the terrorist challenge as the organizing, principle and driving force behind American strategy, although they are more reserved about the desirability of activist approach to democracy promotion – precisely because they question whether democracy promotion helps the effort to defeat Islamic terrorists.
What might we expect from a Democratic Administration? In some respects, the Democrats are the mirror image of the Republicans. Although they will certainly tout their determination to meet and defeat the terrorist threat, few accept the underlying premise that fighting terrorism should be the organizing principle for national security policy.
Some, such as former Senator Edwards in a recent Foreign Affairs article, have explicitly criticized the idea of the Global War on Terrorism. The Democrats critique of the current Administration’s approach has both tactical and strategic elements – tactical, because they argue that the way we have been fighting the global war on terrorism has strengthened, not weakened, the terrorists; strategic, because they question whether the focus on Islamic radicalism is the dominant challenge facing the United States in the years to come.
The Democrats don’t appear to have a strategic bumper sticker to compete with the Global War on Terrorism, which may prove either an advantage or a handicap in the coming campaign.
Instead, they focus on the dramatic and disturbing decline in global support for the United States around the world and the need to restore respect for American leadership. Democrats are more inclined to see the national security challenge as multidimensional, with a particular emphasis on the danger of nuclear proliferation, the need to deal with challenge of emerging powers, and the importance of systemic challenges, like climate change, energy security and emerging threats, such as pandemic disease and failed states.
But it’s notable that unlike 1972, the last time we had a major strategic foreign policy debate in our elections, most Democrats – with the exception of Congressman Kucinich – are not advocating a “come home America” approach in response to the debacle in Iraq.
Not only do they defend global engagement, many also share the neo-Wilsonian values of the current Administration although they also are unlikely to support the robust strategy of democracy promotion and regime change of the early Bush Administration.
Now how might these two perspectives shape our engagement with ASEAN in the coming years? If I’m right that the Republican candidates will largely focus on continuity rather than divergence with current strategy, then I think it’s fair to say that the current preoccupation with counter-terrorism will dominate US engagement in this region if a Republican is elected in November 2008.
What does that mean? First, it means that Southeast Asia will matter because radical Islamist groups have a foothold in the region and that the United States will continue to invest considerable resources in partnering with ASEAN countries to address this threat.
I don’t need to recount to this audience how important that focus has been to our relationship over the last few years, from the joint operation to capture Hambali with Thailand, to the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-terrorism in Malaysia, to the counter-terrorism cooperation we have had with Singapore and Indonesia.
But the counter-terrorism preoccupation is a two edged sword – it has given us a reason to care about Southeast Asia, but not for the reasons I suspect that ASEAN countries would most like. Most ASEAN countries share our concerns about Islamic radicalism, but if I read your media and the subtle comments of your leaders, few fully embrace our strategy to deal with the problem, and none appreciate being viewed solely in the “are you with us or against us” lens of current policy.
I think it’s fair to say that a Democratic Administration would take a different approach to Southeast Asia. Democrats, led by my good friend Kurt Campbell, have been highly critical of the Bush Administration’s lack of engagement in East Asia – the missed summit meetings, the preoccupation with terrorism and the lack of energetic diplomacy and economic engagement. It’s fair to project that a future Democratic Administration will intensify the level of involvement in East Asia in a visible way. I’d like to think that we learned an important lesson from our tardy initial response to the Asian financial crisis that we have an enormous stake in the well being of the countries in this region.
And the Democrats’ focus on the importance of transnational issues like climate change and global public health suggest that they would pursue a more multidimensional approach to the region. But on some areas where ASEAN and the current Administration had disagreements, particularly on human rights as in Burma, it is fair to expect a similar orientation from a future Democratic Administration.
What are the other big issues at stake in the next election, particularly those which will have an impact on Southeast Asia? I have suggest that there are three things to watch: the approach we take toward global trade and investment, the role of international law and international institutions, and how the United States positions itself vis-à-vis the role of emerging powers, especially China.
I’ll touch on the first two quickly, and then focus on the one which will dominate all of our discussions over the next two days – China.
The first big question is what international economic strategy the United States will pursue. Conventional wisdom has it that Republicans are the party of free trade and Democrats the party of protection – a characterization that would dismay Cordell Hull. Democrats, after all, pursued a heavily trade dominated policy toward Japan, particularly in the early years of the Clinton Administration, and Democrats in Congress are at the forefront of the critique of China on trade and currency. On the campaign trail many of the leading candidates have been highly critical of recent trade agreements, including those negotiated by the last Democratic President.
