

# **“The Gingrich Senators, the Tea Party Senators, and Their Effect on the U.S. Senate”**

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January 13, 2013

Over the last thirty years, the increasing party polarization in the Senate can be explained almost entirely by one group: “The Gingrich Senators,” which Theriault (2008) and Theriault and Rohde (2012) define as those Republicans who entered the House after Gingrich’s election in 1978 and subsequently moved to the Senate. In 2011, the Gingrich Senators, helped elect a new breed of senator: the Tea Party Senators. In this paper, I analyze the role that the Gingrich Senators and their predecessors, the Tea Party Senators, had on the Senate. In short, on most dimensions both groups are similarly act as party polarizers and partisan warriors, which is in stark contrast to the other Republicans in the Senate.

Most Americans have recoiled at what their Congress has become. After a recent poll showing congressional approval in the single digits, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) concluded that the only congressional supporters these days include “blood relatives and paid staff.”<sup>1</sup> In an article titled, “Our Broken Senate,” Norman Ornstein, the dean of political pundits, argued that “the Senate had taken the term ‘deliberate’ to a new level... In many ways, the frustration of modern governance in Washington – the arrogance, independence, parochialism – could be called ‘The Curse of the Senate.’” He concludes that the problem with the Senate is the “the culture” and that “is not going to change anytime soon.”<sup>2</sup> This chorus of dysfunction in the Senate is given its clearest voice as senators are on their way out the door. When Senator Evan Bayh, whose father was also a senator, announced his retirement in 2010, he complained:

For some time, I’ve had a growing conviction that Congress is not operating as it should. There is much too much partisanship and not enough progress; too much narrow ideology and not enough practical problem-solving. Even at a time of enormous national challenge, the people's business is not getting done... I love working for the people of Indiana. I love helping our citizens make the most of their lives. But I do not love Congress.<sup>3</sup>

Two years later when Olympia Snowe announced that she would retire at the end of 2012, she commented, “Unfortunately, I do not realistically expect the partisanship of recent years in the Senate to change over the short term.”<sup>4</sup>

When they were announcing their retirement from the Senate, it is my contention that Bayh and Snowe were criticizing the institution on two different, though related, underlying

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<sup>1</sup> As quoted in Norman J. Ornstein, February 8, 2012, “Obama’s Tactic Could Yield Political Results,” *Roll Call*, p.xx.

<sup>2</sup> Norman Ornstein, “Our Broken Senate,” *The American: The Journal of the American Enterprise Institute*, March/April 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Lynn Sweet, February 15, 2010, “Sen. Evan Bayh won’t run again,” *Chicago Sun Times*.

<sup>4</sup> As quoted in Paul Kane and Chris Cillizza, February 29, 2012, “Sen. Olympia Snowe Announces Retirement: Can the GOP hold her seat?” *The Washington Post*, p.xx.

dimensions. First, the senators serving today are more ideologically polarized than their predecessors. While the Senate has always had both extreme conservatives and extreme liberals, today's Senate seems to have more of them than it did before. As the senators have become more ideologically polarized, the number of senators in the middle has shrunk, which has impeded the compromises necessary for solving public policy problems.

While some may think that the growing ideological divide between the parties is reason enough to criticize the institution, a second complaint seems to bother Snowe, Bayh, their fellow senators, political pundits, and congressional scholars even more. That complaint, while it has its roots in party polarization, is combative in nature and requires more than what can be revealed in voting patterns on the Senate floor. I call this second dimension, partisan warfare. The partisan warfare dimension taps into the strategies that go beyond defeating your opponents into humiliating them, go beyond questioning your opponents judgment into questioning their motives, and go beyond fighting the good legislative fight to destroying the institution and the legislative process in order to serve not only your ideological goals, but also your electoral goals.

This warfare certainly has party polarization at its roots. Polarization may be necessary for warfare, but it is not a sufficient cause of it. Parties that are divided over policy can have a serious and honest debate, which can even become heated. In the first half of the famous idiom, the opposing sides can "agree to disagree." Quite apart from the serious policy disagreement, though, the debate between the opposing sides can degenerate into a shouting match where the policy proscriptions are lost in a fight over legislative games where the combatants question the motives, integrity, and patriotism of their opponents. Under such a situation, the second half of the idiom – "without being disagreeable" – is never realized.

This partisan warfare dimension is harder to quantify, though it most certainly exists. What I call, “partisan warfare,” is what Frances Lee (2009) characterized as “beyond ideology” in her book of the same name. Lee argues that only so much of the divide between the parties can be understood as a difference in ideology. The rest of the divide – by some accounts, the lion’s share of the divide – is motivated by some other goal. Lee (2009, 193) defines this behavior as “partisan bickering” and offers the following description:

If partisanship has roots in members’ political interests, then political parties actually exacerbate and institutionalize conflict, rather than merely represent and give voice to preexisting policy disagreements in the broader political environment. In their quest to win elections and wield power, partisans impeach one another’s motives, question one another’s ethics and competence, engage in reflexive partisanship, and—when it is politically useful to do so—exploit and deepen divisions rather than seeking common ground.

I argue that it is this portion of the divide that causes the angst of those participants and observers of today’s Senate. Lee restricts her evaluation of the combat that is beyond ideology to an examination of roll-call votes, which is an appropriate first step. Partisan warfare, though, can operate in contexts beyond the “yeas” and “nays” on the Senate floor. In fact, it is frequently other actions in the legislative and electoral processes that are better exhibits of partisan warfare.

More often than not, congressional scholars have opted to merge these two dimensions for a couple of reasons. First, there is no doubt that they are related. The distinction between party polarization and partisan warfare can easily be masked as the same or at least similar enough to collapse on to one dimension. Second, the second dimension of partisan warfare, especially in comparison to the first, is much harder to isolate, operationalize, and analyze. Nonetheless, real analytic leverage can be brought to our understanding of how the current Senate operates and how it is evaluated if these dimensions are pulled apart.

In this article, I examine these two dimension among three groups of Republican senators – the Gingrich Senators, the Tea Party Senators, and the other Republican senators. I find that the current polarization in the Senate can chiefly be explained by the increasing numbers and increasingly conservative voting patterns of the Gingrich Senators. In the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress, the Tea Party senators perpetuated polarization even more. Furthermore, I show how the Gingrich Senators and the Tea Party Senators have conducted partisan warfare on the Senate by focusing on data from First Session of the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress (2011).

## **I. Linking the Gingrich Senators to the Tea Party Senators**

As Senator DeMint was declaring his intention to make health care reform Obama’s “Waterloo” in July 2009, the script for the 2010 congressional midterm was changing; perhaps, even because of DeMint’s declaration. In July 2009, 61 percent of Americans approved of Obama’s presidency, and only 32 percent disapproved.<sup>5</sup> Obama’s high numbers were reflected in the predictions that Charlie Cook was making at the time. He projected that the Democrats would retain 58 seats in the 2010 election and that an additional 6 were in the “toss-up” category.<sup>6</sup>

Within six months, the entire political landscape would change. On January 19, Scott Brown (R-Massachusetts) ended the Democrat’s filibuster-proof margin when he won the special election to complete Ted Kennedy’s term in the Senate. Brown’s victory signaled that

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<sup>5</sup> Data taken from a Gallup Poll as reported by “The American Presidency Project” (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/popularity.php>; accessed on March 10, 2012).

<sup>6</sup> See [http://cookpolitical.com/charts/senate/raceratings\\_2009-07-15\\_13-59-09.php](http://cookpolitical.com/charts/senate/raceratings_2009-07-15_13-59-09.php); accessed on March 10, 2012.

