Cour de cassation:

Given that on 10 December 1992 Mme H. , a manic depressive, attempted to commit suicide in the Clinique le Coteau, a private psychiatric clinic, to which she had been admitted a month earlier; that on 13 February her condition deteriorated dramatically to the point that at 7.30 p.m. a doctor, being of opinion that she was very likely to kill herself in a paroxysm, ordered her to be bound hand and foot and immobilised on her bed; that at about 8.45 p.m. the patient in an adjoining room, aroused by cries and smoke coming from the room of Mme. H., raised the alarm, and it was found that the mattress of the bed on which Mme H. was tied down had caught fire and caused her third degree burns over 45% of her body; that the inquiry concluded that she had used the cigarette lighter found in her left hand in an attempt to commit suicide; that her burns made it necessary to amputate both her arms below the elbow and admit her to a hospital for patients with very serious burns; that she escaped from it on 27 July 1993 and four days later was found drowned in a nearby pond; that the husband of the deceased, acting on his own behalf and as legal administrator of their minor daughter, sued the private clinic in November 1993 alleging that it was at fault in the supervision of the patient on 13 July 1992 and claiming damages in contract for the various harms suffered by his wife, and in tort for the harm suffered by himself and his daughter; that his claims were dismissed at first instance and in the court of appeal;

On the first and third limbs of the second ground of application for review:

In view of article 1147 Code civil:

Given that the decision under attack held that clinic was not contractually liable since it had not been shown that it was at fault in any way as regards its supervision during the evening of 13 February 1993;

But given that the contract for hospitalisation and treatment between a private clinic and its patient obliges the clinic in particular to take all the steps to protect the safety of the patient which her condition renders necessary, and that having found that Mme H., tied to her bed by reason of her grave condition, was left unsupervised, no member of the staff being present on the same floor, and that assistance had to be called by another patient the court below failed to draw the correct legal conclusions from its findings;

On the first ground of application for review, first two limbs:

In view of articles 1165 and 1382 Code civil;

Given that the court of appeal held that the clinic’s liability in tort could not be considered since M. H. was not a third party;

But given that, on the one hand, it was only with Mme H. that the clinic had a contract for hospitalisation and treatment and that M. H.’s claim for the harm suffered by himself and his daughter as secondary victims (par ricochet) could only be delictual, and, on the other hand, that when a breach of contract causes harm to third parties, they can invoke this without offering any other proof;

From which it follows that in deciding as it did, the court of appeal violated article 1165 Code civil by misapplying it and article 1382 by failing to apply it;

Given that remand is not necessary as regards the fault committed by the clinic, nor as regards the right of M. H. to sue in tort for damages for the harm suffered by him personally and by his daughter; the Cour de cassation can dispose properly of the lawsuit, under article 627(2) of the new Code of Civil Procedure;

For these reasons QUASHES and ANNULS in its entirety the decision of 3 November 1998 by the Court of Appeal of Grenoble;

DECLARES that no remand is necessary as regards the breach of contract by the Clinique le Coteau nor as regards the right of M. H. to sue in tort for damages for the harm suffered by himself personally and by his daughter;

DECLARES that the Clinique le Coteau was at fault in the performance of its contract with Mme H. and that M. H. may found on this fault as constituting a breach of contract as regards the harm suffered by his wife and as constituting a tort as regards the harm suffered by him personally and by his minor daughter;

REMANDS the matter to the Court of Appeal of Lyons, but only for the purpose of determining the extent of the harm caused by the fault in question and the amount of damages therefor.

Civ 1, 18 July 2000: The principle under which the next of kin of a deceased patient can only involve the doctor or the caring institution in liability from the angle of tort in the case of breach by the latter of the medical contract binding him or it to the patient, already affirmed by the Cour de cassation on the 1 April 1968 (Civ 1, Bull no 112), has been widely repeated since. The novelty of this judgment is related more to dispensing, for these third parties, with all other proof than that of the harm resulting for them from the defective non-performance of this contract, a principle confirmed by a judgment of the 13 February 2001 (Civ 1, Bull no 35) repeating "that a blood transfusion centre is under a strict duty of safety (obligation de sécurité de résultat) so far as concerns the blood products which it provides, and that breach of this obligation can be invoked by the third party victim of ricochet harm just as much as by the immediate victim" and that "the third parties to a contract are entitled to invoke any breach by the contractual debtor when this breach has caused them harm, without having to bring any other proof".

Translation by Raymond Youngs

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