By contrast, the current Administration has been active in pursuing free-trade agreements, particularly in East Asia. Just look at the US-Singapore, US-Australia and US-Korea agreements, as well as the agreement between TIFA and ASEAN. Given the importance of trade – particularly trade with US – to ASEAN countries, does that mean that a next Republican Administration offers a better hope for economic cooperation? Not necessarily. A recent Wall Street Journal poll published in October highlighted an important evolution in Republican thinking on trade issues – a growing dissatisfaction with free trade among the rank and file, a perspective that can also be seen in Congress. In that poll, 59% of Republicans said that foreign trade was bad for the US economy.
Republicans have also worried about the security dimensions of expanding trade, from foreign investments in US firms, to rising foreign dollar holdings as a result of blooming trade imbalances. This suggests that irrespective of who wins the cause of free trade will remain contentious. But it is fair to suggest that for a Republican President, wariness about new trade agreements may be counterbalanced by a need to compete with China, which is aggressively courting East Asian countries in the economic sphere through efforts like the China-ASEAN free-trade agreement.
The second big question is how should the United States relate to international institutions and international law? The role of international law and international institutions has been fiercely debated in the United States for much of our history. It played a prominent role in the 2004 election campaign when President Bush accused challenger John Kerry of subordinating US national security policy to a global public opinion test. And most Republican candidates have expressed a strong attachment to the US right to act unilaterally. To be fair, there has been some criticism, especially from Senator McCain, of the Administration’s disdain for international law in the context of the Geneva Conventions, but for the most part, the strong emphasis on the priority of aggressive counter-terrorism combined with a very vocal approach to protecting US sovereignty suggests that building international law and international institutions is unlikely to figure prominently for a next Republican Administration combatant.
This is an area where the Democrats offer a sharply different vision with a much more affirmative approach to international law and international institutions, including a much greater willingness to accept international constraints on US action. Part of the Democrats’ enthusiasm for institution building is driven by their substantive agenda – it’s hard to tackle problems like climate change and global public health without structures of international cooperation. Part is driven by a different assessment of the efficacy of these cooperative approaches. While Republicans tend to emphasize the constraints imposed by the UN and international criminal courts in fighting terrorism, for example, Democrats believe that the gains from cooperation outweigh the costs.
Finally, Democrats tend to emphasize the soft power gains of greater openness to international law and international institutions, arguing that the Bush Administration’s go it alone approach has created more enemies and weakened the United States internationally.
I don’t mean to suggest that Democrats are going to sign up for world federalism, but I do think this starkly different attitude could play an important and positive role in US-ASEAN relations for several reasons. First, I don’t need to tell this audience of the importance that ASEAN has attached to regional and global cooperation and to strengthening the institutions that support it. Just look at the evolution of the ARF, APEC, ASEAN plus three and the East Asian Community and not to mention ASEAN itself as you debate adopting a new, formal charter.
Second, I think that Democrats appreciate that for many of our friends and allies in Asia as in Europe that the United States cannot and should not always be the driving force behind the development of cooperative structures. Sometimes the United States should be content to play a supporting role in following our partners’ lead.
Third, I believe for many Asian countries a United States that is seen as respecting international law will be easier to embrace as a partner – even in places with staunch pro-US leanings, such as Australia and Japan, not to mention ASEAN countries, where public dissatisfaction with American unilateralism constrains the ability of ASEAN leaders to build closer ties with the United States.
Does this mean that the next Democratic President will sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia? Honestly, I don’t know. But I am confident that a next Democratic President will want to play a more engaged role in working with our partners to build institutions and cooperative arrangements, both here in Asia and around the world.
Now let me turn to the elephant in the room – the future US strategy toward emerging global powers, particularly China.
I don’t need to tell this audience about the significance of China’s and India’s emergence as key economic, political and increasingly security players in the region and on the global stage. The more important questions are how the United States will posture itself in response to the developments, and what that will mean for the ASEAN countries.
Here we’re looking through a glass darkly. US policy toward both China and India has been obscured by the preoccupation with terrorism and Iraq. Recall that in the 2000 election campaign, candidate George Bush called China a strategic competitor.
Yet two years later, in the 2002 National Security Strategy Report, the Bush Administration suggested that all the great powers largely shared the same objectives and thus, could be potential partners. What had changed? – The attacks of 9/11 of course. The preoccupation with terrorism and the potential role that China (and Russia) could play in disrupting terrorists’ activities trumped other strategic and political concerns. And it’s fair to say that since that time US-China relations have remained very positive. Relations further reinforced by the Chinese role in addressing the North Korean nuclear problem, which is a welcome relief for an Administration preoccupied with the challenge of Iraq. Indeed, on the issue that matters most, China-Taiwan, the Bush Administration has gone from suggesting, in April 2001, that it would provide a security guarantee to Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack to a posture of sharp criticism of President Chen for destabilizing the situation across the straits.