Democrats were facing mounting and ominous odds in the 2010 elections. Republican believed that if they could win in Massachusetts, they could win just about anywhere. The numbers supported their belief. Those approving of Obama exactly equaled those disapproving and Cook down-graded the Democrat's projection to 51 seats with an additional 12 in the toss-up category.<sup>7</sup>

No politician encapsulates the narrative for the 2010-midterm elections better than Gingrich Senator, Jim DeMint. While it is unclear if he led the Tea Party movement or simply got out in front of it after it started, few dispute how crucial he was for its success. In fact, the very definition of what it meant to be a Tea Party candidate according to the *New York Times*, in part, depending upon having his endorsement.<sup>8</sup> While former House Majority Leader (under Gingrich's speakership) Dick Armey (R-Texas) and Former Governor Sarah Palin (R-Alaska) also played important roles in the Tea Party movement, but both were out of office in 2010. DeMint, alone, could walk that fine line between being an outsider, which the Tea Party movement valued, while still operating the levers of government power.

Even before his "Waterloo" comment, DeMint had a significant effect on the 2010 election when he endorsed Pat Toomey, a former House member, in the 2010 Republican primary for a Pennsylvania Senate seat. Toomey's opponent in the primary was incumbent Arlen Specter, who, within a week of DeMint's endorsement, switched parties giving the Democrats the sixtieth vote they needed to break Republican filibusters. In making his choice of Toomey, DeMint argued, "I would rather have 30 Republicans in the Senate who really

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<sup>7</sup> See [http://cookpolitical.com/charts/senate/raceratings\\_2010-01-14\\_14-48-48.php](http://cookpolitical.com/charts/senate/raceratings_2010-01-14_14-48-48.php); accessed on March 10, 2012.

<sup>8</sup> See Kate Zernike, October 14, 2010, "Tea Party Set to Win Enough Races for Wide Influence, *The New York Times*, p. xx.

believe in principles of limited government, free markets, free people, than to have 60 that don't have a set of beliefs.”<sup>9</sup>

The Toomey endorsement was only the first of many that would cause the Republican establishment – as best articulated by Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas), who was serving as the chair of the National Republican Senate Committee – much heart-ache. The other endorsements of candidates running against establishment candidates included:

- Marco Rubio, Florida. On June 15, 2009, a week after his Toomey endorsement was publicly announced, DeMint endorsed Rubio, a former Florida House Speaker, over Governor Charlie Crist (R-Florida), who received the NRSC endorsement a month earlier. At the time of DeMint's announcement, Rubio was trailing by more than thirty points in the polls – a Quinnipiac poll showed Crist with a 54 to 23 advantage.<sup>10</sup> In May, 2010, Crist announced that he was dropping out of the Republican primary and would run for the seat as “a non party affiliated” candidate. He lost the general election to Rubio, by almost 20 percentage points; the Democratic candidate, Congressman Kendrick Meek (D-Florida) finished a distant third with 20 percent of the vote.
- Chuck Devore, California. On November 4, 2009, almost a year before the 2010 elections, DeMint endorsed Devore over Carly Fiorina in the Republican primary race to take on Senator Barbara Boxer (D-California). Although Fiorina had not officially earned the NRSC endorsement, she was the candidate of the Republican establishment. In the same month that DeMint endorse her opponent, Fiorina was the guest of honor at a fundraiser featuring Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), and John McCain, who had named her as one of his chief advisers during his 2008 presidential campaign.<sup>11</sup> Devore finished third in the primary with only 19.3 percent of the vote. Fiorina secured 56.4 percent and former Congressman Tom Campbell (R-California) won 21.7 percent. Fiorina lost in the general election to the incumbent.
- Ken Buck, Colorado. On April 14, 2010, DeMint endorsed Ken Buck, the District Attorney of Weld County, over former Lieutenant Governor, Jane Norton, who was the NRSC preferred candidate. In March, Norton lead Buck 41-13 percent in the polls. In the week after DeMint's endorsement, Buck, for the first time, led the polls,

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<sup>9</sup> See Timothy P. Carney, April 2009, “Did DeMint's endorsement of Toomey set off Specter?” *The Washington Examiner* (<http://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/beltway-confidential/2009/04/did-demints-endorsement-toomey-set-specter/136018>); accessed on March 10, 2012.

<sup>10</sup> As reported by Manu Raju, June 15, 2009, “Jim DeMint backs Marco Rubio in Florida Governor Race,” *Politico* (<http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23754.html>); accessed on March 12, 2012). Incidentally, the headline of this article is inaccurate – the endorsement was in the Senate race.

<sup>11</sup> As reported by Reid Wilson, November 4, 2009, “Senator DeMint Bucks Republican Party, Backs Conservative in California Race,” *The Hill*, p.xx (<http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/66169-demint-bucks-party-backs-conservative-in-california>); accessed March 10, 2012.

though just by 3 percentage points. Although Buck was outspent and out organized by Norton (R-Colorado), he won the primary by 4 points, but lost the general election to Michael Bennet, who was appointed to the seat after Ken Salazar (D-Colorado) became Interior Secretary.

- Marlin Stutzman, Indiana. On April 20, 2010, DeMint endorsed a young farmer and businessman, Marlin Stutzman, over former Senator Dan Coats (a Gingrich Senator) and former Congressman John Hostettler (R-Indiana). DeMint's endorsement helped the Stutzman campaign gain traction against Coats, who had the NRSC endorsement. He lost by 10 percentage points to Dan Coats, who easily won the general election. Stutzman would later win a special election to fill the House seat vacancy caused by the resignation of Mark Souder (R-Indiana), who was caught in a sex scandal.
- Rand Paul, Kentucky. On May 5, 2010, DeMint endorsed ophthalmologist Rand Paul over Trey Grayson, the Attorney General, who was backed by Kentucky's senior senator, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, as well as former Vice President Dick Cheney and former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani. Paul won the primary by more than 20 points and the general election by more than 10 points.
- Mike Lee, Utah. In the week before the Republican convention on May 8, 2010, DeMint made a video endorsing Mike Lee that was to be played only if the incumbent, Senator Bob Bennett, was defeated in the early voting. The contents of the video were leaked prior to the vote. Subsequently, Bennett finished third in a preliminary ballot at the convention, knocking him from contention. Although Tim Bridgewater finished first in the final round of voting at the convention, he did not secure the 60 percent of supporters that would have cancelled the primary. Lee reversed the order in the primary by less than 2.5 percentage points and went on to win the general election in a landslide.
- Ovide Lamontagne, New Hampshire. On September 11, 2010, with less than a week to go before the primary, DeMint endorsed Ovide Lamontagne, over the establishment-candidate, Kelly Ayotte, who was the former Attorney General. The New Hampshire race was the only Senate race where Sarah Palin and Jim DeMint gave contradicting endorsements. Ayotte also had the endorsement of Judd Gregg, whose seat she was seeking, Mitch McConnell, Warren Rudman (R-New Hampshire), and John McCain. Although Lamontagne trailed Ayotte 34 percent to 15 percent in the polls a week before DeMint's endorsement, he ended up losing the race by less than 2,000 votes out of more than 138,000 votes cast. Ayotte went on to win the general election.
- Christine O'Donnell, Delaware. On the same day as he made his Lamontagne endorsement, DeMint also endorsed Christine O'Donnell over Congressman Mike Castle (R-Delaware). Although he made his endorsement only three days before the primary, it may have made the difference as O'Donnell won the primary by less than 4,000 votes. O'Donnell's victory compelled Charlie Cook to shift the seat from "Likely Republican" to "Likely Democrat." She was soundly defeated by Chris Coons (D-Delaware), who was the sitting county executive for New Castle County, in the general election.

The candidates above are not the only candidates DeMint backed. His endorsement of Ron Johnson (Wisconsin), Dino Rossi (Washington), Tom Coburn (Oklahoma), and John Raese (West Virginia) were not controversial among Republicans. Furthermore, he withheld two endorsements during contested primaries. In Nevada, DeMint found both Sharon Angle and Sue Lowden sufficiently conservative. In Alaska, he respected senatorial courtesy and remained neutral in Joe Miller's challenge to Senator Lisa Murkowski. After the primaries in these two states, he fervently rallied to Miller's and Angle's causes, though both in a losing effort.

DeMint's endorsements, unlike those from almost every other Leadership PAC, came with more than a just a check from the Leadership PAC. DeMint not only provided funds from his Leadership PAC, but also encouraged his followers to contribute to the individual campaigns. While his Leadership PACs gave \$135,000, his nationwide network of donors added more than \$6.6 million more through the Senate Conservative Fund website (table 1 shows the donations DeMint made in the 2010 Senate races).<sup>12</sup>

Insert Table 1.
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While Republicans were overwhelmingly pleased with the results on election night, the record in the Senate for the Tea Party and DeMint was more mixed. While they were pleased with the victories by Johnson (Wisconsin), Lee (Utah), Paul (Kentucky), Rubio (Florida), and Toomey (Pennsylvania), they mourned the losses by Miller (Alaska), Angle

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<sup>12</sup> The SCF claimed that DeMint was responsible for raising more than \$9.3 million in the 2010 cycle (see <http://senateconservatives.com/site/post/692/release-scf-raises-100000-for-mandel>; accessed on March 31, 2012). The records filed with FEC shows that DeMint raised less than that amount. As such, it is not clear for whom he raised that much and how it was distributed. In an earlier SCF press release (<http://senateconservatives.com/site/post/366/scf-tops-5-million-candidate-goal>; accessed on April 3, 2012), \$5.2 million of the \$9.3 million is accounted. This includes \$554,000 to candidates that lost in the primary (the FEC only reports \$156,709 of that amount). It also includes \$1,856,000 in donations to state GOP victory committees. The same press released announced that he had raised more than \$7 million dollars.

(Nevada), Buck (Colorado), O'Donnell (Delaware) and, especially, Angle (Nevada), who lost to Majority Leader Harry Reid. While the Tea Party was credited with providing the fuel for the overwhelming Republican victories, their over zealotry in the primaries was criticized for keeping the Senate in Democratic hands. Had Norton faced Bennet in Colorado, Castle faced Coons in Delaware, and Lowden faced Reid in Nevada, the pundits reasoned that the Republicans could have picked up an additional three Senate seats.

Jim DeMint, of course, was not the only Gingrich Senator who was involved in the 2010 elections. The Gingrich Senators gave more than \$1.5 million through their Leadership PACs. While this amount is quite significant, it does not equal the amount of money that was contributed through DeMint's Leadership PAC website. Whether this form of influencing congressional elections will catch on among the other Gingrich Senators or the newly minted Tea Party Senators, only time can tell. At least one Tea Party Senator, Mike Lee, has fashioned his Leadership PAC in the mold of DeMint's.<sup>13</sup>

## **II. The Gingrich Senators and Tea Party Senators as Party Polarizers**

In the 2010 elections, the Republicans gained 63 seats in the House and 6 seats in the Senate. While Gingrich Senators Sam Brownback, Jim Bunning, and Judd Gregg were leaving the Senate, six new Republicans with House experience were elected to the Senate and Dan Coats, who had retired 12 years earlier, was elected again to his old seat. For a list of the Gingrich Senators and the Tea Party Senators, see the Appendix. While John Boozman,

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<sup>13</sup> See Alexander Bolton, August 4, 2011, "DeMint's Leadership PAC Battles Leaders in Fight for Future of Senate GOP Caucus," *The Hill*, p. xx.

Roy Blunt, Mark Kirk, Jerry Moran, Rob Portman, and Pat Toomey were being welcomed to the Senate, they were not the stars of the show. Republicans and the entire political world were especially eager to see how the Tea Party Senators would adapt to the Senate. Rand Paul, for his iconoclastic beliefs, and Marco Rubio, for his compelling life story, were the two newly elected senators that received the most press. In this section, I describe the voting behavior of the Gingrich Senators and the Tea Party Senators.

Since the first of their rank, Phil Gramm, entered the Senate in 1985, the Gingrich Senators have been much more conservative than the other Republicans. Up through the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress (2007-8), Theriault and Rohde (2012) find that the Gingrich Senators are 56 percent more conservative than the other Republicans. That distinction continued seamlessly in the first session of the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress (2011). While the other Republicans had a similarly averaged polarization score of 0.38, the Gingrich Senators polarization score was 38 percent higher at 0.53. This distinction is similar to the differences between the two groups of Republicans over the last few congresses. In the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress, the Tea Party Senators made their mark as party polarizers. This new group had a polarization score of 0.80, which was less than their primary benefactor, Jim DeMint, who had a 0.87 polarization (see Table 2 for a list of the polarization scores for all the Republicans in the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress). The only two senators more polarizing than DeMint were Rand Paul (1.00) and Mike Lee (0.99). Figure 1 shows the polarization scores for the Democrats (0.37) as well as the Gingrich Senators and the other Republicans from the early 1990s until 2010. Figure 2 shows the polarization scores of these groups for the First Session of the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress (2011). The last bar shows what each of the three groups contributed to Senate party polarization in 2011. Even though the Tea Party Senators have the highest polarization score, their overall effect is smaller because

they only had 5 members.<sup>14</sup> The Gingrich Senators and the Tea Party Senators account for two-thirds of the polarization contributed by the Republicans even though they are only 55 percent of the conference. Though the two groups were only 26 percent of the entire Senate, they account for 37 percent of the polarization.

Insert Table 2.
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Insert Figure 1.
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The roll-call votes from the First Session of the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress suggest that the Gingrich Senators were every bit the party polarizers that they had been in previous congresses. Their direct descendants – at least Jim DeMint’s direct descendants – had even larger polarizing scores.<sup>15</sup> While the Tea Party Senators were more polarizing individually, they had fewer than a quarter of the membership of the Gingrich Senators. While the future of these Tea Party Senators and the Tea Party Senator grouping, more generally, is unclear, the roll call voting analysis from 2011 suggests that the Gingrich Senators remain as distinct as ever from the other Republicans.

### III. The Gingrich Senators and Tea Party Senators as Partisan Warriors

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<sup>14</sup> This assessment is based on an average polarizing score of the Tea Party Senators of 0.80 multiplied by the five senators giving them a total polarizing effect of 3.98. The 22 Gingrich Senators had an average polarizing score of 0.53, giving them a polarizing effect of 12.15, which is more than three times larger the effect of the Tea Party Senators.

<sup>15</sup> Not all the Gingrich Senators greeted the Tea Party Senators with open arms. In separate incidents, McCain, on the Senate floor, went after Paul on his foreign policy views and Toomey on his budget views. For the former, see Halimah Abdullah, December 11, 2011, “D.C. is Big Tea Party for Rand Paul,” *The Houston Chronicle*, p. A38. For the latter, see David M. Drucker, July 29, 2011, “McCain Spars with Activists on Debt,” *Roll Call*, p. 3. On the other hand, McCain has become a mentor to Portman, a fellow Gingrich Senators. See David M. Drucker, “McCain Coaches Portman,” *Roll Call*, p. 1.