Does that suggest that a future Republican President will follow in the path of its predecessors – both Republican and Democratic – in favoring a strong positive relationship with China? Not necessarily. Even in the current Administration, the approach to China is less one of affirmative embrace and more one of controversy avoidance. From time to time – such as former Secretary Rumsfeld’s famous remarks at the Singapore Defense Ministers meeting in 2005, to Secretary Rice’s observation on the eve of her 2006 visit to Southeast Asia – a deep wariness about China’s rise lurks in the background. And it’s important to recall in the 2002 National Security Strategy the Bush Administration did enunciate a policy of assuring that there would be no “potential adversaries” that would compete with the United States.
Moreover, it is possible to see in the Administration’s embrace of a more robust security policy for Japan – including revision of Article IX of the Japanese constitution, as well as the promotion of the US-Australia-Japan security dialogue and the warming of security ties with India – an implicit strategy for counter-balancing, if not explicitly containing China. This is a strategy that is likely to have considerable appeal for Republican policymakers, but as China’s political, economic and military power grows, the timing and prominence of the policy shift will depend critically on how quickly the United States extricates itself from Iraq and the level of terrorist activity against the United States.
What about the Democrats? Well, contrary to some conventional wisdom, for Democrats, China is problematic too. It is problematic not only because of potential military competition but also on economic and human rights issues as well – as evidence by the very prominent and critical voices of House Speaker Pelosi and Senator Chuck Schumer, among others. Many Democrats too are drawn to implicit encirclement strategy, focusing on partnerships with Asia’s democracies as can be seen in what might have been thought of as the surprising degree of Democratic support for the US-India nuclear deal.
Does that mean that conflict with China is inevitable and that the US will look to ASEAN states to partner with us in containing China regardless of the outcome of the election?
Not necessarily. Although the push of US politics makes that outcome more likely than might be seen as desirable. There is another path possible. Elements of which can be seen in the recent Council on Foreign Relations study group report that was included in the reading for this symposium. I want to close by saying a few words about what I think our approach should be with the caveat that I’m speaking for myself and not necessarily predicating what a future Administration might adopt as policy.
I think we can all agree that the first best outcome is a prosperous, democratic and peaceful China, along with a prosperous, already Democratic India, taking their place as constructive members of the regional and global communities. This is the best long result for the region and the world. That’s the easy part.
The tougher question is how best to assure that outcome and at the same time, safeguard ourselves against the real possibility that the outcome does not come to pass.
I want to suggest to you that there must be twin pillars to US strategy. First, it is incumbent on all of us to make clear that we would in fact welcome this best outcome we all desire. It is and will be tempting to many to focus on the dangers that a growing, more active China can present to the region and to build a strategy to contain China – a strategy that would include trying to enlist key partners like India as a part of that more or less explicit alliance to balance China. But the surest way to bring about a more dangerous, confrontational environment in the region is to start from the assumption that conflict is inevitable, and therefore, we must prepare for it as inevitable.
Together, the United States and our partners in ASEAN should be prepared to sketch out a future for the emerging powers that shows that positive developments will be met with enthusiasm by us all.
But we must also have a second pillar, if despite our best efforts, things do not develop as we would hope. Some have called this hedging, but I don’t much care for the term, since it conveys a sense of lack of confidence in a better result. I prefer to call it readiness – being alert to both good and bad developments and to retaining the capacity to respond to adverse ones when and as needed. We need to make clear to China in particular that there are steps that China can take that will be reassuring, and steps that China could take that could cause anxiety and that our reactions will be governed by the choices China itself makes either to reassure or unsettle.
I think ASEAN colleagues understand the need for this two-pronged approach well, and their active engagement with US policymakers can help us avoid the danger of falling into a self-fulfilling bad result. And I’m also convinced that ASEAN countries will prefer an approach that does not force them into the unwelcome posture of having to choose between the United States and China.
On each of the core challenges I’ve discussed today, the outcome of the US debate is uncertain. Foreign policy factors will not be the only ones that determine the outcome of our election. But the one certainty I leave you with is that we face what my colleague Dean Elspeth Rostow calls a “nodal moment” in US foreign policy that will have profound consequences for years to come.
Copyright 2007 The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