The Gingrich Senators as party polarizers did not change as a result of the 2010 elections, as least inasmuch as their roll-call voting behavior in 2011 can attest. Their ranks were increased with the addition of the Tea Party Senators, who were even bigger party polarizers. To examine their roles as partisan warriors, I evaluate a variety of evidence – both quantitative and qualitative – because partisan warrior behavior cannot be as easily summarized as polarization scores can summarize party polarizers.

#### A. Earmark Ban

The effect of the Tea Party was felt even before the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress convened on January 3, 2011. Within days of the election, the Republican leaders in the House declared that they would pass a two-year moratorium on earmarks. Jim DeMint and Tom Coburn aimed to get the Senate Republicans to endorse a similar move in the Senate. They faced an uphill battle. Despite an early overture from President Obama, the earmark ban was criticized by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, in a speech two days after the election to the Heritage Foundation. He argued, “Every President, Republican or Democrat, would love to have a blank check from Congress to do whatever he chose to do on every single issue... And we’ll be discussing the appropriateness of giving the President that kind of blank check in the coming week.” He reasoned, “You can eliminate every congressional earmark and you would save no money. It’s really an argument about discretion.”<sup>16</sup>

On the day before the Senate Republican Conference met for the first time after the 2010 elections, McConnell back-pedalled and supported the earmark ban. On the Senate floor, he offered his explanation:

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<sup>16</sup> See <http://www.heritage.org/events/2010/11/mitch-mcconnell>; accessed March 13, 2012.

Nearly every day that the Senate's been in session for the past 2 years, I have come down to this spot and said that Democrats are ignoring the wishes of the American people. When it comes to earmarks, I will not be guilty of the same thing.

Make no mistake. I know the good that has come from the projects I have helped support throughout my State. I don't apologize for them. But there is simply no doubt that the abuse of this practice has caused Americans to view it as a symbol of the waste and the out-of-control spending that every Republican in Washington is determined to fight. And unless people like me show the American people that we are willing to follow through on small or even symbolic things, we risk losing them on our broader efforts to cut spending and rein in government.

That is why today, I am announcing that I will join the Republican leadership in the House in support of a moratorium on earmarks in the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress.<sup>17</sup>

The next day, the Republican Conference by voice vote supported the earmark ban.

Two weeks later, in a debate on food safety during the lame duck session to the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, Coburn attempted to introduce an amendment that would, in effect, ban earmarks. The procedural motion to bring up the amendment was defeated, 39-56. The Republicans supported the ban, 32-8. The only Gingrich Senator to oppose the ban was Jim Inhofe (Sam Brownback was absent). Seven of the 22 other Republicans who voted, opposed the earmark ban.<sup>18</sup>

Rather than writing an earmark ban into the rules of the Senate, the Appropriations Committee adopted an earmark moratorium that would last for the entirety of the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress. Not satisfied with an informal and temporary solution, Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri) and Pat Toomey, who was both a Gingrich Senator and a Tea Party Senator, introduced, on February 2, 2012, an amendment to the STOCK Act, which would make the earmark ban permanent. Again, the amendment lost, 40-59. All 5 Tea Party Senators

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<sup>17</sup> *The Congressional Record*, 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, November 15, 2010, p. S7872.

<sup>18</sup> The roll call votes of the Gingrich Senators and the other Republicans are statistically significantly different from one another (p=0.010).

supported it as did 17 out of 21 Gingrich Senators (Kirk was missing). The other Republicans split more evenly, 12-9.<sup>19</sup>

### B. Presidential Support Scores

For every representative and senator since the Eisenhower Administration, Congressional Quarterly has been calculating “Presidential Support Scores,” which includes all the roll-call votes in which an “explicit statement is made by the president or his authorized spokesmen.”<sup>20</sup> These scores range from 0, if the member never supported the president on one of these votes to 100 if they voted with the president on every single one. Not surprisingly, these votes have become increasingly divided by party in the era of party polarization (see figure 3 for the presidential support scores by Democrats, other Republicans, Gingrich Senators, and Tea Party Senators from George H.W. Bush to Obama).

Insert Figure 3.

The differences among the groups of Republicans is especially stark during Democratic administrations. In fact, during Republican Administrations, the presidential support scores for the other Republicans and the Gingrich Senators are similar. During Democratic presidential administrations, the difference is large and statistically significant.

The Gingrich Senators, combining forces with the Tea Party Senators in the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress, have been leading the charge against the president’s public policy agenda in the Senate. Not only is the average for the Gingrich Senators lower than the other Republicans, but the average for the Tea Party Senators is much closer to the Gingrich Senators than the

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<sup>19</sup> The roll call votes among the Tea Party Senators, the Gingrich Senators, and the other Republicans are statistically significantly different from one another ( $p=0.042$  for Gingrich Senators and other Republicans;  $0.013$  for Gingrich Senators and Tea Party Senators; and  $0.000$  for Tea Party Senators and other Republicans).

<sup>20</sup> Quoted from *2006 CQ Almanac*, p. B-19.

other Republicans. During 2011, the anchors of Obama opposition are the Gingrich Senators and their descendants. Paul had the lowest score (40.9 percent), followed by DeMint (41.4), Vitter (42.6), Heller (45.1), and Rubio (46.2). Only three other Republicans are among the 15 lowest supporters of President Obama during his third year in office (only Toomey doesn't make the list among the Tea Party Senators).

One way of interpreting these data is that the Gingrich Senators are behaving more like the "other Republican" as they accrue more experience in the chamber and as they secure more important positions. An alternative view suggests that just as the Gingrich Senators convinced the Republican Conference to ban earmarks, so it is with opposing Obama's legislative initiatives. What at one point in time was a vote based on the substance of the bill or the qualifications of the nominee has become simply a pawn in a larger chess match to win majority party control.

The nomination fight for Obama's choice to lead the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) strongly suggests it is the latter. In 2010, Congress passed and Obama signed into the law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Bill, which included a provision to establish a CFPB headed by a director. The bill only became law when three Republicans – Brown, Collins, and Snowe – voted with 57 Democrats to both defeat a filibuster and pass the bill.

In an attempt to mollify the Senate Republicans, Obama passed over nominating Elizabeth Warren, who had been a partisan lightning rod, in favor of nominating Richard Cordray, who had lost his Ohio Attorney General reelection bid to Mike DeWine, a Gingrich former Senator, in the 2010 election. No one questioned Cordray's credentials to lead the CFPB. Shortly after Obama announced the nomination, Richard Shelby (R-Alabama), the ranking Republican of the Senate Banking Committee wrote Obama a letter stating that 44

Republicans would vote to block any nominee to head the CFPB unless Congress made “reasonable changes” to the law to make it more accountable to Congress.<sup>21</sup> On December 8, 2011, the Republicans held true to their promise when a unified conference – but for Brown – upheld a filibuster to defeat the nomination.<sup>22</sup> Many congressional observers thought that this was the first time a nomination was defeated because of an objection to the underlying law establishing the bureaucratic structure. In a move that escalated the partisan war, Obama made a controversial recesses appointment when he installed Cordray into the position on January 4, 2012. In another unprecedented move in the partisan war, Obama made the recess appointment when it was not clear that the Senate was even in recess.

### C. Amendments on the Senate Floor

On March 24, 2010, Senator Coburn introduced an amendment that prohibited sex offenders from using the health insurance that was being established in Obama’s health care reform package to pay for Viagra. What senator would possibly vote against such an amendment? As it turned out, 55 out of 57 Democrats did.<sup>23</sup> During this particular debate, the Democrats were orchestrating a complex legislative maneuver that could lead to the passage of health care reform without explicitly overcoming a Republican-led filibuster. By passing the measure through the reconciliation process, the Democrats only needed a majority, but they could not change a word in the bill or the entire process might unravel. As

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<sup>21</sup> See Richard Shelby, July 21, 2011, “The Danger of an Unaccountable ‘Consumer-Protection’ Czar,” *The Wall Street Journal*, p.xx.

<sup>22</sup> While Collins switched her vote to uphold the filibuster even though she voted for the initial legislation, Snowe voted “present” to avoid a potential conflict with her husband’s business involving student loans that are regulated by the agency.

<sup>23</sup> The floor mechanics on this amendment are a bit tricky. Instead of subjecting Democrats to an explicit vote on the amendment, Senate Max Baucus (D-Montana) offered a motion to table Coburn’s amendment. Fifty-five out of 57 Democrats voted for that motion, thus the amendment was tabled, which in this instance is equivalent to defeating the amendment.

such, the Republicans had the Democrats in the difficult position of voting down amendments that might otherwise seem constructive or reasonable.

In addition to voting down the prohibition of paying for sex offenders' Viagra, the Democrats defeated an amendment by Mike Crapo that would ensure that no individual making less than \$200,000 would be subject to a tax increase as a consequence of the legislation. They also defeated an amendment by John Ensign to protect the damages in medical malpractice suits resulting from pro bono cases. By voting against each of these amendments, Democrats could be subject to campaign commercials arguing that they voted to give Viagra to sex offenders, to raise taxes on those making less than \$200,000, and to subject pro bono health care providers to exorbitant malpractice lawsuits. No Democrat disagreed when Senator Max Baucus (D-Montana) called Coburn's amendment, "A crass political stunt aimed at making a 30-second commercial."<sup>24</sup>

Teasing a strategy of electioneering on the Senate floor is difficult. Teasing obstruction on the Senate floor is equally difficult. In an ideal world, we would count the number of holds – or threats of placing holds – that the Gingrich Senators and Tea Party Senators have placed on bills or nominations. Regrettably, holds are often secret. No reliable count exists. Nonetheless, we can glean insight of obstructionism into examining the number of roll-call votes that are associated with the Gingrich Senators' amendments.

As Coburn's amendment on Viagra showed, getting senators on the records is a new favorite game of the Gingrich Senators. Offering amendments is the easiest way that a senator can get his or her colleagues on the record. Offering amendments serves another purpose as well. It delays action in the Senate. Amendments require debates, motions, and

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<sup>24</sup> As quoted in Chris Casteel, March 25, 2010, "U.S. Sen. Tom Coburn's Viagra Amendment Fails," NewsOK (<http://newsok.com/u.s.-sen.-tom-coburns-viagra-amendment-fails/article/3449000>; accessed on December 20, 2011).

points of order all of which can put otherwise noncontroversial legislation in an endless holding pattern.

As with the introduction of these electioneering amendments, the number of roll call votes associated with the amendments is a new weapon in the partisan warriors' arsenal. In the 103<sup>rd</sup> (1993-4) and 107<sup>th</sup> (2001-2) Congresses, when the Democrats were also a majority, the Gingrich Senators, on average, offered amendments with only slightly more roll-call votes than their Republican colleagues (see figure 4). While the minority party has always offered more amendments resulting in more roll-call votes than the majority, the numbers associated with the Gingrich Senators are unprecedented. In the last two congresses, the amendments of 6 Gingrich Senator have resulted in more than 20 roll call votes each. In the previous 7 congresses (1993-2006), only 9 Democrats, 2 non-Gingrich Senators Republicans, and 2 Gingrich Senators (McCain and Brown in the 103<sup>rd</sup> Congress) have surpassed that benchmark.

Insert Figure 4.
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The number of amendments that the Gingrich Senators have offered has increasingly consumed time on the Senate floor. In the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress (2007-8), the Gingrich Senators amendments resulted in 173 roll call votes, which is 26 percent of the total number of roll call votes that senators took. The top five roll-call producing amendment sponsors were all Gingrich Senators: Coburn (34), DeMint (34), Kyl (18), Vitter (17), and Ensign (16). The ranking was only interrupted by Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, whose amendments resulted in 15 roll-call votes.

Once the Democratic majority in the Senate was joined with a Democrat in the White House, the number and proportion of votes caused by the Gingrich Senators' amendments were even greater. In the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress (2009-10), the Senate voted 214 times on the

Gingrich Senators amendments – which accounted for more than 30 percent of the total number of votes! Not surprisingly, the Gingrich Senators are at the top of the roll-call amendment sponsor list. Coburn (49), McCain (27), Vitter (23), Thune (19) were the top four and DeMint (17), Ensign (14), and Kyl (13) were in the top ten.<sup>25</sup> While the Republicans who were not Gingrich Senators also faced a majority opposition in the Senate and a Democrat in the White House, their amendments only accounted for 79 roll-call votes, even though they outnumbered the Gingrich Senators 25 to 19 in the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress.

The pattern continued in the First Session of the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress. Coburn's amendments resulted in the most roll call votes (13), followed by Paul (10), McCain (6), Diane Feinstein (D-California, 5), Vitter (4), and DeMint (4). The other four Tea Party Senators offered amendments that resulted in only 3 additional roll call votes. While the Gingrich Senators were responsible for amendments that resulted in 31 roll-call votes, the other Republicans' amendments only contributed 13 roll-call votes. The Democrats, who still enjoyed a majority albeit smaller than their majority in the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, offered amendments that resulted in 30 roll call votes.

The frequency of roll-call votes, alone, does not prove that the Gingrich Senators and the Tea Party Senators are using the amendment process for obstructionism. What is also true about these roll-call votes is that they are far less successful at securing support for their positions than are even their fellow Republicans. In the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, the Gingrich Senators won 11 percent of the roll-call votes on their amendments. While we might expect the minority party to have a difficult time getting their amendments adopted, the Republicans who were not Gingrich Senators did twice as well – they won 22 percent of the roll-call votes

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<sup>25</sup> The other senators in the top ten were Baucus (ranked fifth with 17), Reid (seventh, 15), and Sessions (tenth, 12).

on their amendments. The Democrats, on the other hand, won 62 percent of the roll-call votes on their amendments.

Not only are the Gingrich Senators less successful in roll-call votes on their amendments, but also when they fail, they fail miserably. On 22 percent of the unsuccessful roll-call votes associated with their amendments, the Gingrich Senators received less than 35 percent support from the Senate. This 35-percent standard is less than the number of Republicans serving in the Senate during the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress, 15 percentage points less than the minimum needed to get their amendment adopted, and 25 percentage points less than the minimum needed to stop a potential filibuster on their particular amendment. Their Republican counterparts do not achieve 35 percent support on only 14 percent of the roll-call votes on their amendments. The Gingrich Senators do almost 50 percent worse in securing support than their Republican colleagues.

#### D. The 2011 Debt-Limit Crisis

Even as Congress was trying to avert a government shutdown in April 2011 because it had not yet passed a budget, political and economic experts on Capitol Hill and around the globe feared a much bigger partisan showdown. By July, it was speculated, the federal government would reach its debt ceiling. If Congress did not raise the ceiling, the government was headed not to a shutdown, but a far more drastic outcome: default on its loans. Under the grey clouds that were gathering on the horizon, Senators Mark Warner (D-Virginia) and Saxby Chambliss (R-Georgia), who shared some ideas with one another on the Senate floor, formed a “Gang of Six,” who would search for a bipartisan compromise to the impending crisis. They were joined by Dick Durbin (D-Illinois), Kent Conrad (D-North

Dakota), Tom Coburn, and Mike Crapo. All three Republican senators participating in the Gang of Six talks were Gingrich Senators.

As the drama of the debt ceiling played out over the spring and summer, the stock of the Gang of Six fell and rose and fell again. When talks between the party leaders and the White House faltered, the eyes of the public and the members of Congress, switched back to the Gang of Six. In frustration, Coburn quit the group, but then rejoined it a few months later giving it new life. When Biden convened a panel of party leaders for talks over the summer and when Obama and Boehner met in the weeks finally leading up to the compromise package, chatter about the Gang of Six reverted to mere background noise.

The issue that irreparably divided the Gang of Six was on the amount of revenue increases that would be part of the final package. At various times, the participants in the compromise efforts seemed to get close, but they could never reach a final compromise. Most talking heads in Washington, D.C., thought that the ground of compromise under discussion in the Gang of Six had more revenue increases than the ground of compromise among the other viable alternatives, which included Biden's working group and the Obama-Boehner talks. While House Republican leaders Boehner and Cantor had been resolute that tax increases could not be part of the package, Chambliss and his fellow Republicans recognized that they had to be part of the solution. Chambliss had argued as such throughout the spring. When word leaked that the Gang of Six was considering tax increases, Grover Norquist, an anti-tax activist, complained that such tax increases would constitute a breaking of the "Taxpayer Protection Pledge" that all three Republicans in the Gang of Six had signed. Chambliss, Coburn, and Crapo raised the hopes for compromise when they rhetorically sparred with Norquist by releasing a letter that such action would not break their pledge, "but

rather affirms the oath we have taken to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, of which our national debt may now be the greatest.”<sup>26</sup>

Rather than enacting a final solution to the problem, Congress passed and Obama signed legislation that would form a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (a.k.a., “The Super Committee”), which was tasked with coming up with \$1.5 billion in deficit savings, either through revenue increases or spending cuts else they would kick-in an automatic trigger mandating across the board cuts, including massive spending cuts in the military. Although few on Capitol Hill were happy that the “can had been kicked down the road,” the temporary compromise enjoyed large congressional majorities, including a final passage vote of 74-26 in the Senate. The 3 Republicans – all of whom were Gingrich Senators – that participated in the Gang of Six vote against the final agreement (in opposition to their 3 Democratic counterparts). They were joined in opposition by the 5 Tea Party Senators; the Gingrich Senators, marginally supported the agreement, 12-10. The other Republicans (16-5) and the Democrats (46-7) overwhelmingly voted for the package.<sup>27</sup>

Each party leader in each chamber named 3 members to the “Super Committee.” Mitch McConnell named Jon Kyl (the Minority Whip), Rob Portman (former Director of the Office of Management and Budget for President George W. Bush), and Pat Toomey. All three are Gingrich Senators, with Toomey carrying the mantel for both the Tea Party Senators

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<sup>26</sup> As quoted in Jackie Calmes, April 16, 2011, “‘Gang of Six’ in the Senate Seeking a Plan on Debt,” *The New York Times*.

<sup>27</sup> The roll call votes among the Tea Party Senators, the Gingrich Senators, and the other Republicans are statistically significantly different from one another ( $p=0.063$  for Gingrich Senators and other Republicans;  $0.000$  for Gingrich Senators and Tea Party Senators; and  $0.000$  for Tea Party Senators and other Republicans).

and the Gingrich Senators. Much like their predecessors, the Super Committee failed. Unless Congress acts before December 31, 2012, the sequestration trigger will kick-in.

#### E. No Reindeer Games for the Gingrich Senators

The first session of the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress (2011) was difficult for most senators. Democrats were frustrated that the Republicans made legislating exceedingly difficult. The Republicans were frustrated that the Democrats would not consider important legislation passed by the House. The Gingrich Senators and Tea Party Senators were frustrated that Obama was still in the White House, the Democrats were still a majority in the Senate, and the budget deficit continued to rise.

Shortly after Thanksgiving, Senator Al Franken (D-Minnesota), who is Jewish, decided that the Senate needed to institute a new tradition to ease tensions. In conspiring with Senator Mike Johanns (R-Nebraska), he sent an email around to his colleagues asking them to participate in a Senate version of Secret Santa. As Franken explained: “I remember one year [as a child] I picked this kid who used to intimidate me on the playground. Turns out after we got to know each other and we became friends. So, I thought Secret Santa would be a good way to cut through the partisan divide here in the Senate. And who knows, maybe it will create some unlikely friendships.”<sup>28</sup> Franken and Johanns set the limit at \$10 and picked December 13 as the date that they would exchange gifts.

The trick for the Secret Santa to work, though, was for the senators to participate. They did. At least 58 – and, perhaps, as many as 61 – senators offered their names up for the

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<sup>28</sup> As quoted in Jennifer Steinhauer, November 30, 2011, “Secret Santa in the Senate,” *The New York Times*, p. xx.

possibility of increasing comity (and, perhaps, comedy) in the Senate.<sup>29</sup> The participation rate varied by party. While at least 45 percent of the Republicans participated, 70 percent of Democrats did.<sup>30</sup> The differences among the Republicans groups were remarkable: 67 percent of other Republican senators participated, 40 percent of the Tea Party Senators, and 23 percent of the Gingrich Senators.<sup>31</sup>

Secret Santa participation cannot be explained by ideology. The other Republicans who participated were slightly more conservative (0.41) than those who did not participate (0.33). For the Tea Party Senators and the Gingrich Senators, the opposite is true, but just barely (0.79 compared to 0.80 for the Tea Party Senators and 0.50 compared to 0.53 for the Gingrich Senators). None of the differences in ideology are close to achieving conventional levels of statistical significance.

Not only was one senator unwilling to participate, but he ridiculed the entire enterprise. Pat Toomey, who has the unique distinction of being a Tea Party Senator as well as a Gingrich Senators, scoffed at the gift exchange. When Ginni Thomas, wife of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, asked him what he would give Majority Leader Harry Reid if he were to have participated, Toomey replied, “I would give him the inspiration to do a budget. I think I would try to inspire him to take responsibility that the majority party in the United States Senate ought to accept, which is to lay out to the American people just what

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<sup>29</sup> On the day of the drawing, 58 senators participated. At the day of the gift exchanged, news accounts indicated that as many as 61 senators exchanged gifts. All news accounts said that either 21 or 22 Republicans participated. Through a extensive search of the internet, including news articles, press releases, and blogs, 21 Republican senators and 29 Democratic senators could be identified.

<sup>30</sup> The proportions are statistically significantly different from one another ( $p = 0.015$ )

<sup>31</sup> The Tea Party Senators who participated were Rubio and Lee. The Gingrich Senators who participated were Boozman, Crapo, Portman, Vitter, and Wicker. The differences in proportions between the Gingrich Senators and the other Republicans is statistically significant ( $p = 0.001$ ). The difference in proportions involving the Tea Party Senators is not ( $p = 0.767$  with the Gingrich Senators and  $p = 0.135$  with the other Republicans).

they intend to do with American taxpayer dollars.”<sup>32</sup> Perhaps if he had participated, he would have gotten lumps of coal from Senator Joe Manchin (D-West Virginia). Instead, Manchin chose gave those lumps of coal, which were carved into a donkey and an elephant, to Senator Chuck Schumer (D-New York).<sup>33</sup>

#### F. Appearances on Sunday Morning Talk Shows

Each weekend, while most Americans are sleeping in and going about their normal daily lives, the opinion makers, pundits, politicians, and even political scientists focus their attention on the Sunday morning political talk shows, which includes NBC’s Meet the Press, ABC’s This Week, Fox News Sunday, CBS’s Face the Nation, and CNN’s State of the Union. With Obama in the White House and the number of Democrats vacillating around a veto proof margin in the Senate, these talk shows provided the Republicans an outlet to voice their concerns over the direction the Democrats were taking the country.

More often than not, the face of the Republicans in the Senate was represented by the Gingrich Senators (and the Tea Party Senators in 2011). Although Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell alone appeared on the shows 18 times in 2010, the Gingrich Senators’ appearances still outnumbered the other Republicans’ appearances (46-45). The Gingrich Senators, on average, were on these shows 2.4 times compared to 1.8 times for the other

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<sup>32</sup> See <http://dailycaller.com/2011/12/24/sen-toomey-on-his-secret-santa-gift-for-sen-reid-video/#ixzz1pNuuu000>; accessed on March 17, 2012.

<sup>33</sup> To learn more about the gifts given and received, see Ann Gerhart, December 13, 2011, “Senate’s Secret Santas Make Their Rounds,” *The Washington Post*, p. xx. Interestingly, the article was published in the Style section, not the Front Page.

Republicans – if McConnell’s appearances are removed from the total for the other Republicans, they only averaged 1.1 times.<sup>34</sup>

After McConnell, four of the next five Republican senators most likely to make appearances were Gingrich Senators (Graham, Kyl, McCain, and DeMint). The only other Republican to break this string was third-ranked John Cornyn (R-Texas), who was the chair of the National Republican Senatorial Committee. The only Democrats to have more appearances than DeMint were Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Illinois) and the Chair of the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee Bob Menendez (D-New Jersey). These data suggest that the Gingrich Senators are not only leading the war inside the Senate, but also in the media.

In 2011, the Gingrich Senators continued to make more regular appearances on the Sunday morning talk shows. They made 65 appearances compared to 30 total appearances for the other Republicans. While there were more than five times as many other Republicans in the Senate as there were Tea Party Senators, the latter had about half as many appearances as the former. On average, the Gingrich Senators had 3.0 appearances per senator, compared to 2.8 for the Tea Party Senators and 1.4 for the other Republicans. In 2011, McCain (19) and Graham (18) had more appearances than the elected leader of the Republican Conference, Mitch McConnell.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> The difference in appearances between the Gingrich Senators and the other Republicans is not statistically significant ( $p = 0.317$ ). When McConnell is deleted from the analysis, the difference nears statistical significance ( $p = 0.113$ ).

<sup>35</sup> The difference in appearances between the Gingrich Senators and the other Republicans is not quite statistically significant ( $p = 0.141$ ), unless McConnell is deleted from the analysis ( $p = 0.051$ ). The differences in appearances neither between the Tea Party Senators and the other Republicans ( $p = 0.185$ ) nor the Tea Party Senators and the Gingrich Senators ( $p = 0.438$ ) is statistically significant.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

The Gingrich Senators have not only been party polarizers, but also partisan warriors. In both quests, they have been joined in 2011 by another battalion of troops: the Tea Party Senators. These Freshman senators can trace their election victories to Gingrich Senator Jim DeMint, who was crucial in getting the Tea Party Senators elected and acclimated to his style of anti-establishment behavior in the U.S. Senate.

Because of how drastically the Republican Conference in the Senate changed in 2011, Senator Lamar Alexander (R-Tennessee) opted to resign his post as the Republican Conference Chair, the third ranking Republican in the Senate. Rather than continue in the position for the remainder of his term, he stepped down a full year before the Republicans would shuffle their leadership positions as a result of Minority Whip Jon Kyl's retirement. After making the announcement, Alexander claimed that he felt "liberated." According to a "knowledgeable Republican lobbyist, "Alexander was frustrated with some of the new tea-party-inspired Members – especially with their impatience, disdain for deal-making and low regard for Senate tradition and protocol. Even less appealing was trying to wrangle that crowd as the Whip.”<sup>36</sup>

In an article published two days before Alexander made his announcement, Burr handicapped the impending whip race between Alexander and Cornyn. His observation was astute for not only how he characterized the race, but also for how he depicted the entire Republican Conference in the Senate: "I'd say that the needs we have now and next year are

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<sup>36</sup> Quotes from David M. Drucker, September 21, 2011, "Alexander Takes a Step Back," *Roll Call*, p.1.

totally different than they were four years ago.”<sup>37</sup> Not only were their needs different, but the entire institution of the Senate was different because of them.

The 2010 elections only exacerbated the party polarization and partisan war in the Senate.<sup>38</sup> While the other Republicans appeared to behave a bit more like the Gingrich Senators, the introduction of the Tea Party Senators provided reinforcements in the battle. The year 2011 may very well be an inflection point from the Gingrich Senators being distinct in the Republican Conference to them taking over the strategy of the conference in an all out battle with Democrats not on substantive grounds, but on partisan grounds. While the Gingrich Senators may have led the fight, the Democrats, including President Obama, have shown that they will not back down.

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<sup>37</sup> As quoted in David M. Drucker, September 19, 2011, “Independence Could Stall Alexander’s Rise,” *Roll Call*, pgs.1 and 12.

<sup>38</sup> Through the 2010 elections, the Gingrich Senators not only transformed the Senate, but also, as it turns out, the Republican Conference in the Kansas Legislature. Brownback, who was elected its governor in 2010, took the lessons of the Gingrich Senators to the state legislature. When Republican moderates, in the tradition of Senators Bob Dole and Nancy Kassebaum dared to cross him, he vowed revenge: “We cannot continue on this path and hope we can move forward and win the future. It won’t work. We have to change course, and we’re going to have to be aggressive about it or we are doomed to a slow decline.” Nine of them faced primary challengers in 2012. Quote from Annie Gowen, December 21, 2011, “In Kansas, Gov. Sam Brownback Puts Tea Party Tenets into Action with Sharp Cuts,” *The Washington Post*, p.xx.

## Appendix: The 40 Gingrich Senators

Name	State	Senate		House of Representative	
		Tenure	Ideology <sup>1</sup>	Tenure	Ideology
Allard	Colorado	105-110	0.613	102-104	0.597
Allen	Virginia	107-109	0.407	102	0.474
Blunt	Missouri	112-present	*	105-111	0.602
Boozman	Arkansas	112-present	*	107-111	0.521
Brown	Colorado	102-104	0.543	97-101	0.456
Brownback	Kansas	105-111	0.459	104	0.546
Bunning	Kentucky	106-111	0.630	100-105	0.505
Burr	North Carolina	109-present	0.579	104-108	0.445
Chambliss	Georgia	108-present	0.518	104-107	0.427
Coats	Indiana	101-105, 112-present	0.407	97-100	0.297
Coburn	Oklahoma	109-present	0.907	104-106	0.815
Craig	Idaho	102-110	0.512	97-101	0.487
Crapo	Idaho	106-present	0.493	103-105	0.523
DeMint	South Carolina	109-present	0.831	106-108	0.704
DeWine	Ohio	104-109	0.192	98-101	0.343
Ensign	Nevada	107-112	0.554	104-105	0.635
Graham	South Carolina	108-present	0.473	104-107	0.477
Gramm <sup>2</sup>	Texas	99-107	0.561	98	0.548
Grams	Minnesota	104-106	0.526	103	0.530
Gregg	New Hampshire	103-111	0.429	97-100	0.412
Heller	Nevada	112-present	*	110-112	0.646
Hutchinson	Arkansas	105-107	0.457	103-104	0.412
Inhofe	Oklahoma	104-present	0.689	100-103	0.475
Isakson	Georgia	109-present	0.504	106-108	0.500
Kirk	Illinois	111-present	0.333	107-111	0.453
Kyl	Arizona	104-present	0.616	100-103	0.527
Mack	Florida	101-106	0.407	98-100	0.520
McCain	Arizona	100-present	0.371	98-99	0.302
Moran	Kansas	112-present	*	105-111	0.494
Portman	Ohio	112-present	*	103-109	0.447
Roberts	Kansas	105-present	0.399	97-104	0.407
Santorum	Pennsylvania	104-109	0.373	102-103	0.294
Smith	New Hampshire	102-107	0.747	99-101	0.545
Sununu	New Hampshire	108-110	0.423	105-107	0.634
Talent	Missouri	108-109	0.305	103-106	0.455
Thomas	Wyoming	104-110	0.525	101-103	0.396
Thune	South Dakota	109-present	0.509	105-107	0.358
Toomey	Pennsylvania	112-present	*	106-108	0.795
Vitter	Louisiana	109-present	0.623	106-108	0.550
Wicker	Mississippi	110-present	0.444	104-110	0.487

\* Ideology scores are not computed until the senator completes at least one congress.

<sup>1</sup> Ideology is measured by the average DW-NOMINATE scores.

<sup>2</sup> Gramm was first elected as a Democrat to the 96th Congress. In January 1983, he resigned his seat, switched parties, and won reelection as a Republican. The data analysis includes only his service as a Republican.

## Appendix: The 5 Tea Party Senators

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<b>Name</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Tenure</b>	<b>Senate Ideology<sup>1</sup></b>
Johnson	Wisconsin	112-present	*
Lee	Utah	112-present	*
Paul	Kentucky	112-present	*
Rubio	Florida	112-present	*
Toomey	Pennsylvania	112-present	*

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\* Ideology scores are not computed until the senator completes at least one congress.

<sup>1</sup> Ideology is measured by the average DW-NOMINATE scores.

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**Table 1: DeMint Campaign Contributions to Senate Candidates, 2010.**

<b>Candidate</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Leadership PACs*</b>	<b>Coordinated through SFC*</b>	<b>State GOP Committees*</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>General Election Winners</b>					
Marco Rubio	Florida	\$10,000	\$573,000	\$250,000	\$833,000
Johnny Isakson	Georgia	\$5,000			\$5,000
Dan Coats	Indiana	\$5,000			\$5,000
Jerry Moran	Kansas	\$5,000			\$5,000
Rand Paul	Kentucky	\$5,000	\$258,000	\$150,000	\$413,000
Richard Burr	N. Carolina	\$5,000			\$5,000
John Thune	N. Dakota	\$7,500			\$7,500
Rob Portman	Ohio	\$5,000			\$5,000
Tom Coburn	Oklahoma		\$13,136 ^		\$13,136
Pat Toomey	Pennsylvania	\$5,000	\$304,000	\$150,000	\$459,000
Jim DeMint	S. Carolina	\$5,000		\$350,000	\$355,000
Mike Lee	Utah	\$10,000	\$302,000		\$312,000
Ron Johnson	Wisconsin	\$5,000	\$195,000		\$200,000
<b>General Election Losers</b>					
Joe Miller	Alaska	\$10,000	\$570,000	\$100,000	\$680,000
Carly Fiorina	California	\$2,500			\$2,500
Ken Buck	Colorado	\$10,000	\$871,000	\$250,000	\$1,131,000
Christine O'Donnell	Delaware	\$10,000	\$505,000	\$250,000	\$765,000
Sharon Angle	Nevada	\$5,000	\$682,000	\$156,000	\$843,000
Dino Rossi	Washington	\$5,000	\$326,000	\$100,000	\$431,000
John Raese	W. Virginia	\$5,000	\$70,000		\$75,000
<b>Primary Losers</b>					
Chuck Devore	California	\$5,000	\$33,776 ^		\$38,776
Marlin Stutzman	Indiana	\$5,000	\$121,808 ^		\$126,808
Ovide Lamontagne	New Hampshire	\$5,000	\$1,125 ^	\$100,000	\$106,125
<b>Total</b>		<b>\$135,000</b>	<b>\$4,825,845</b>	<b>\$1,856,000</b>	<b>\$6,816,845</b>

\* Leadership PAC direct contributions from FEC; Coordinated through Senate Conservative Fund (SCF) from the SCF website; State GOP Victory Committee contributions from SCF website.

^ Coordinated through SCF from the FEC.


**Table 2: Polarization Scores for Republicans, 2011.**

Rank	Name	Score*	Category	Rank	Name	Score*	Category
1	PAUL	1.000	Tea Party Senator	25	SHELBY	0.462	Other Republican
2	LEE	0.987	Tea Party Senator	26	GRAHAM	0.454	Gingrich Senator
3	DEMINT	0.872	Gingrich Senator	27	GRASSLEY	0.444	Other Republican
4	COBURN	0.857	Gingrich Senator	28	BOOZMAN	0.439	Gingrich Senator
5	JOHNSON	0.751	Tea Party Senator	29	COATS	0.431	Gingrich Senator
6	INHOFE	0.733	Gingrich Senator	30	ROBERTS	0.431	Gingrich Senator
7	ENSIGN <sup>#</sup>	0.718	Gingrich Senator	31	WICKER	0.428	Gingrich Senator
8	TOOMEY	0.641	Tea Party Senator and Gingrich Senator	32	JOHANNIS	0.424	Other Republican
9	VITTER	0.623	Gingrich Senator	33	PORTMAN	0.421	Gingrich Senator
10	ENZI	0.612	Other Republican	34	MORAN	0.410	Gingrich Senator
11	BARRASSO	0.605	Other Republican	35	MCCAIN	0.404	Gingrich Senator
12	RISCH	0.599	Other Republican	36	CORKER	0.391	Other Republican
13	RUBIO	0.597	Tea Party Senator	37	HUTCHISON	0.383	Other Republican
14	CRAPO	0.592	Gingrich Senator	38	COCHRAN	0.343	Other Republican
15	SESSIONS	0.577	Other Republican	39	HATCH	0.342	Other Republican
16	KYL	0.576	Gingrich Senator	40	HOEVEN	0.321	Other Republican
17	BURR	0.560	Gingrich Senator	41	BLUNT	0.310	Gingrich Senator
18	CORNBYN	0.551	Other Republican	42	KIRK	0.282	Gingrich Senator
19	CHAMBLISS	0.531	Gingrich Senator	43	ALEXANDER	0.276	Other Republican
20	AYOTTE	0.521	Other Republican	44	LUGAR	0.237	Other Republican
21	MCCONNELL	0.512	Other Republican	45	MURKOWSKI	0.211	Other Republican
22	ISAKSON	0.481	Gingrich Senator	46	BROWN	0.125	Other Republican
23	THUNE	0.479	Gingrich Senator	47	SNOWE	0.041	Other Republican
24	HELLER <sup>#</sup>	0.474	Gingrich Senator	48	COLLINS	0.040	Other Republican


\*Polarization Score based on Poole-Rosenthal Common Space DW-NOMINATE Scores for 2011.

<sup>#</sup>Ensign, a Gingrich Senator, was replaced by Heller, a fellow Gingrich Senator, when he resigned in May, 2011.


**Figure 1: Polarization Scores for the Democrats, Gingrich Senators, and the Other Republicans, 93rd to 111th Congress (1973-2010).**



**Figure 2: Polarization Scores based on Roll-Call Votes in 2011.**



**Figure 3: Presidential Support Scores of Democrats, Other Republicans, Gingrich Senators, and, Tea Party Senators, GHW Bush to Obama (1989-2011).**



**Figure 4: Amendments offered by Democrats, Other Republicans, Gingrich Senators, and Tea Party Senators, 101st to 112th Congresses (1993-2011).**

